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This case involved a warranty deed, subject to a "reserved life estate,"
executed by Alfred and Lillie May Williams to their son Walter. The fol-
lowing clause in the deed gave rise to the issue treated by this note:
As a part of the consideration for the sale of this real estate, the
second party binds and obligates himself to provide a suitable home
for first parties,... as long as they both live, with all necessities
of life, including food, clothing, shelter, luxuries, medical and hos-
pital attention, drugs and any other items necessary to the comfort
and maintenance of first parties. In the event second party fails to
fully and faithfully comply with this provision and obligation, title
to the above described premises shall revert to first parties,* and in
such event second party shall forfeit any and all payments made
by him upon the purchase price of said real estate.2
After the parents' death, two of Walter's sisters brought this action
to set aside the deed. They sought to invoke the reverter clause on the
grounds that Walter did not faithfully comply with his obligation to pro-
vide for his parents. Defendant pleaded compliance with the terms of the
deed and substantial cash consideration.3 Judgment was for defendant in
the trial court.
The significant issue on appeal was whether the rights retained by
the grantors under the forfeiture clause were "personal to the grantors"4
(as the trial court held), or whether they could form the basis of a suit by
the heirs of the grantor. The Missouri Supreme Court decided this issue in
favor of the plaintiff sisters, holding that the heirs can bring suit to enforce
a "reverter for breach of condition."5
The *deed in question purported to convey an estate in fee simple
to the grantee to commence in possession on the death of the survivor of the
grantors. Although commonly referred to as a "reserved life estate," the
possessory estate retained by the grantors was, strictly speaking, an estate
in fee simple which was defeasible by a springing executory interest in fee
1. 456 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 329.
3. Id. Defendant also argued (1) that the provisions for support and for a
reverter were personal to the grantors and may not be enforced by the heirs;
()2 that plaintiffs had failed to join all necessary parties -in that they omitted
a sister (who was present and testified); and (3) that the remedy should have
been sought in ejectment and not in a suit to cancel. Id. at 30.
4. Id. at 330.
5. Id. at 332.
(94)
1
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
RECENT CASES
simple created in the grantee by the deed.6 In addition to their present pos-
sessory estate in fee simple defeasible, the grantors retained the possibility of
reacquiring the full fee simple absolute if the grantee failed to provide for
them as specified in the quoted clause. Breach of the requirements of this
clause would have to occur during the lifetime of the survivor of the
grantors. If the springing executory interest of the grantee terminated auto-
matically upon breach of the requirements of the quoted clause, the surviving
grantor owned the fee simple absolute at his death and this passed, upon
that death, to the heirs of the survivor. If, on the other hand, the springing
executory interest of the grantee did not terminate automatically upon
breach of the requirements of the quoted clause, the court's conclusion that
the heirs of the surviving grantor could elect to terminate it would seem to
effectuate the intent of the grantors. Unless someone other than the grantors
could enforce the clause, no one could do so for a breach which occurred
during the last illness of the surviving grantor.
If the springing executory interest of the grantee was not to terminate
automatically upon breach of the quoted clause, the right or power to
terminate it retained by the grantors resembled a right of entry on breach
of condition subsequent. However, it was not strictly that because the
grantors retained both seisin and possession for their lives and so could not
enter upon themselves. Their right or power to terminate the grantee's
springing executory interest upon his breach of the requirements of the
quoted clause was probably a reserved power of revocation. Such a power
may be created so as to be exercisable by the heirs of the grantor who
creates it.7 Powers of revocation are common in instruments creating active
trusts but rare in warranty deeds. This being so, it is not surprising that
the court, while reaching a correct result, had difficulty with terminology.
The springing executory interest in fee simple granted in the principal
case was not absolute, but rather was qualified by the forfeiture clause.
Thus, the future estate conveyed was a fee simple defeasible-"an estate
in fee simple which is subject to a special limitation, a condition subse-
quent, an executory limitation or a combination of these restrictions."8
For the purposes of this discussion, two types of fee simple defeasible are of
interest: the fee simple determinable and the fee simple on condition sub-
sequent.9
6. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 46, Illustrations 2, 12 (1936).
7. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335; 1 E. SUGDEN, A PRACTICAL TnRA-
TisE OF POWERS *159, *440-42. It is probable that such a reserved power of revo-
cation may be so created as to be exercisable by assignees of the original donee of
the power. See How v. Whitfield, 1 Ventr. 338, 339, 86 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1679);
1 E. SuGDEN, A PRACrICAL Ta.TISE OF POWERS *153. Powers of revocation did
not exist at common law; they were recognized by courts of law only after the
enactment of the Statute of Uses, and then only when, as in the case under dis-
cussion, they were powers to revoke executory interests, which are permitted
at law only because of that statute.
The validity of a power of revocation reserved in a conveyance of a spring.
ing executory interest in fee simple to commence in possession at the grantor's
death was recognized in St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260
S.W.2d 483 (En Banc 1953), and Julius v. Buckner, 452 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1970).
8. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note §§ 44-58, at 117 (1936).
9. The third form of fee simple defeasible, the fee simple subject to execu-
tory limitation, resembles the fee simple determinable in that, on the fulfillment of
1972.]
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The fee simple determinable or fee simple on special limitation' 0
is a fee simple defeasible estate which ends automatically in accordance
with the limitation expressed in the terms of the conveyance." The restric-
tion contained in the conveyance is termed a "special limitation." The in-
terest retained by the grantor of a fee simple determinable is termed a
possibility of reverter.12 For example, a conveyance by A to "B and his
heirs so long as the Governor's Mansion shall stand" gives B a fee simple
determinable and leaves a possibility of reverter in A.
On the other hand, "a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent
exists when the fee simple is subject to a power in the grantor to terminate
the estate granted on the happening of a specified event"'-the condition
subsequent. When a present estate is conveyed, the interest retained by the
grantor is termed a right of re-entry or power of termination.14 A convey-
ance by A to "B and his heirs, but, if liquor shall ever be sold on the
premises conveyed, the grantor or his heirs may re-enter and terminate
the estate hereby conveyed" is an example of a fee simple on condition
subsequent. As Moynihan states:
The basic difference, therefore, between the fee simple determin-
able and the fee simple on condition subsequent is that the former
automatically expires by force of the special limitation, contained
in the instrument creating the estate, when the stated contingency
occurs, whereas the fee simple on condition subsequent continues
despite the breach of the specified condition until it is divested or
cut short by the exercise by the grantor of his power to terminate.'5
In discussing the defeasible fee created by the conveyance in the Polette
case, the court did not differentiate clearly between the determinable fee
and the fee on condition subsequent. The interest remaining in the grantor
was referred to as a reversion, a possibility of reverter, and a right of re-
entry16 The estate created was said to be subject to a condition subse-
quent,17 and the court cited with approval a prior Missouri case in which
the court had termed an estate of the type involved here a "base fee
determinable on a condition subsequent."'18
The court was inaccurate in referring to the interest remaining in the
grantor as a reversion.' 9 A reversion is defined as "the residue of an estate
the executory limitation, it automatically ends. It differs in that it terminates in
favor of some person other than the grantor of the estate. See L. SiMEs c A. SMITH.
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTEREsTs § 221 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SIMES:
SMITH].
10. Also referred to as a "base fee" or "determinable fee."
11. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 95 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as MOYNIHAN]; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note
§§ 44-58 (1986); SIMEs & SMITH, § 281.
12. Authorities cited note 11 supra.
13. MOYNIHAN, at 36. See also SIms Sc SMITH, § 242.
14. SIMES & SMITH, § 241.
15. MOYNIHAN, at 36-87.
16. 456 S.W.2d at 881.
17. Id.
18. Id., citing Davis v. Austin, 848 Mo. 1094, 156 S.W.2d 903 (1941).
19. For other cases in which the Missouri Supreme Court has misapplied the
term "reversion" with respect to the interest remaining in the grantor of a fee
[Vol. 37
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left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of
some particular estate granted out by him."20 A reversion remains in the
grantor only after he conveys an estate less than that which he holds. For
example, when a grantor holding in fee simple conveys an estate for life,
he holds a reversion in fee simple which becomes possessory upon the
death of the life tenant. Thus, there can be no reversion after the convey-
ance of a fee simple as the grantor has conveyed his entire estate.21 Another
way of stating this proposition is to say that a reversion is a future interest
retained by a grantor which is to become a possessory estate upon the ex-
piration of an estate tail, estate for life or estate for years created by the
same instrument.
The other terms used by the court to describe the grantor's remaining
interest apply to the fee simple defeasible. But, as indicated above, the
court used some language applicable to the determinable fee (reverter,
possibility of reverter) and some which is applicable to the fee on condition
subsequent (right of re-entry, power of termination, or power of revocation
on breach of condition subsequent). The Missouri courts are not alone in
this practice of blurring the distinction between determinable fees and
fees on condition subsequent.22 Indeed, the language used in conveyances
often makes it -very difficult to determine which was intended. In many
cases, including that under review, it is unimportant to the result.
Since the-opinion is not dear as to whether the springing executory
interest of the. grantee was on condition subsequent or terminated auto-
matically, it is appropriate to go over the criteria which should be used
to resolve this question.23
First of all, there is no express formula or closely defined rule of con-
struction used to distinguish a determinable fee from a fee on condition
subsequent. 2 4 Generally, words indicating a special limitation (determin-
able fee) are "while," "during," "until," "so long as" and words of like
import.25 Words indicating a fee on condition subsequent are said to be
simple estate, see Davis v. Austin, 348 Mo. 1094, 156 S.W.2d 903 (1941); Univer-
sity City v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 347 Mo. 814, 149 S.W.2d 321 (1941); Keller v.
Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157 (1936); Church of the Holy Ghost v. Schreiber,
277 Mo. 113, 209 S.W. 914 (1918); and Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute, 264
Mo. 713, 175 S.W. 571 (En Banc 1915).
20. 2 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTAMES 275. See also SIMms S SMrrH, § 81.
21. Indeed, not since the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290 has it been per-
missible to retain a'reversion after granting a fee simple. See MOYNIHAN, at 94.
22. See, e.g., Fuhr v. Oklahoma City, 194 Okla. 482, 153 P.2d 115 (1944);
Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E.2d 495 (1951). See also 26 C.J.S. Deeds§ 147b (1956).
23. Though the opinion is unclear as to terminology, the effect of the court's
holding was that a fee simple on condition subsequent was created, since the
court stated re-entry was necessary to bring about a forfeiture.
24. In Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo. App. 197, 209-10 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878), aff'd,
72 Mo. 198 (1880), the lower court suggested that a good place to start in de-
ciphering the particular conveyance is to determine if the conveyance itself is
absolute and a condition is expressed separately (condition subsequent), or if
the limitation is inherent (determinable fee). The Missouri courts, however, have
not elaborated upon this in subsequent cases.
25. MoYNiHAN, at 99; SIMEs & SMITH, § 286, at 341. See also Duncan v. Acad-
emy of Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 350 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Mo. 1961); Chouteau v.
City of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 781, 790, 55 S.W.2d 299, 301 (En Banc 1932).
1972]
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"upon condition that," "provided that," or "but if," coupled with a pro-
vision for re-entry by the transferor on the occurrence of the stated
event.20 Application of this "hornbook" test does not furnish a definite
answer. The language of the Polette conveyance, "In the event," suggests
a condition subsequent. But, on the other hand, the grantor made no
reference to re-entry and the conveyance says "title... shall revert," both
of which suggest a determinable fee. However, the grantors could not
contemplate re-entry under the circumstances because they were to retain
seisin and possession for their lives.
The general rule that the intent of the parties executing a deed is to
be the most important factor in construing that deed (polar star rule of
construction) is applicable here.27 Even though the Missouri courts' state
that there is no requirement of a provision for re-entry to 'create a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent,28 it is at least arguable that the
conveyance here was intended to create a determinable fee by reason of
the grantors' failure to add a clause empowering them to revoke or ter-
minate the grantee's executory interest. The court, however, did not dis-
cuss this possibility.
Courts generally, and the'Missouri courts in particular, are hostile to
forfeiture clauses in deeds conveying a fee simple. 29 Most-courts prefer to
construe restrictions and qualifications in conveyances as (1) a mere recital
of the purpose of the conveyance which does not restrict the estate conveyed
or the conduct of the grantee; (2)- a covenant or equitable use restriction;
(3) a fee simple subject to condition subsequent; 'or (4y a determinable
fee.3 0 Though the Missouri courts have not clearly expounded on this rule,
it appears they follow it in spirit. It may be noted in passing that, while
the determinable fee construction is usually the most adviantageous to a
grantor in fee, the condition subsequent construction is most advantageous
to a lessor for years because it gives him an option of not terminating
the lease, including the lessee's -obligation to pay rent, upon breach of con-
dition.
26. MOYNIHAN, at 104; SrMis 8s Si n-, § 247, at 280. See also Stilwell v. St.
Louis & H. Ry., 39 Mo. App. 221, 227 (St. L. Ct. App. 1890).
27. See Haydon v. St. Louis &c S.F.R.R., 222 Mo. 126, 139, 121 S.W. 15, 18,(1909), in which the Missouri Supreme Court said: "It is also true that the ques-
tion whether a clause in a deed- is a condition ... is one of intent to be gathered
from the whole instrument by following out the object and spirit of the deed or
contract." Accord, Holekamp Lumber -Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 173 S.W.2d
938 (Mo. 1943); Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157 .(1936);, Long v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 332 Mo. 288, 57 S.W.2d 1071 (1933).
28. See MOYNIHAN, at 105, and SiMEs & STn,=, § 248, for authority moving
away from the traditional view that it is possible to create a conditional fee with-
out an express re-entry clause. Missouri, however, still follows the traditional view.
See Duncan v. Academy of Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 350 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Mo.
1961); Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute, 264 Mo. 713, 723, 175 S.W. 571, 572
(En Banc 1915); Smith v. Eagle Coal & Merc. Co., 170 Mo. App. 27, 34, 155 S.W.
886, 888 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913).
29. SiMms & SMrrH, §248.
30. Id. " .. .
[Vol. 37
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Numerous Missouri cases hold that conditions subsequent are dis-
favored. 3' Due to the difficulties with terminology in this area, it is not
dear if by these statements the Missouri court really means just conditions
subsequent are not. favored or, by misuse of the term condition subsequent,
means both conditions subsequent and determinable fees are disfavored.
This possibility is raised because nowhere in the Missouri cases does one
find a statement -of the logical counterpart to the rule disfavoring condi-
tions subsequent: that determinable fees are also disfavored. (Of course,
such *a statement • is unnecessary if the term condition subsequent encom-
passes both.) The Missouri courts apparently hold the determinable fee
in even less'favor 'than the fee simple on condition subsequent.8 2
The preseht state of the Missouri law in this area is confusing and
needs to be ceared up.3 3 The Missouri court should state and adhere to
a reasonable and predictable method of differentiation between the fee
simple determinable and the fee simple on condition subsequent. The dis-
tinction between a determinable fee and a fee simple on condition subse-
quent is a' fundamental postulate of property law. The two estates have
been treated differently for a number of purposes because of the basic
distinction between the two-the forfeiture is automatic in the case of a
fee simple determinable while re-entry with intent to cause a forfeiture is
necessary to' cause 'forfeiture in the case of a fee simple on condition sub-
sequent. The f016wing examples
. 
poiht up the importance of distinguish-
ing between the two estates:'
(1) Upon the happening of the terminating event, the grantor of a
determinable fee has an immediate cause of action for waste and right to
possession while the grantor of a fee simple on condition subsequent must
re-enter to enjoy the benefits.3 4
(2) Traditionally the possibility of reverter has been held to be alien-
31. 'In Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute, 264 Mo. 713, 723, 175 S.W. 571,
572-73 '(En Banc 1915), the court said: "While a condition subsequent may be in-
serted in a conveyance of lands ... no such conclision will be drawn, if it may
be avoided by any' other reasonable. construction of the language of the deed."
See also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 234 Mo. 144, 136 S.W. 411 (1911), and Haydon v.
St. Louis kS.F.R.R., 222 Mo. 126, 121 S.W. 15 (1909).
82. It is possible that the pieferente operated (silently) to produce this result
in the case under' discussion. Indeed, this conveyance might be a good one on
which to rely on a preference because, since it is somewhat ambiguous, operation
of the preferefice does not produce results which openly violate rules of construc-
tion.
33. Although, as illustrated in the cases cited in note 7 supra, the Missouri
court has misused 'terminology in reference to the types of defeasible fees, there
are some cases in 'which the court has had n6'difficulty in discussing these par-
ticular estates accurately. See Donehue v. Nilges, 864 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553(1954); Boaid'v. Nevada School Dist., 363 Mo. 328, 251 S.W.2d 20 (1952); White
v. Kentling, 345 'Mo. 526, 134 S.W.2d 39 (1940); Keller v: Keller. 338 Mo. 731,
92 S.W,2d'157 (1936).
34. For a detailed discussion of such differentiation, see Dunham, Possibility
of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHi.
L. RFuv. 215, 218 (1953).
197,2]•
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able inter vivos while the right of re-entry has been heldnQt to be.3 5 The
trend, however, is to erase this distinction.36
(3) While the majority position today is that the.statute of limitations
begins running against the holder of either a determinable fee or fee
simple subject to condition subsequent on the occurrence of the terminat-
ing event,3 7 it has been held that the statute of limitations does not run
against the holder of a fee simple on condition subsequent until he has
exercised this right of re-entry.3 8
(4) It has been held that a right of re-entry can be released while a
possibility of reverter cannot.8 0
(5) There is authority to suggest that, in some jurisdictions, an at-
tempt to transfer a right of entry on condition subsequent will result in
destruction of that interest while an attempted transfer of a possibility of
reverter is simply ineffective.40
(6) The defenses of waiver and estoppel apply to the fee simple on
condition subsequent but not to the determinable fee.4 1
Though some differences in the two estates have been judicially elimi-
nated, 42 the fee simple determinable and the fee simple on condition
subsequent remain today as two separate and distinct entities. This should
be made dear.
R. THOmAS DAY
35. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 159-61 (1936). Polette contains dictum that
both possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition subse-
quent to terminate estates in fee simple are "not alienable, assignable, or de-
visable." 456 S.W.2d at 331. See Fratcher, Exorcise the Curse of Reversionary Pos-
sibilities, 28 J. Mo. B. 34, 36, 38 (1972).
36. See Dunham, supra note 34, at 221.
37. Id. at 229. For many years Missouri had legislation requiring action to en-
force a right of entry to be commenced within ten years after the breach of condi-
tion. See, e.g., Mo. Laws 1847, at 94, § 2. This legislation was applied in Tower
v. Compton Hill Imp. Co., 192 Mo. 379, 91 S.W. 104 (1905), and Hoke v. Central
Twp. Farmers Club, 194 Mo. 576, 91 S.W. 394 (1906). This legislation having
been repealed (by Mo. Laws 1909, at 661), it would seem that the statute of limi-
tations does not begin to run against the holder of a right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent until he elects to exercise it. Cf. Robinson v. Cannon, 346
Mo. 1126, 145 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
38. City of New York v. Coney Island Fire Dep't, 170 Misc. 787, 10 N.Y.S.2d
164 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
39. See O'Connell, Estates on Condition Subsequent and Estates on Special
Limitation in Oregon, 18 ORE. L. Rzv. 63 (1939).
40. See Comment, Property-Fee Simple Determinables-Distinguishing Char-
acteristics, 71 W. VA. L. Rav. 367, 374 (1969).
41. See Williams, Restrictions on Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and
Determinable Fees, 27 TExAs L. Rxv. 158 (1948).
Even a cursory examination of the above noted references indicates the com-
plexity of the legal differentiation between the determinable fee and the fee
simple on condition subsequent. For the view that much of the differentiation is
disappearing, see Dunham, supra note 34.
42. E.g., at one time it was held that determinable fees were inheritable and
devisable while the fee simple on condition subsequent was not. See Comment, supra
note 40, at 375. Also, in the past it was held that a possibility of reverter passed
by representation while a right of re-entry passed by descent. See Ferrier, De-
terminable Fees and Fees Upon Conditions Subsequent in California, 24 CALIF.
L. REv. 512 (1936).
[Vol. 37
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CREDITOR'S REMEDIES-THE ACCOUNT STATED
Watkins Products, Inc. v. Peek'
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract which provided that
plaintiff would supply defendant with merchandise on credit and defendant,
as sales agent, would sell the merchandise to customers. Either party could
terminate the contract upon proper notice and in the event termination
took place, the plaintiff agreed to accept a return of any unsold mer-
chandise sent to one of the cities designated in the contract. The con-
tract was properly terminated, and the defendant signed a statement agree-
ing that she owed plaintiff a certain sum. The defendant offered to return
the merchandise to an unauthorized city, but plaintiff rejected this offer.
Defendant then refused to pay the balance due and plaintiff brought this
action on. the account stated. At the close of the evidence plaintiff asked
for a directed verdict. The trial court refused and the jury found for the
defendant. 2 On appeal, the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that because there was uncontradicted evidence of
an account stated plaintiff should have recovered as a matter of law.3
This case is not unique and it promulgated no new law. It is presented
here as a vehicle to examine the seemingly little used cause of action
known as an account stated. In defining an account stated, the Watkins
court quoted from Gerstner v. Lithocraft Studios, Inc.:4 "[A]n account
stated is said to be created when the parties, having had financial transac-
tions between them, arrive at an agreement as to the balance due and
the party debtor acknowledges his obligation and promises to pay."15
At common law the action on an account stated was developed for
merchants dealing between themselves.6 Periodically, they would balance
their accounts and the resulting debtor would recognize the amount of
the debt and .agree to pay the same. If the debtor did not satisfy the debt,
the creditor could sue upon a new and independent cause of action known
as an account stated.7 At first the action was limited to merchants,8 but
1. 461 S.W.2d 341 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
2. Id. at 342.
3. Id. at 344.
4. 258 S.W.2d 250, 253 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953).
5. 461 S.W.2d at 344.
6. In Daxmeron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 250, 219 S.W. 954, 957 (1920), the
court noted that at one time the action on an account stated was limited to mer-
chants. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accounts & Accounting § 23 (1962); Note, Account
Stated Revisited, 14 SYFAcusE L. Rv. 653 (1963).
7. Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S.W. 954 (1920); McCormick v. Inter-
state Consol. Rapid-Transit Ry., 154 Mo. 191, 55 S.W. 252 (1900); Koegel v. Givens,
79 Mo. 77 (1883); Brown v. Kimmel, 67 Mo. 450 (1878); Cape Girardeau & State
Line R.R. v. Kimmel, 58 Mo. 84 (1874); Shepard v. Bank of Mo., 15 Mo. 143 (1851);
Watkins Products, Inc. v. Peek, 461 S.W.2d 341 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Gerstner v.
Lithocraft Studios, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 250 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Conkling v.
Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co., 20 S.W.2d 564 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929);
Kansas City Commercial Photo View Co. v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 208 Mo. App.
255, 253 S.W. 947 (K.C. Ct. App. 1921); Barr v. Lake, 147 Mo. App. 252, 126 S.W.
755 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910); Mulford v. Caesar, 53 Mo. App. 263 (St. L. Ct. App.
1893); Pickel v. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce Ass'n, 10 Mo. App. 191 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1881), afrd, 80 Mo. 65 (1883).
8. See note 6 supra.
1972]
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in Missouri, as in most states, it has been made available to any parties
having a debtor-creditor relationship.9 For example, it includes banker
and depositor,'0 principa'l ind agent," partners,' 2 and attorney and
client.' 3
An account stated must be based upon some valid prior transaction
and the consideration for that transaction is. the .consideration for the
account stated.14 Therefore, the lack of a valid prior transaction, i.e., a
contract which was illegal or void,15 is a good defense as is the. lack of
consideration in the initial transaction.' 0 Although these factors. are essen-
tial in order to establish an .account stated, however, the most important
requirement is an agreement between the parties as to the. balance due.' 7
If the agreement is express it may be eithdr oial or -in writing,'8 and,
if in writing, does not need to be signed. 9 It might take the form of a
promissory note but more likely it will be an agreement on: the amount
due.20 Once the agreement is made the law presumes that the debtor
promises to pay that amount.2 ' In Watkins, the defendant sighed and
9. In Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 250, 219- S.W. 954,.957 (1920), the
court said: "[T]he doctrine of settled or' stated accounts altliough applied originally
only to dealings between merchants, has been extended to other "dasses of 'persons
who had business relations-a ruling since followed." See cases cited-note 7 supra.
10. Shepard v. Bank of Mo., 15 Mo. 144 (1851). The defendant-bank used
account stated as a defense to an action brought by the plaintiff-depositor..
11. Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S.W. 954 (1920). The agent, as
principal's farm manager, recovered against the principal on account stated.
12. Barcus v. Cole, 250 S.W. 629 (K.C. Mo. App. 1923). Account stated, was
used by one partner against the deceased partner's estate after partiership dis-
solution.
13. 1 Am. JuR. 2D Accounts & Accounting § 23 (1962). -
14. Gerstner v. Lithocraft Studios, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 250, 253 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1953); Barr v. Lake, 147 Mo. App. 252, 126 S.W. 755 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
15. Price v. Barnes' Estate, 300 Mo. 216, 254 S.W. 33 (1923). The account
stated was based on a gambling transaction and was, therefore, unenforceable.
Accord, Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker, 202 Mo.-App. 81, 214 S.W. 216
(St. L. Ct. App. 1919).
16. See cases cited note 14 supra. RESTATEMENT OF CONTActs 4 22, comment
j at 795 (1932) provides (in part): "Obvious insufficiency of consideration also in-
validates an account stated."
17. Account Stated Revisited, supra note 6, at 654.
18. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACIS § 422, comment c at 795 (1932) provides:
It is not essential that an account shall be stated in a particular form.
Any evidence indicating assent by a debtor to his creditor that a stated
amount is that due the creditor, is ground for implying a promise by the
debtor. Express statements are not essential; inferences from conduct are
enough. So that retention of a statement of account without objection for
more than a reasonable time, implies consent to its correctness.. Though
it is usually the creditor who submits a statement df.account, it.may be
the debtor.
19. Id.
20. See I AMr. JUR. 2D. Accounts tr Accounting. § 24 (1962); Account Stated
Revisited, supra note 6, at 654-55.
21. In Koegel v. Givens, 79 Mo. 77 (1883), the court said: "[Oln proof of
the settlement having been made (which fact the jury found for the plaintiff),
the law would raise by implication a promise to pay the debtor party." Id. at 80.
Accord, Conkling v. Henry Quellmalz Lumber 8: Mfg. Co., 20 SW.2d 564 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1929).
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returned a statement to the plaintiff which read "I have verified the above
statement of my account and find it correct. ' 22 The court noted that this
was an express acknowledgement of the amount due and said: "[W]hen
the :original debt is acknowledged... a new cause of action known as an
account stated arises between the parties."
23
Although not exemplified in Watkins, an account stated can arise
by the implied assent or acknowledgement of the debtor24 This can occur
when the creditor sends the debtor an account due. If the debtor retains
the statement and does not object to it within a reasonable time, he is
presumed to have agreed to the balance due.25 However, there are several
exceptions to this rule. For example, if the debtor is a receiver, executor
or administrator 6, an express agreement is necessary.27 It is also important
to note that implied assent- creates only a prima fade case, 28 and courts
will usually be very liberal in allowing the debtor to explain why he did
not object to the rendered account.29
In making a case on implied assent, one of the main issues is the
length of time the debtor must retain the statement before his assent is
implied. It..has. been .held "that whether on a given state of facts, the
transaction amounts to an account stated, is a question of law and not
of fact.''30 This means that the court must decide what constitutes a rea-
sonable time, lapse,3 1 and the court will usually look to all the circum-
stances in making this decision.3 2 Thus, the court may consider the nature
of the transaction, the type and custom of the business, the number of
previous transactions between the parties and any other circumstances it
deems relevant.3 3
22. 461 S.W.2d at 342-43.
23. Id. at 344.
24. Powell v. Pacific R.R., 65 Mo. 658 '(1877); Watkins Products, Inc. v.
Peek, 461 S.W.2d 341 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Kansas City Commercial Photo View
Co. v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 208 Mo. App. 255, 233 S.W. 947 (K.C. Ct. App.
1921).
25. In Conkling v. Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co., 20 S.W.2d 564
(St. L. Mo. App. 1929), plaintiff sent defendant an account showing a certain
sum due plaintiff. Defendant did not object to this account within a reasonable
time, and the court found an implied account stated. -See Brown v. Kimmel, 67
Mo. 430 (1878); Powell v. Pacific R.R., 65 Mo. 658 (1877).
26. 1 AM. JUR. 21 Accounts & Accounting § 31 (1962); Account Stated Re-
visited, supka. note'6, at 654.
27. 1 Am. JuR. 2n Accounts & Accounting § 31 (1962).
28. In Br6wn "v. Kimmel, 67 Mo. 430 (1878), the court stated: "In no case
has such implied admission been held to be an estoppel-but simply a prima fade
case throwing the burden-of contradiction or explanation on the adverse party."
Id. at 431. See Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S.W. 954 (1920).
29. Cases cited note 28 supra.
30. Powell v. Pacific R.R., 65 Mo. 658, 662 (1877).
81. Brown v. Kimmel, 67 Mo. 430 (1878); Powell v. Pacific R.R., 65 Mo. 659
(1877).
32. In' Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S.W. 954 (1920), the court said:
"What constitutes a reasonable time wherein to object depends on the circum-
stances of the particular case, and, as said, one circumstance is the local situation
of the: parties." Id: at 256, 219 S.W. at 957. Accord, Brown v. Kimmel. 67 Mo.
430 (1878).
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An account stated which arises by implied assent can only be used
by the creditor.34 The general rule is that if there is an express agreement
as to the balance due, the original debt is abrogated,3 5 and the account
stated may be used as a defense by the debtor.3 6 For instance, if a contractor
does work for an owner and they expressly agree on a balance due, this
account stated could be used as a defense to a quantum meruit action
by the contractor for a greater sum.3 7 On the other hand, if the account
stated is implied, the creditor may successfully assert a claim for a greater
amount on the underlying transactions or on quantum meruit.38 The
implied account stated can be used as evidence of the value of the work,
however.39
In practice the plaintiff must allege in the complaint that he and
defendant-debtor did agree on an amount due and that- the defendant
has not paid the account. 40 He may attach a copy of the statement to the
complaint, and need not plead or set out the original transaction. 4 ' The
defendant may plead a general denial or he may affirmatively plead fraud
or mistake.42
If the defendant pleads a general denial he may prove the nonexistence
of the account stated 43 by showing "payment, nonperformance, or im-
probability of agreement based on the whole transaction." 44 As mentioned
previously, the defendant may also show that the prior transaction on
34. In Kansas City Commercial Photo View Co. v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 208
Mo. App. 255, 233 S.W. 947 (K.C. Ct. App. 1921), plaintiff sued on an open
account. Defendant claimed the open account was converted into an account
stated because plaintiff sent defendant a statement to which defendant did not ob-ject within a reasonable time. The court, however, held that only the party who
rendered the statement could us.e the implied assent to establish an account stated.
35. In McCormick v. Interstate Consol. Rapid-Transit Ry., 154 Mo. 191, 55
S.W. 252 (1900), plaintiff sued on an open account and on quantum meruit for
services rendered. Defendant claimed that there had been a compromise for a les-
ser sum, an account stated. The court found there had been a settlement, and
therefore the plaintiff could only recover on the account stated.
36. McCormick v. Interstate Consol. Rapid Transit Ry., 154 Mo. 191, 55 S.W.
'252 (1900); Shepard v. Bank of Mo., 15 Mo. 144 (1851).
37. Shepard v. Bank of Mo., 15 Mo.. 144 (1851).
38. See note 34 supra.
39. Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N.Y. 50 (1879); Williams v. Glenny, 16 N.Y. 389
(1857); Account Stated Revisited, supra note 6, at 658.
40. Conkling v. Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co., 20 S.W.2d 564 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1929).
41. In Koegel v. Givens, 79 Mo. 77, 79 (1883), the court said: "To maintain
the action on account stated it was only necessary to prove that the settlement was
made." The court went on to say that the earlier transaction could be pleaded
to show the foundation of the settlement but that it need not be. Accord, Cape
,Girardeau & State Line R.R. v. Kimmel, 58 Mo. 84 (1874).
42. In Barr v. Lake, 147 Mo. App. 252, 126 S.W. 755 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910),
plaintiff sued on account stated, and the defendant answered with a general
-denial. The court said that this allowed defendant to show that no account stated
existed. This could be done by showing there had been no settlement or that the
parties never had any dealings. But the court said that fraud or mistake cannot be
'proved unless pleaded affirmatively.
43. Id.
44. Account Stated Revisited, supra note 6, at 658.
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which the account stated is based is void or illegal.45 Also, if the plaintiff
is relying on implied assent, defendant may explain why he did not object
to the account or attack the reasonableness of the time lapse.40
If the facts are uncontradicted that there is an account stated, the gen-
eral rule is that the debt is conclusive unless the defendant affirmatively
pleads and proves fraud or mistake.47 This means that the defendant
cannot show a breach of the original contract or that the work done under
the contract was unsatisfactory. 4s If defendant knows the account stated
is valid but that there is some mathematical inaccuracy he should plead
this affirmatively and set out the alleged mistake or fraud clearly in the
complaint. 49 Only then will the court open up the original transaction
and examine the individual items of the account. In Watkins, the de-
fendant tried to prove a breach of the original contract by plaintiff as a
defense against the account stated. The court found that there was no
breach and went further to say that this testimony was correctly excluded
by the trial court because "this was an account stated and it cannot be
avoided 'except on clear proof of fraud or mistake.' ,0
In conclusion, it would seem to be to a creditor's advantage to estab-
lish an account stated at the end of every transaction, especially where
there is an open account with numerous underlying transactions. It would
be advantageous because the action is simple to plead and prove and
supercedes many of the debtor's defenses under the original contract. The
account stated could be established by rendering the debtor a statement
at the close of every transaction with a request for a verification of the
amount due. If the debtor expressly acknowledges the statement as correct
or if he retains the statement and does not object to it an account stated
will arise. The simplicity of an account stated should be attractive to both
creditors and the practicing lawyer.
C. W. CRUMPECKER, JR.
45. Price v. Barnes' Estate, 300 Mo. 216, 254 S.W. 33 (1928); Elmore-Schultz
Grain Co. v. Stonebraker, 202 Mo. App. 81, 214 S.W. 216 (St. L. Ct. App. 1919).
46. Dameron v. Harris, 281 Mo. 247, 219 S.W. 954 (1920); Brown v. Kimmel,
67 Mo. 430 (1878).
47. See note 42 supra.
48. In Pickel v. St. Louis Chamber of Commerce Ass'n, 10 Mo. App. 191 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1881), aff'd, 80 Mo. 65 (1883), plaintiff-contractor sued on a promis-
sory note issued by defendant after the work was completed, in acknowledgement
of an account stated. The defendant counter-claimed for liquidated damages be-
cause plaintiff had delayed in completing the building. The court held that the
counterclaim was void and that the original transaction could not be reopened
except on clear proof of fraud or mistake.
49. Watkins Products, Inc. v. Peck, 461 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970);
Gerstner v. Lithocraft Studios, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 250 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
50. 461 S.W.2d at 344.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-IMPLIED FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
-STATES PRECLUDED FROM REGULATING RADIOACTIVE
EMISSIONS FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota1
On June 19, 1967, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) granted a
provisional permit to Northern States Power Company (Northern) to con-
struct a nuclear-fueled electric generating plant.2 The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency issued a waste disposal permit for the plant on May 20,
1969. On January 19, 1971, the AEC issued a provisional operating license
for the plant, under which it is currently operating. The company is acting
in compliance with all federal laws and with the radiation safety require-
ments of the AEC. However, the radioactive emission conditions imposed
by the Minnesota agency cover the same subject matter ("stack releases")
and are more stringent than those imposed by the AEC under federal law.3
The company is not in compliance with the state standards. Northern
brought suit in federal district court to obtain a judgment declaring Min-
nesota to be without authority to regulate radioactive releases to the en-
vironment. The issue was whether the United States government had pre-
empted the states from regulating radioactive releases from nuclear plants.
The district court held Minnesota was expressly pre-empted. 4 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, this decision
was affirmed on the basis of implied pre-emption.5 The court held that the
federal government had exclusive authority to regulate the construction
and operation of nuclear power plants,6 and this included exclusive regu-
lation of the levels of radioactive effluents discharged.
1. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S.
Nov. 12, 1971) (No. 71-650).
2. Id. at 1145. The permit was issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2134 (b) (1970), and the regulations contained in 10 C.F.R. § 50.1-.110
(1971).
3. Kenworthy, Who Should Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970,§ E at 2, col. 4 (city ed.), reported the AEC operating license would permit a
"stack release" of 41,400 curies a day, or over 15 million a year. The Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency permit set a limit of 860 curies a day or just over 300,000
a year-about 2% of the AEC standards. Northern States Power Company com-
plained that the state standards made economical operation of the plant impossible.
In the federal district court, it was stipulated that
an attempt by plaintiff to comply with the stricter state standards would
require substantial alterations in the present plant and that . . . some
of the equipment and facilities needed for systems necessary to attempt
compliance with the PCA permit would have to be designed and manu-
factured for the Monticello plant....
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F.Supp. 172, 174 (D. Minn. 1970).
On appeal, the court said:
[N]o physical impossibility of dual compliance with both the AEC and
Minnesota regulations governing radioactive discharges from the Monti-
cello plant is presented on this record. 447 F.2d at 1147.
4. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
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1. THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
The doctrine of pre-emption is based on the supremacy clause, which
states that the Constitution and federal acts "shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.' '7 On the other hand, the tenth amendment to the'Constitution
reserves all powers "not delegated to the United States by the (,onstitution
... to the states ... or to the people."8 Included in these powers is the
power to legislate for the public health and welfare. Minnesota's air pollu-
tion regulations dearly fall within these reserved powers as a measure to
protect the health of its citizens.9
Pre-emption arises when a state law will frustrate or interfere with the
operation of a federal statute or when Congress requires that the operation
of state law be suspended.1 0 When a state law directly conflicts with a
federal statute, the state law is invalid. However, it is a more difficult case
when there is no direct conflict. In resolving this difficulty, the Supreme
Court has used several principles in determining whether to *apply the
doctrine of pre-emption. An early case stated:
[I]n the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of
Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a re-
served power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and
positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently
stand together; and also that the act of Congress should have
been passed in the exercise of a dear power under the Constitu-
tion .. 
In Reid v. Colorado,12 this principle was reaffirmed and expanded to re-
quire the additional finding that Congress intended "to supersede or by its
legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States .... ." This
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
9. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Note, Juris-
diction-Atomic Energy-Federal Pre-emption and State Regulation of Radioactive
Air Pollution: Who is the Master of the Atomic Genie?, 68 Mica. L. REv. 1294,
1298 (1970).
10. Comment, Federal Pre-emption: Governmental Interests and the Role of
the Supreme Court, 1966 DuKE L.J. 484, 485. See also Note, Pre-emption as a Pref-
erential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1958).
11. Sinnot v. Commissioners of Pilotage, 63 U.S. 307, 312, 22 How. 227, 243
(1859). This quotation suggests the initial determination is whether Congress had
the power to enact the legislation. This issue was foreclosed in Northern because
it was conceded that Congress had the authority to enact the Atomic Energy Act
pursuant to a power granted by the Constitution, 447 F.2d at 1147. See Estep &
Adleman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations
Problem, 60 MICH L. REV. 41 (1961); Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety
Standards in Peacetime Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 MicH L. REv. 833
(1954).
12. 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902).
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principle has found its strongest and most consistent application in cases
where a state has legislated for the public health, welfare, and safety.13
However, the Supreme Court has stated in another case involving state and
federal conflict that no rigid formula can be used to determine the intent
of every act of Congress,14 and when the question is whether a federal act
overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must be considered.15
With these principles in mind, the question arises whether Northern de-
parts from the traditional pre-emption standards which have heretofore
governed in situations where a state has acted under its reserved powers to
promote the public health and safety.
The court of appeals listed three basic factors to be considered in deter-
mining the pre-emption question. First, state law is excluded where com-
pliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.16
The record contained no evidence of physical impossibility in complying
with both the AEC and Minnesota regulations governing radioactive dis-
charges,17 so this test was not applicable. Second, when Congress has un-
equivocally and expressly declared that the authority conferred by it shall
be exclusive, the state cannot exert regulatory authority over the activity.' 8
This principle was also not applicable in Northern because no provision
of the Atomic Energy Act expressly declares that the federal government
shall have the exclusive authority to regulate emissions from nuclear
plants.19 Finally, federal pre-emption may be implied even though Congress
has not expressly prohibited dual regulation nor unequivocally declared
its exclusionary exercise of authority over a particular subject matter.20 The
court used this principle to find pre-emption.
J1. FACTORS USED TO FIND IMPLIED FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
A. Legislative History
In Northern, the court used four key factors in determining whether
Congress has impliedly pre-empted an area and precluded state attempts at
dual regulation. The first of these is the aim and intent of Congress as
13. See Florida Lime 8. Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146,
rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963) (state regulation concerning oil content of
avocados was not pre-empted by federal marketing orders); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (municipal air pollution ordinance upheld);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (state warehouse laws pre-
empted by federal regulations); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (state law
to prevent fraud in sale of animal feed was upheld); Comment, supra note 10, at
484 n.8.
14. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
15. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
16. 447 F.2d at 1146; Florida Lime &- Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43, rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
son, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942).
17. 447 F.2d at 1147.
18. Id. at 1146; Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
19. 447 F.2d at 1147.
20. Id. at 1146; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330
U.S. 767 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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revealed by the statute itself and its legislative history.21 In 1946, the Atomic
Energy Act2 2 created a government monopoly over all nuclear facilities and
placed ownership of all nuclear facilities in the AEC as an agent for the
government. In 1954, the Act was revised to encourage private enterprise
to develop and utilize atomic energy for peaceful purposes by permitting
private industry to own nuclear production facilities.23 Otherwise, the
Commission retained exclusive control over such facilities. Then, in 1959,
the Act was amended to clarify the states' position in relation to the AEC
and the regulation of nuclear reactors.24 Section 2021 (b) now authorizes the
AEC to turn over certain regulatory activities to the states, including control
over radiation hazards which involve by-product, source and special nuclear
material not sufficient to form a critical mass.2 5
While agreeing that the Act prohibits total relinquishment of federal
control over nuclear power plants, Minnesota contended it does not prevent
the concurrent exercise of state control over nuclear facilities.2 6 The court
rejected this argument, finding that the statutory language of the 1959
amendment made it clear that Congress intended the AEC to possess sole
authority to regulate radiation hazards associated with by-products, source,
and special nuclear materials, as well as production and utilization facili-
ties.2 7 This included the discharge of radioactive effluents.2 8 In support
of this conclusion, the court reasoned that subsection (b) would be unneces-
sary if the states possessed concurrent jurisdiction since it allows the state
to regulate only those materials covered by the turn-over agreement.2 9
21. 447 F.2d at 1146; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 147-50, rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S.
297, 301-02 (1961).
22. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 1, 60 Stat. 755.
23. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 1-3, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-13 (1970).
24. Id., as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
25. Id. § 2021 (b). This section states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission is
authorized to enter into agreements with the Governor of any State pro-
viding for discontinuance of the regulatory authority of the Commission
under subchapters V, VI, and VII of this chapter, and section 2201 of




(3) special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a
critical mass. During the duration of such an agreement it is recognized
that the State shall have authority to regulate the materials covered by
the agreement for the protection of the public health and safety from
radiation hazards.
26. 447 F.2d at 1153. This is Minnesota's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c)
(1970), which provides:
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section
shall provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission
shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of-
(1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization
facility; ....
27. 447 F.2d at 1153.
28. Id. at 1154.
29. Id. at 1149.
1972]
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In addition, subsection (k) provides that nothing in the Act is to be con-
strued to affect the authority of any state to regulate activities other than
radiation hazards; 0 the court felt the inclusion of this subsection -would
likewise be meaningless unless the federal government possessed exclusive
authority to regulate radiation hazards.3 ' Furthermore, the court Teasoned
that subsection (k) illustrated the negative implication of subsection (b)
and a congressional intent that the states possess no concurrent authority to
regulate radiation hazards.3 2
Such a statutory interpretation is reasonable in light of Congress' grant
of discretion to the AEC to execute turn-over agreements allowing the states
to regulate radiation hazards.3 3 The AEC has the power to execute such
an agreement only when the governor of a state certifies that the state can
adequately protect against these hazards; in addition, the AEC must find
the state program compatible with the Commission's standards and ade-
quate to protect the public health and safety.3 4
An alternative interpretation of the statute, pointed out by the dissent,
is that Congress only intended to place the responsibility on: the AEC, as
licensor, to set certain standards to protect the public against 'radiation
hazards.8 5 Moreover, nothing in the statute expresses a clear c6ngressional
intent to prohibit the states from taking additional reasonable steps to
control air, water, and land pollution, whether caused by radiation or other-
wise.3 0 The control of pollution not caused by radiation is expressly re-
served to the states. Yet, under the court's interpretation, the control of
pollution is divided by source between the state and the AEC. Close factual
issues may arise, such as whether the pollution is caused by radioactive
sources, which will serve to complicate the question of who is to regtilate.
It is difficult to envision that Congress intended such a result.
30. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k) (1970) provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any
State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protec-
tion against radiation hazards.
31. 447 F.2d at 1150.
32. Id.
33. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (1970).
34. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d) (1970) provides:
The Commission shall enter into an agreement under subsection (b) of
this section with any State if-
(1) The Governor of that State certifies that the State has a program for
the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public health
and safety with respect to the materials within the State covered by the
proposed agreement, and that the State desires to assume regulatory respon-
sibility for such materials; and
(2) the Commission finds that the State program is compatible with the
Commission's program for the regulation of such materials, and that the
state program is adequate to protect the public health and safety with re-
spect to the materials covered by the proposed agreement.
35. 447 F.2d at 1157 (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. Traditionally, states have regulated radiation hazards from naturally
occurring radioactive materials (radium and polonium), x-ray apparatus, and re-
search apparatus such as accelerators and their products. No provision of the act
was to affect this power of the state. So, state regulation over radiation hazards
is not an entirely new concept.
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The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded.., unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."37 As previously stated, the statute does not expressly
exclude nor prohibit state regulation of radioactive emissions. It estab-
lishes the responsibility of the AEC to regulate permissible radiation of
nuclear plants; but it does not state such power is exclusive. The court's
persuasive answer to this contention was that its acceptance would render
the 1959 amendment a useless act.38
To the court, the legislative history accompanying the 1959 amendment
resolved the question of congressional intent.39 Senate Report No. 87040
explained that the federal government retained exclusive control over the
construction and operation of nuclear reactors, and that there was to be no
room for the state to control radiation hazards by regulating by-product,
source, or special nuclear materials.41 However, the dissent pointed out
that during the hearings it appeared that the general counsel to the AEC
did not favor defining the precise area or extent of pre-emption. 42 He felt
any such interpretation should be left to the courts in order to allow flexi-
bility in this area.43 Even though as a general rule of statutory construction
a Senate report will be given precedence over hearings and debates, there is
some doubt whether the rule was applicable in this particular case. The
Supreme Court has said that an unexpressed congressional purpose to set
aside state regulation of internal affairs is not to be lightly inferred or
implied when the legislative command, read in the light of its history,
37. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See also Cali-
fornia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n,
318 U.S. 261 (1943); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S.
412 (1914).
38. '447 F.2d at 1150.
39. Id. at 1153.
40. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1959). The most pertinent partis:
3. It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or con-
current jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating
byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to have the
material regulated and licensed either by the commission, or by the State
and local governments, but not by both. The bill is intended to encourage
States to increase their knowledge and capacities, and to enter into agree-
ments to assume regulatory responsibilities over such materials.
41. Id.
42. Hearings on Federal-State Relations Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic
Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306 (1959). During the hearings Mr. Lowenstein,
from the Office of the General Counsel, AEC, was questioned on the lack of ex-
plicit delineation of federal and state responsibilities. It was suggested the Act be
reworded to make explicit Congress' intent to pre-empt state control of nuclear
reactors. But Mr. Lowenstein replied:
We thought that this Act, without saying in so many words did make clear
that there was pre-emption here, but we have tried to avoid defining the
precise extent of that pre-emption, feeling it is better to leave these kind
of detailed questions perhaps up to the courts later to be resolved. Id. at
307.
See Note, supra note 9.
43. Hearings on Federal-State Relations, supra note 42, at 307.
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remains ambiguous. 44 In addition, the Senate report may be read as an
opinion on existing law under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, rather than
an authoritative interpretation of the 1959 amendment by its draftsmen. 45
The court also placed reliance on the AEC's construction of the statute
as a final aid in construing the Act.46 According to the AEC, the Act has
pre-empted the field.47 Administrative interpretations are persuasive guides
in the interpretation of statutes. However, the general requirement for pre-
emption when the exercise of the state power is aimed at promoting health
and welfare has been the showing of a "dear and manifest" intent by Con-
gress. So, in this area, the ultimate question should be whether Congress
intended to pre-empt, and reliance on agency interpretation of Congress'
intent should be avoided.
B. Pervasiveness of Federal Regulatory Scheme
The second key factor seized upon by the court in its determination
that Congress had intended to pre-empt this area was the pervasiveness of
the federal regulatory scheme. 48 While the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme authorized by the legislation and actually carried out is
a significant factor for consideration, cases involving state health and safety
measures generally require a conflict with the federal law so direct and
positive that they cannot be reconciled or stand together.49 In this regard
the Supreme Court has observed:
When the prohibition of state action is not specific but inferable
from the scope and purpose of the federal legislation, it must be
clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with those of the
state to justify the thwarting of state regulation. 50
The dissent in Northern argued that it is possible to reconcile the state and
federal acts. First, the federal Act could set the maximum emission stand-
ards but still allow the states to set stricter standards to protect the public
44. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943).
45. Lemov, State and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1008, 1013 (1964).
46. 447 F.2d at 1152.
47. Interpretation by the General Council: AEC Jurisdiction Over Nuclear
Facilities and Materials Under the AEC Act, 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1971). Subsection i
states:
It seems completely clear that the Congress, in enacting section 274, in-
tended to preempt to the Federal Government the total responsibility
and authority for regulating, from the standpoint of radiological health
and safety, the specified nuclear facilities and materials; that it stated
that intent unequivocally, and that the enactment of section 274 effectively
carried out the Congressional intent, subject to the arrangement for limited
relinquishment of AEC's regulatory authority and assumption thereof by
states in areas permitted, and subject to conditions imposed, by sec-
tion 274.
48. 447 F.2d at 1146. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947).
49. Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937); Sinnot v. Commissioners of
Pilotage, 63 U.S. 307, 313, 22 How. 227, 244 (1859).
50. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942).
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health and environment.5 1 But it has been held that a federal scheme pre-
vails even though it is a more modest, and less pervasive regulatory plan
than that of the state.52 Another case noted that federal law excludes local
regulation, even though the latter does no more than supplement the for-
mer.53 But, in both of these situations, the Supreme Court had already
found that the "dear and manifest purpose" of the federal regulatory scheme
involved was to prevent the states from acting. Northern is therefore dis-
tinguishable because the Atomic Energy Act shows no "clear and manifest"
purpose to pre-empt state regulation. In the past, the Supreme Court has
required either a clear and manifest purpose to pre-empt or a high degree
of conflict before declaring that a state health or safety regulation is pre-
empted by federal legislation. 54
A recent pollution case involving a conflict between federal regulations
and a municipal ordinance, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,55 is
illustrative. Detroit enacted a smoke abatement code, and Huron's ships
exceeded the maximum standards of the code when their boilers were
cleaned. Since the boilers were inspected and licensed to operate in inter-
state commerce in accordance with comprehensive regulations enacted by
Congress, the company argued that Congress had pre-empted the field and
therefore the ordinance was invalid.56 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, stating that the ordinance was passed for the purpose of pro-
moting the health and safety of the citizens. Moreover, pollution control
was held to be within the traditional concept of the police power.57 The
Court stated: "In exercise of [the police] power, the states and instru-
mentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime
activities, concurrently with the federal government."5 8 The possession of
a federal license did not immunize the ship from the operation of normal
incidents of local police power, which did not constitute a direct regulation
of commerce. 59
Northern is analogous to Huron because both involved local air pollu-
tion regulation in an area where federal regulation was also present. How-
ever, Huron is distinguishable in that the federal act and the municipal act
were aimed at different objects, i.e., the federal act was enacted to protect
against the dangers of maritime navigation while the Detroit ordinance was
aimed at protecting the health of its citizens from air pollution. In Northern,
both the federal and state regulations were aimed at protecting the health
and safety of nearby citizens. On this basis, there was a stronger case for
pre-emption in Northern than in Huron.60
51. 447 F.2d at 1157 (dissenting opinion).
52. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
53. Campbell v. Hussey, 868 U.S. 297, 302 (1961).
54. Note, supra note 9, at 1300.
55. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
56. Id. at 441-42.
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 447.
60. This distinction may be weak because of Florida Lime 9- Avocado Growers,
lnc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, rehearing denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963), which said:
The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the
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C. Need for Exclusive Federal Regulation
The nature of the subject matter and whether'it required exclusive
federal regulation was the third factor considered.0 ' The court felt that
the regulation of radioactive wastes required uniform regulation by a na-
tional agency. 2 They thought the determination of the proper balance
between industrial progress and safety standards should be vested in the
AEC, because stricter standards imposed by a state could slow the develop-
ment and use of atomic energy.63 However, as the dissent pointed out, the
reasonableness of the state standards was not in issue. Rather, the issue was
whether Congress intended to prohibit all state control. There is no un-
qualified rule that a federal license immunizes a product from more de-
manding state statutes.6 4 Furthermore, when state health and safety stand-
ards are more exacting than federal standards, the court is more willing
to accept them, than when the state standards are more permissive.6 5 Fed-
eral regulations could set uniform standards and still allow a state to enact
stricter standards to protect the health of its citizens. The specific subject
matter involving state control of radioactive effluents does not automatically
require exclusive federal regulation. Control of pollution is of vital interest
to both state and federal governments. And, as the dissent pointed out, if
state regulations should become unreasonable or arbitrary, and threaten
to stifle the development of atomic energy, they could be challenged in the
courts., 6
D. State Regulation as Obstruction to Accomplishment of Federal Purposes
Whether the state regulation stands as an obstacle to the accomplisli
ment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress was the
final factor considered by the court.6 7 The court briefly stated that inde-
state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be en-
forced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not
whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.
In this case,. California regulated the maturity of avocados by oil content while the
federal marketing orders placed no significance on oil content in gauging the ma-
turity of avocados. Although it was conceded the California statute was not a
health measure, it was enacted under a reserve power and treated much like the
traditional cases involving health and safety measures. The Court found no ir-
reconcilable conflict and that Congress did not intend to oust state power. So
California was entitled to enact this legislation to keep immature avocados off
the store shelves.
61. 447 F.2d at 1146. The court cited in support of this contention Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44, rehearing denied,
374 U.S. 858 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
241-44 (1959); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957); Mor-
gan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946).
62. 447 F.2d at 1154.
63. Id.
64. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960).
65. Note, supra note 9, at 1300.
66. 447 F.2d at 1157-58 (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 1147. In support the court cited Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
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pendent state licensing would block the effectiveness of the AEG. There was
little discussion on this point and the court quickly concluded that it stood
as an obstacle.68
It appears the last two factors used by the court are not as distinct as
the numerical breakdown may indicate. Instead, they tend to support the
traditional rules of pre-emption as stated in the first two factors. The dissent
stated that the acts could be reconciled and allowed to stand together, so
that the state could regulate the emission of radioactive effluents without
seriously blocking the objectives of Congress to promote atomic energy for
peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the state, as a matter of policy, should be
encouraged to protect its citizens from pollution hazards.69 The federal act
could set the maximum emission allowances but leave to the states authority
to set stricter standards to protect their citizens. The dissent felt this was
possible; the majority felt it was not, basing a large portion of its reasoning
on the unique nature of atomic energy.
III. TnE UNIQUE SUBJECT MATrER OF NORTHERN: HISORY AND POLICY
An important distinction in Northern from other cases in the area of
public health and safety is that it arose under the Atomic Energy Act.
The Atomic Energy Commission was created under the Atomic Energy
Act to give the federal government complete control over atomic energy
development.70 Thus, the states have no historic police powers over atomic
energy per se. In 1954, Congress amended the Act 7 ' to encourage the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes by
private industry,72 and, in 1959, Congress further amended the Act to allow
the states to regulate certain activities by way of a turn-over agreement.73
68. 447 F.2d at 1154.
69. This may ultimately be a scientific judgment as to whether states can
adequately regulate and control radioactive effluents. Secondly, the need for uni-
form regulations throughout the nation may outweigh the state interest in this
area. However, in other areas of pollution control the state and federal govern-
ments have developed a program which encourages local control of pollution sources.
See Air Quality Control Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 1857a. (1970). This analogy
may be poor because of the unique nature of atomic energy. See Green, Radiation
Standards: FederallState Relations, 12 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 402 (1970). He states:
"[a] dual system of Federal and State regulation can work, even in a complex
technological area which has overriding health and safety considerations." Id. at
415. In support of this statement, he cites the area of aircraft noise standards,
where both federal and state regulations are present.
70. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 1, 60 Stat. 755.
71. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 1-3, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-13 (1970).
72. See generally Lemov, State and Local Control Over the Location of
Nuclear Reactors Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1008,
1013 (1964). Lemov argues that the 1954 Act was to end the government's monoply
over atomic energy and promote the growth of privately owned nuclear plants.
Therefore, the act removed all monopolistic control except that expressed in the
statute. Moreover, the Act did not attempt to establish regulatory principles for
control of the non-existent atomic power industry. Also, there was some evidence
that the Act intended to establish minimum safety standards and not prevent the
establishment of stricter standards by state and local governments. Little support
has appeared for this argument.
73. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (1970).
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But, beyond these delegations, the AEC still retains exclusive control. Since
the AEC was created to occupy the entire field, the states are unable to
regulate anything in the field unless they enter into a turn-over agreement
with the AEC. 74 Therefore, Northern must be distinguished from other
cases involving state health and safety measures, since the AEG was created
with, and has never been completely divested of, its monopoly over atomic
energy. 75
Whether states should have the power to regulate radioactive discharges
from nuclear power plants is an important public policy decision, aside
from the constitutional issue of pre-emption. There are several arguments
against state regulation in this area. First, states may not have sufficient
personnel and financial resources to effectively regulate. 0 Moreover, states
might compete with the federal government for scarce manpower resources,
with the result that neither the state nor the AEC could adequately regu-
late. Second, air pollution from nuclear plants may be an interstate prob-
lem requiring exclusive federal regulation.77 This is especially true when
pollution affects adjoining states, making uniform federal regulations
necessary to protect the public health in a vast interstate area. Third, state
regulation may be so stringent as to make nuclear power uneconomical pre-
cluding the establishment of nuclear power plants in the state.78 States
could thereby impede the development of nuclear power facilities without
any off-setting health and safety advantages.1 9 Also, the more restrictive
state radiation protection standards might not be compatible with the
AEC technical specifications and increase the overall safety risks.8 0 Next,
state regulation may have a detrimental effect on consumer markets for
nuclear power outside the state by increasing costs of production, and thus
adversely affecting interstate commerce. Therefore, uniform federal regu-
lations are arguably necessary to prevent injurious effects on interstate com-
merce. Lastly, the AEC certainly has a special competency in this area,
which gives much support to the contention that its regulation should be
exclusive.81 Indeed, the AEC is in a better position to promulgate regula-
tions because it has researched and regulated this area since 1946. The
AEC is more capable of surveying the entire field and setting uniform na-
74. Id.
75. See generally New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170
(Ist Cir. 1969). The court said that the state may not enjoin the issuance of a con-
struction license even though the AEC is not required to, and does not, inquire
into the effects of thermal pollution. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Water
and Environmental Quality Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970), authorizing all
federal agencies to license projects only after state discharge permits are obtained
by the licensee. This tends to illustrate the monopolistic control exerted by the
AEC even in the area of public health and safety.
76. See Green, supra note 69, at 404; Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching
Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv.
43, 63-66 (1967); Note, supra note 9, at 1307.
77. Note, supra note 9, at 1309.
78. Green, supra note 69, at 406; Note, supra note 9, at 1310.
79. Green, supra note 69, at 406; Holifield, Federal State Responsibilities in
Nuclear Development, 12 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 165, 177 (1970).
80. Authorities cited note 79 supra.
81. Helman, supra note 76, at 63; Note, supra note 9, at 1308.
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tional standards which will not only encourage nuclear technology but also
adequately protect the public.82
On the other hand, there are several persuasive reasons for allowing
state regulation. First, although states may lack the resources to regulate
the entire field, they could effectively regulate a specific area such as
pollution from nuclear plants.8 3 A state may be able to use experienced
personnel from its state universities and agencies to assist in enacting and
enforcing such regulations. Perhaps the AEC and the state could arrange
a cooperative program in the field. Secondly, states have an important local
interest in protecting their citizens from a nuclear plant in the community.8 4
For example, there are areas of purely local concern in which substantial
hazards exist; there has been extensive state regulation in these areas not
covered by the federal program.85
Finally, the AEC regulatory program may not be adequate to protect
the public against the pressures of a growing nuclear industry. State regu-
lation is therefore desirable because it may help balance the demand for
new plants against the interest in public safety. It should be remembered
that the AEC is not only the regulator but also the promoter of atomic
energy. Sometimes the AEC tends to favor promotion over protection,88
and it has been referred to as a captured agency;S7 i.e., its interest in nuclear
energy development may override its regulatory function. So the ultimate
question may be whether the AEG regulatory program is adequate to pro-
tect the public interest against the enormous hazards inherent in the in-
dustry.88
The catastrophic results of nuclear accidents make it essential that
nuclear reactor technology develop with greater regard for safety measures
than is usual in any other industry.8 9 But the question has been raised
82. Holifield, supra note 79, at 181.
83. Green, supra note 69, at 411; Helman, supra note 76, at 63; Note, supra
note 9, at 1308.
84. Helman, supra note 76, at 59; Note, supra note 9, at 1312.
85. Helman, supra note 76, at 60. Helman cites as an example the state
licensing of radium, x-ray equipment, and accelerators and accelerator-produced
radioactive material. State action is recognized in this area but this fact does not
prevent the existence of a defined and extensive federal regulatory program. Hel-
man feels there are substantial hazards to be regulated other than those developed
under the federal program. See Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic
Energy on Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 132 (1959). Representative Durham testified:
It was brought out here yesterday that 95 per cent of the irradiation is
coming from x-ray machines and all kinds of tools throughout the country,
and only 5 percent of it is emanating from the atomic energy industrial
operation at the present. So the states have a great responsibility. We have
never thought of controlling it at the federal level, such as telling a man
how to use an x-ray machine ....
86. Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical
View, 43 NoT DAME LAw. 633 (1968); Note, supra note 9.
87. Kenworthy, Who Should Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970,§ E at 2, col. 4 (city ed.).
88. Green, supra note 86, at 649.
89. Other industrial technology has advanced by learning from mistakes. An
illustration of this is the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows bridge over Puget Sound
in 1940. The bridge represented a departure from the then accepted suspension
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whether "the AEC has been sufficiently concerned about the reliability of
safety devices. 0 Recently, a group of scientists called for a halt in the is-
suance of operating licenses for nuclear power plants because they felt there
were no safeguards of assured performance.9 1 They recommended a review
by a qualified independent scientific group to determine whether the
reactors' constitute an unacceptable hazard to the population.9 2
The AEC is proud of the fact that nuclear reactors have had no acci-
dents with serious consequences to the public under its supervision. It ap-
pears that the striving for development of comprehensive safety controls to
completely avoid unfortunate accidents is unique to the AEG.93 But some
states feel that state regulation is needed because the AEC can not continue
to achieve that goal and adequately protect the public while also encourag-
ing the development of nuclear power technology. By finding implied
pre-emption, the court in Northern expressed a confidence that such state
regulation is unnecessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Four factors were used by the court to determine that Minnesota was
pre-empted from regulating radiation emissions from a nuclear power plant.
Each factor is persuasive that Congress intended pre-emption, and any one
factor standing alone could be used to find pre-emption in cases not in-
volving state health and safety measures. But it is of special interest
that the court used them as four factors to find implied pre-emption.
Normally, implied pre-emption is not used to prevent states from acting
bridge technology. This departure caused the bridge to collapse as a result of
aerodynamic instability in high winds. An investigation of this accident resulted
in new technical knowledge in bridge building, and the probleni was avoided in
later bridges. D. STEINMAN 8: S. WATSON, BRIDGES AND THEIR BuiLDERs .956-57 (2d
ed. 1957).
Another illustration, in the field of aviation, is the seemingly unexplainable
crashes of two Lockheed Electras in 1959 and 1960. It was discovered that the
planes' flexible wings had snapped off from metal fatigue caused by a newly dis-
covered phenomena called whirl mode. Stiffer and stronger wings were placed on
the Electras, and the problem was solved. This process of improving aviation
technology from accidents has led to the present excellent safety record of com-
mercial aircraft. R. SERLING, LOUD AND CLEAR 184, 232, 236 (rev. ed. 1970).
90. SUch fears have been expressed recently. See, e.g., Sesser, Nuclear Power
Plant in Oregon Generates Dispute Over Safety, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1972,
at 1, col. 1.
Even though the national nuclear power program has proceeded on the premise
that catastrophic experience must be by-passed, because any accident at a nuclear
plant could result in immense damage to a large area and its population, near
disasters have occurred. In October, 1966, the Fermi power reactor near Detroit
experienced an accident resulting in a core melt down. Fortunately the reactor
was brought under control before it exploded, but the reactor required over one
year's reconstruction. See Green, supra note 86; A. CuRTIs & E. HoGAN, PERILS OF
THE PEACkFUL ATOM 1-18 (1969).
91. Forbes, Ford, Kendall, & MacKenzie, Nuclear Reactor Safety: An Evalu-
ation of New Evidence, NucLEAR NEws, Sep., 1971, Vol. 14 at 32, 37.
92. Id. at 40.
93. Helman, supra note 76, at 66; Ramey, The AEC Regulatory Program-
Current'Stdtus, Future Trends, 45 N.C.L. REv. 323 (1967).
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in the field of public health and safety when federal regulations are also
present. Thus, one view of Northern is that it expands the doctrine of pre-
emption in cases involving state health and safety regulations.
However, a better view is that atomic energy is distinguishable from
other cases involving state health and safety measures, due to its unique
creation and function. The courts may find pre-emption more readily
when the AEC is involved than in the usual cases involving state health
and safety measures, in light of the dominant national interest in the de-
velopment and regulation of atomic energy. This case stands for that
proposition and future cases involving the AEC are likely to have a similar
result unless Congress dearly legislates a contrary intent.
KENNETH 0. MCCUTrCHEON
EVIDENCE-SEARCHES-MORE THAN "CONSENT"
REQUIRED FOR WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS IN MISSOURI
State v. -Witherspoon'
Defendant Harold Hamilton was arrested by a highway patrolman for
displaying an improper license plate. The patrolman had stopped his car
solely on a report from an informant that defendant was driving in a reck-
less manner and'at a high speed. After the arrest, the patrolman placed
Hamilton in the patrol car. The patrolman then approached the passenger
in the car, defendant Robert Witherspoon, inspected his driver's license
for identification,. and asked Witherspoon if he thought he could operate
the vehicle. The patrolman did not arrest Witherspoon or search the car
for weapons at that time. There is no indication in the record that he saw
anything in open view inside the car that "caused him to be suspicious, or
caused him to believe it necessary to search the trunk, either to protect
himself or to aid in the investigation of the improper license plate charge."
The patrolman then asked Witherspoon "if there would be anything- in the
trunk they would care if [he] looked at."2 Witherspoon said "no" and
handed the officer the keys. The officer unlocked the trunk and found it
to contain numerous burglary tools. Hamilton and Witherspoon were then
placed under arrest for possession of burglary tools. They were-jointly
convicted of the charge and each sentenced to five years in the state peni-
tentiary. Defendants appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court asserting
that the trial court erred in denying defendants' timely motion to suppress,
and admitting into evidence the burglary tools seized by the patrolman as
a result of the trunk search. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
convictions, holding that the search was illegal (1) because it had.been
made without warrant or probable cause to search the car and the situa-
1. 460 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 282.
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tion did not bring it under any of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, and (2) because defendant Witherspoon had not "freely, intelligently
and unequivocally" waived his fourth amendment rights.8 This decision
is significant because it outlines a new approach in Missouri to the de-
termination of the validity of a waiver of fourth amendment rights. 4
Since the application of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio,5 evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure is
not admissible in a subsequent state criminal prosecution.6 In the absence
of a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights, a search and seizure is not
valid unless supported by probable cause.7 The search must also be made
pursuant to a search warrant, unless the state can show exceptional cir-
cumstances that made it impossible or impracticable to obtain a warrant.8
To determine the legality of the search of defendant's car, the court in
Witherspoon first considered the impact of the absence of a search warrant.
The court said:
[W]here, as here, the search is without warrant, the burden is on
those seeking to come within one of a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement to establish that their acts are, in fact, exempt from
the rule that magistrates rather than police officers should deter-
mine when searches should be permitted and what limitations
should be placed on such activities.9
The State of Missouri in Witherspoon sought to justify the search of
defendants' car by arguing that the search fell into the following exceptions
to the warrant requirement:' 0 (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest,11
3. Id. at 289.
4. The terms "waiver" and "consent" are often interchanged and misused.
See, e.g., State v. Witherspoon, 460 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Mo. 1970). As will be explained
in a later portion of this note, a person may factually consent to a search without
waiving his fourth amendment rights.
5. 367 U.S. 648 (1961).
6. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886); State v. McAnnally, 259 S.W. 1042 (Mo. 1924); State v.
Tunnell, 302 Mo. 433, 259 S.W. 128 (En Banc 1924); State v. Lock, 302 Mo. 400,
259 S.W. 116 (En Banc 1924).
7. For general definitions of probable cause, see Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161 (1925); United States v. Zager, 14 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Md. 1936);
State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Mo. 1968); State v. Hall, 312 Mo. 425, 279
S.W. 102, 106 (1925); State v. Lock, 302 Mo. 400, 259 S.W. 116, 120-21 (En Banc
1924); Scurlock, Searches and Seizures in Missouri, 29 U.K.C.L. Rxv. 242, 256
(1961).
8. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
9. 460 S.W.2d at 284; accord, Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48(1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
10. For a general discussion of exceptions to the warrant requirement see
B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 21-119
(1969).
11. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 389 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 867 (1947); State v. Murray, 445
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and (2) a search of an automobile or other mobile means of transportation
undertaken to prevent removal of evidence from the jurisdiction.1 2 How-
ever, the court rejected these contentions, finding no probable cause and
no exceptional circumstances to justify the search of defendants' auto-
mobile.13 The court stated:
S.W.2d 296 (Mo. 1969); State v. Moody, 443 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 169); State vw
Glenn, 481 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1968); State v. Burnett, 429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968);
State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1968); State v. Craig, 406 S.W.2d 618 (Mo.
1966); State v. Brookshire, 358 S.W.2d 681 (Mo.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 67 (1962);
State v. Green, 292 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. 1956); State v. Carenza. 357 Mo. 1172, 212
S.W.2d 743 (1948); State v. Raines, 389 Mo. 884, 98 S.W.2d 580 (1986).
To conduct a valid search incident to an arrest an officer must act on the
basis of facts of which he was cognizant at the time of the arrest. Beck v. Ohio,
879 U.S. 89 (1964). The arrest should precede the search. Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); State v. Morice,
79 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1935). In addition, the search must be a bona fide search
for articles connected with the arrest already made. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). Recent Supreme Court decisions have greatly limited the
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969). For a general discussion in this area see: Henry, Search and Seizure
as Incident of Lawful Arrest, 13 Mo. L. Rxv. 802 (1948); Odegard, Criminal Law-
Arrest-Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 26 Mo. L. REv. 875 (1961); Van Matre,
Criminal Law-Search Incident to Arrest, 14 Mo. L. REv. 111 (1949).
12. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 408 U.S. 448 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 899 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182 (1925); United
States v. Taylor, 428 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 988 (1971);
Holland v. Swenson, 818 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 909 (8th
Cir. 1970); State v. Edmonds, 462 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1971); State v. Speed, 458
S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1970); State v. Pigg, 312 Mo. 212, 278 S.W. 1080 (En Banc 1925).
18. 460 S.W.2d at 281. To justify a warrantless search incident to a law-
ful arrest, the arrest should precede the search, and the search must be made
in a bona fide attempt to find articles connected with the arrest already made.
See cases cited note 12 supra. Since the arrests in Witherspoon for possession of
burglary tools followed the search and the officer who conducted the search ad-
mitted that he was not likely to find any evidence relating to the license tag
charge in the trunk, the court found that the trunk search was not valid as incident
to an arrest. 460 S.W.2d at 284. The court then considered whether the search
as incident to the arrest of Hamilton on the license plate charge would be justified
as a search for weapons to protect the officers. The court cited with approval
B. GEORGE, supra note 10, at 73-74, where the author stated:
If after initiating the encounter the experienced officer reasonably believes
that the driver or occupants may be armed, he should be full justified
in ordering them out, frisking them, and quickly checking the part of
the vehicle that might be accessible to them if they should break away
from the officer and attempt to flee. But this probably would not extend
to a search of the trunk of a passenger automobile . . . since this begins
to look like an exploratory search for evidence.
The Witherspoon court determined that the trunk search was not a valid
search for weapons because there was no evidence that the officer had reason
to believe the defendants were carrying weapons, and because the officer searched
the trunk rather than searching more likely places for weapons first. 460 S.W.2d
at 285; see also State v. Durham, 386 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1965); State v. Durham,
367 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 (1963). The court in Witherspoon
ruled that the search was not a valid automobile search to prevent removal of
evidence from the jurisdiction because there was no showing that the officer
had reasonable or probable cause to believe that he would find the instrumentality
of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before he began his warrantless
search. 460 S.W.2d at 287.
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[T]he facts can only justify the conclusion that the officer. em-
barked on an exploratory search, without any justification shown-
in the record that he had reasonable or probable cause. Lacking
that vital element, the motion to suppress should have been sus-
tained, unless the defendants, or one of them, consented to the
search. 14
The state also argued that the search and seizure was lawful because
defendant Witherspoon had consented to the search and, thereby, waived his
fourth amendment rights. This poses the question of what constitutes a valid
waiver. Historically, four tests have been formulated to determine the
validity of a waiver of fourth amendment rights.1 For discussion, these
tests will be designated as follows: (1) the submission to authority test; (2)
the factual consent test; (8) the totality of the circumstances test; and (4)
the warning of rights test. Under the submission to authority test the courts
look only to see if the defendant has allowed the search; the fact of acquies-
cence is all that is required and there is no inquiry into whether the de-
fendant actually expressed verbal consent to the search.' 6 The factual con-
sent test looks to the acts of the defendant and asks whether, by words or
conduct, he affirmatively communicated to the officers his consent to the
search.' 7 The totality of the circumstances test is the test which was adopted
in Witherspoon,18 and the elements of it will be investigated in a later
14. 460 S.W.2d at 287.
15. The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be waived. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); Perlman
v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900);
Huhm;n v. United States, 42 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1930); Nelson v. Hancock, 239
F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965); State v. Reagan, 328 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1959); State
v. Smith, 357 Mo. 467, 209 S.W.2d 138 (1948); State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102,
182 S.W.2d 46 (1944).
16. For Missouri cases finding a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights
from the mere fact of acquiescence, see State v. Burney, 346 Mo. 859, 143 S.W.2d
273, 274 (1940); State v. Bliss, 18 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1929); and State v. Allen,
251 S.W. 69 (Spr. Mo. App. 1923). For early cases rejecting the submission to
authority test, see State v. Owens, 802 Mo. 348, 349-50, 259 S.W. 100, 101-02 (En
Banc 1924), and State v. Luna, 266 S.W. 755, 756 (Spr. Mo. App. 1924).
17. For examples of cases holding defendant's verbal consent to constitute a
valid waiver of fourth amendment rights, see Gendron v. United States, 227 F. Supp.
182, 184 (E.D. Mo. 1964); State v. Edmondson, 461 S.W.2d 718, 715 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Virdure, 371 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Mo. 1963); State v. Foster, 349 ,.W.2d
922, 924 (Mo. 1961); State v. Tull, 333 Mo. 152, 159-60, 62 S.W.2d 389, 392(1933). But see Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), in which the
court stated:
[W]aiver (of constitutional immunity from unreasonable search and
seizure) cannot be conclusively presumed from a verbal expression of
assent. The court must determine from all the circumstances whether verbal
assent reflected an understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal election
to grant the officers a license which the person knows may be freely and
effectively withheld. Id. at 97.
18. This test was suggested though not fully formulated by the Missouri
Supreme Court in State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1968). The court said:
Although defendant got the keys from the ignition and personally opened
the trunk ... this did not constitute free and voluntary consent on the
part of the defendant under the circumstances. When this hippened
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portion of this note. Finally, the warning of rights test, adopted in some
jurisdictions, is based on the rationale of the decision in Miranda v. Ari-
zona'9 and indicates there can be no valid waiver of fourth amendment
rights without a prior warning as to the scope of those rights.
On the basis of precedent, the Missouri Supreme Court in Witherspoon
rejected the submission to authority test.20 The court also rejected the
factual consent test, which had previously been the law in Missouri.2 '
Special Judge Henry A. Reiderer spoke for the majority, saying: "[W]e
believe all factors should be considered in a 'totality of circumstances'
criterion." 22 The totality of the circumstances test includes not only the
factual question of the communication of consent to the search (i.e., was the
consent stated in a "clear and unequivocal manner"), but asks other ques-
tions as well, including whether the waiver was given in circumstances "free
of duress and coercion," and whether the waiver was "knowingly and in-
telligently" made.23
In order- to sustain the burden of proof on the issue of waiver under
the totality of the circumstances test, the prosecution must show three
things.24 First, it must convince the court that the defendant's acts, by words
or conduct, give sufficient indication of actual consent to the search.2 5
Secondly, if the court finds sufficient acts of consent,26 it then must deter-
mine whether the consent was given under circumstances "free of duress
and coercion."2" What facts are considered by the courts as pertinent to
this question? Those chiefly involved are consideration of the defendant's
there were. three Joplin policemen, their automobiles, and police dog
present representing the authority and compulsion of the law. Under the
circumstances defendant was doing no more than submitting to the will
of the police .... Id. at 181.
19.- 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. - See note 16 supra.
21. 460 S.W.2d at 288. The court said a waiver should not "be conclusively
presumed-,from a -erbal expression of consent or acts tantamount thereto." Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. For cases which considered the totality of the circumstances in determin-
ing validity, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938); Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965); Channel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Mason, 290
F. Supp. 843 (D.N.H. 1968); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa.
1966); and State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1968). The totality of the circum-
stances test was the test employed by courts to determine the validity of a waiver
of fifth amendment rights prior to Miranda.
24. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504 (1957); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d
225 (Mo. 1968); State v. Craig, 406 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1966). See also B. GEORGE, THE
PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK 139 (1969). Consequently, pre.Miranda cases involving
waiver of fifth amendment rights are arguably still precedent for cases considering
waiver of .fourth amendment rights under the totality of the circumstances test.
25. See cases cited note 23 supra.
26e Under the factual consent test this was the extent of the court's inquiry
and disposed of the issue. See cases cited note 17 supra.
27. See cases cited note 23 supra.
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physical condition, 28 age,29 and intelligence;3 0 whether there were any
threats of violence or use of force by police officers; 3 1 and whether there
is any indication of undue pressure or influence.32
The third factor considered under the totality of the circumstances
test is whether the waiver was "knowingly and intelligently" made, i.e., the
defendant must have knowledge of his constitutional rights before he can
validly waive these rights. This third factor is at the heart of the Wither-
spoon decision. The Missouri Supreme Court, facing the problem of de-
termining if a knowing and intelligent waiver had been made, asked:
Will the consent be "voluntary" if the officer does not advise the
person of his Fourth Amendment rights, i.e., that he is privileged to
refuse admission, that there is a general requirement of a search
warrant and that evidence found on the premises may be used
against him? 33
Since the 1966 Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona,3 4 sev-
eral state and federal court decisions have held that a waiver of fourth
amendment rights is not valid unless, prior to the waiver, the defendant
28. See People v. O'Leary, 45 Ill. 2d 122, 257 N.E.2d 112 (1970) (defendant
recovering from tear gas). For cases involving intoxication as affecting voluntariness,
see State v. Thompson, 10 Ariz. App. 301, 458 P.2d 395 (1969); In re Cameron,
68 Cal. 2d 487, 439 P.2d 633, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1968); State v. Manuel, 253 La.
195, 217 So. 2d 369 (1968); State v. Warner, 237 A.2d 150 (Me. 1967); State v.
Thresher, 350 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961). See also Henley v. State, 228 So. 2d 602 (Miss.
1969) (defendant undergoing withdrawal symptoms).
29. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 520 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
30. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 520 (1963); Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1968); State v.
Bridges, 349 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1961); State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1953);
State v. Sisneros, 79 N.M. 600, 446 P.2d 875 (1968).
31. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547(1942); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); State v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 845
Mo. 1958); State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1953).
32. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1963); Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1968);
Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964); Higgins v. United States,
209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954); State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1968); State
v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
33. 460 S.W.2d at 288.
34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda the Supreme Court said:
We will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his
rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately
safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been
given or that an effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a
knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent
record. Id. at 498-99.
The Court also stated that:
The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary
ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
The warnings required and the waiver necessary . . . are in the absence
of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any
statement made by a defendant. Id. at 476.
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had been advised of those rights,35 or there is other evidence of the de-
fendant's knowledge of the rights.36 The Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Blalock3s said:
The fourth amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than
do the fifth and sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each
serves the same purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility that the
ignorant may surrender their rights more readily than the
shrewd.. . . To require law enforcement agents to advise the sub-
jects of investigation of their right to insist on a search warrant
would impose no great burden, nor would it unduly or unneces-
sarily impede criminal investigation. 38
The drafters of the American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure 39 outlined two respects in which the argument for
requiring warning in the case of a waiver of fourth amendment rights is
stronger than that for requiring a Miranda warning:
First, by the consent search the officer is seeking to short circuit
another means available to him-the use of a warrant-to obtain
evidence. No such alternative exists with respect to information
sought by interrogation .... Second, one of the arguments against
requiring a warning as a condition of police questioning has been
in many instances discussion between policeman and citizen is a
natural and spontaneous phenomenon, and that to interpose a
warning of rights will often have the effect of turning such an ex-
change into an artificially formal and hostile one. The seeking
and granting of a request to search an individual's home, his car,
his briefcase or his pocket seems much less of such a natural inter-
change and it seems likely that the warning as a condition of such
a request will less often seem anomalous.4 0
35. Perkins v. Henderson, 418 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Miller, 395 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1968); Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390(9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blalock,
255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
36. United States v. Curiale, 414 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1969).
37. 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
38. Id. at 269-70.
39. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1970).
40. Id. § SS4.02, comment on Art. 4. Section SS4.02 reads (in part):(1) Persons from Whom Effective Consent May Be Obtained. The consentjustifying a search and seizure ... must be given in the case of
(a) search of individual's person, by the individual in question or,
if the person be under age of 16, by such individual's parent or
guardian;(b) search of a vehicle, by the person registered as its owner or in
apparent control of its operation and contents at the time con-
sent is given; and
(c) search of premises, by a person who by ownership or otherwise,
is apparently entitled to determine the giving or withholding
of consent.(Z) Required Warning to Persons Not in Custody or Under Arrest. Be-
fore undertaking a search under the provisions of this article, an of-
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The Missouri Supreme Court in Witherspoon rejected *this line of
reasoning and ruled that failure to give a warning of fourth amendment
rights does hot automatically preclude a valid waiver of these' rights and
render, inadmissible evidence seized as a result of a subsequent search.4 1
This decision is in line with the majority of federal and state court de-
cisions which hold that a warning is not a prerequisite to a valid waiver
of fourth amendment rights, 42 although such a warning is required for a
waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights.4 3
Rather than testing the validity of defendant's waiver by examining
the presefice or absence of a formal warning or other evidence that'the de-
fendant was already aware of his fourth amendment rights, the Missouri
court in Witherspoon looked to the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the waiver.4 4 Nevertheless, it is dear that one of the major factors
considered in the totality of the circumstances is the absence or presence
of a warning.4 5 For instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rosen-
ficer present shall inform the individual whose consent is sought that
he is under no obligation to give such consent and that anything found
may be taken and used in evidence.
(3) Required Warning to Persons in Custody or Under Arrest. If the
individual whose consent is required under subsection (1) is in cus-
tody or under arrest at the time such consent is offered or invited;
such consent shall not justify a search and seizure . . unless such
individual has been informed that he has the right to consult an
attorney, either retained or appointed, before deciding whether to
grant or withhold consent. ...
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), still contains the most convincing argu-
ment in support of the warning requirement as a prerequisite to a valid waiver.
In Miranda, the Court said:
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based oii informa-
tion as to his age, education, intelligence or prior contact with authorities(totality of, circumstances test) can never be more than speculation; a
warning is a clear cut fact. More important, a warning at the time' of the
interrogation is indispensible to overcome its pressures and to insure that
the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that poini in
time. Id. ai 468-69.
41. Judge Riederer, speaking for the majority, said:
[CJonsent or waiver of Fourth Amendment rights should not be auto-
matically excluded because of failure to spell out the full rights in, every
detail [warning of rights test]; and neither should a waiver be conclusively
presumed from a verbal expression of consent or acts tantamount thereto
[factual consent test]. 460 S.W.2d at 288.
42. Court decisions subsequent to Miranda holding that there is no specific
warning requirement for waiver of fourth amendment rights include: United States
v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Combs v. La Vallee,
417 F.2d 53 "(2d Cir. 1969); Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 937 (1969); Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252 (Alas. 1969); cert. denied,
396 U.S. 921 (1969); People v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 265, 270 n.7, 455 P.2d 146,
150 n.7, 78 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 n.7 (1969) (dictum); State v. Lyons, 76 Wash, 2d
343, 458 P.2d 30 (1969).
43. See note 34 supra.
44. 460 S.W.2d at 288.
45. Rogenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968); Gorman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 158 (Ist Cir. 1967). See also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737
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thall v. Henderson,4 0 ruled that the failure to advise the defendant of his
fourth amendment rights is one factor to be considered in determining if
his waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. The Rosenthall court
said:
The failure to so advise might have more weight in one case than
in another. To advise a person with experience or training in this
field that he has the right to refuse consent would be a waste of
words. To fail to so advise another, who by low mentality or in-
experience is obviously ignorant of his rights, might in some cases
be decisive.4 7
And in Gorman v. United States,45 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that giving of a Miranda warning as to fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights put the defendant on notice that he could refuse to co-operate
and it was fair to infer that the defendant's waiver of fourth amendment
rights was valid, even though defendant was not specifically informed of
those rights. 49
In,the Witherspoon case the majority considered three factors in de-
termining if Witherspoon's waiver was knowingly and intelligently made:
(1) the absence of express oral consent to the search; (2) the absence of a
fourth amendment warning or any other evidence of the defendant's knowl-
edge of, these rights; and (3) the fact that Witherspoon's actions could be
construed as-merely demonstrating a desire to offer no resistance to the
patrolman. Under these circumstances, the court determined that Wither-
spoon had not validly waived his constitutional rights.5 0 Since the warrant-
less search was not upheld by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
or supported by a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights, the court de-
termined that the evidence obtained as a result of the search. was inad-
missible against the defendants in a criminal prosecution, and that defend-
ants' motion to suppress the evidence should have been sustained6 1
The.' decision in Witherspoon has a substantial effect on the law of
search and.seizure in Missouri. Missouri law enforcement officers would
be well counseled to advise persons routinely of their fourth amendment
rights before conducting a search and seizure pursuant to consent. Although
the Witherspoon court did not hold that a constitutional warning is always
46. 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968).
47. Id. at 516. The same factual elements considered as relevant in determining
if the. circumstances of the case constitute "duress or coercion" are considered by the
court in deciding if the warning given to the particular individual is sufficient.
so that the waiver was "knowingly and intelligently" made. For a discussion of these
different factual elements, see cases cited notes 82 and 32 supra.
48, 880 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967).
49. Id.
50. 460 S.W.2d at 289. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Holman- argued that
Witherspoon had consented to the search, stressing that his words and acts, in the
absence of any evidence of duress or coercion, were sufficient to show a voluntary
consent. Id. (dissenting opinion). Holman's dissent reflects the application of the
factual consent test rejected by the majority court. Id. This test looks to the acts
and words of the defendant but does not consider whether, under the totality of
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a prerequisite to a valid waiver of fourth amendment rights, as a practical
matter Witherspoon indicates that a warning should be given in most




INSTRUCTIONS APPLIED TO FOREIGN LAW
Meredith v. Missouri Pacific R.R.'
On August 20, 1965, the plaintiff, Barbara A. Meredith, was injured
as a result of a train-auto collision at the intersection of Main and First
Streets in Ottawa, Kansas. The Missouri Pacific train was operated by
engineer Martin Snell, a co-defendant. At the time of collision Mrs.
Meredith had left her car and was attempting to reach safety. The train
struck the car, knocking it against Mrs. Meredith and injuring her.2 Mrs.
Meredith brought suit in Missouri. She submitted her case on two theories
of negligence: excessive speed, and failure to slacken speed to avoid a
collision.8 Defendants alleged contributory negligence, charging that Mrs.
Meredith failed to keep a careful lookout, failed to turn her auto around
and proceed in the opposite direction, and failed to exercise ordinary care.
Missouri Pacific submitted this charge by Instruction No. 4, which stated
in part: "Third, such negligence of plaintiff caused or directly contributed
to cause any damage plaintiff may have sustained."4
A jury verdict was returned for defendants and plaintiff moved for a
new trial on the ground that the omission of the word "directly" before
the word "caused" in Instruction No. 4 was a deviation from the Missouri
Approved Jury Instructions [hereinafter referred to as the MAIl, and
that this "failure to conform to MAI 28.01 (now MAI 32.01) was preju-
dicial."5 The trial judge sustained plaintiff's motion, solely on the basis
of the above mentioned omission.6
Missouri Pacific appealed the court's ruling, contending that:
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Plaintiff a New Trial on the
Ground That Defendant's Instruction No. 4 Was Prejudicially
Erroneous Because Said Instruction Was Not Erroneous in That
the Accident Herein Involved Occurred in Kansas, the Substantive
Law of Kansas Is Therefore Controlling, There Are No Mandatory
MAI Instructions Setting Out the Substantive Law of Kansas, and
1. 467 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1971).
2. Id. at 80-81.
3. Id. at 81.
4. Id.
5. Record, vol. 2, at 697.
6. Id. at 699.
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This Instruction Properly States the Substantive Law of Kansas
and Otherwise Complies with the Rules of this Court7
Plaintiff defended the trial court's ruling. First, she argued that MAI
28.01 [now 82.01] was applicable, and, therefore, must be used. Second,
she challenged as erroneous the defendant's contention that the instruction
in question would have been equally acceptable to a Kansas court with
or without the word "direct" included.8 The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling, stating: "[I]f the Missouri Approved
Instructions include an instruction which correctly states the substantive
law of Kansas, the approved instruction must be given." 9
It is a well established conflicts rule that, in an action arising out
of an "occurrence" in a foreign state, questions of substantive law are
determined by the law of the foreign state, while questions of procedure
are controlled by the law of the forum state. 10 Missouri has subscribed
basically to this rule. 1 Therefore, to determine which law applies to a
particular issue, the issue involved must first be characterized as substantive
or procedural. The forum state makes this characterization according to
its own conflict of laws rules.' 2 Unfortunately, once a particular rule is
characterized as procedural or substantive in one fact situation, the courts
have tended to apply the characterization uncritically in all situations. 8
7. Brief for Appellant at 7. Appellant's argument that the instruction prop-
erly stated the substantive law of Kansas was based on the case of Henderson v.
Kansas Power 9- Light Co., 191 Kan. 276, 380 P.2d 443 (1963). Appellant also
argued that although the Kansas Pattern Instructions use the word "directly" in
the causation definition instruction, which is to be used in conjunction with the
contributory negligence instruction, these instructions have advisory status only.
Brief for Appellant at 12. Appellant concluded argument on this point saying
that the Missouri court should relax its technical requirements since this instruc-
tion was "couched in language acceptable to the courts in Kansas .... ." Id. at 13.
8. Brief for Respondent at 22.
9. 467 S.W.2d at 82.
10. Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915); Dixon v. Ramsay, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 594 (1806); Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th
Cir. 1958). See also 16 AMxr. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 76, at n.20 (1964); 15A
C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 22(1), at n.1 (1967).
11. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Rhyne v.
Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1955); Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo.
1955); Menard v. Goltra, 328 Mo. 368, 40 S.W.2d 1053 (1931); Devine v. Rook,
314 S.W.2d 932 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). See also Martinez v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
327 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1959) (inferences and presumptions); Lynde v. Western &
S. Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 147 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956) (admissibility and weight
of evidence); Niehaus v. Joseph Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 164 S.W.2d 180
(St. L. Mo. App. 1942) (exception where remedy is "inseparably interwoven");
Burns v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 123 S.W.2d 185 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939) (demurrer
to evidence).
12. See Noe v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Mo.
1966); Hopkins v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 41, 46, 171 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1943).
13. This is not to say that most laws have not been correctly categorized as
either procedural -or substantive. However, on occasion the inequity of uncritically
declaring a law absolutely procedural or substantive becomes dear. For instance,
the case of Menard v. Goltra, 328 Mo. 368, 40 S.W.2d 1053 (1931), held that,
in Missouri, the burden of proof for contributory negligence is procedural. The
result in this case was that the defendant was required to plead and prove con-
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This may be done for several reasons: convenience, to keep that area of
the law settled, or because a statute or court rule has declared the issue
procedural. 14
In 1962 the Missouri Supreme Court appointed a committee "to
consider means for simplification of instructions to juries including con-
sideration of whether and to What extent standardized or pattern in-
structions might be used for this purpose."1 5 The product of this commit-
tee's efforts was the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions. At the same
time the court amended rules 70.01 and 70.02 of the Missouri Rules of
Civil Procedure. These rules seem to indicate that Missouri courts view
the form of jury instruction as a procedural question.' 6
Because such a procedural device would cut down the "sheer volume
of words," as well as reduce the number of instructional errors which
formed the basis for appeals and reversals,17 Missouri courts readily em-
braced the MAI, chastising those who violated either its letter or its
spirit.18 So zealous were the Missouri courts in maintaining the force and
integrity of the MAI, that case law evolved into a stricter 'master than
court rule. Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 70.01(c) provides that:
"The giving of an instruction in violation of the provisions of this rule
shall constitute error, its prejudicial effect to be judicially determined."
This theoretically leaves the prejudicial effect of a nonconforming instruc-
tion an open question to be determined on an ad hoc basis by the court.
However, the rule has evolved, culminating in Brown v. St. Louis Public
tributory negligence, though if tried under the law of Illinois,. where. the tort
took place, the freedom from contributory negligence would have been part of
the plaintiff's case. The decision was often questioned and criticized, but not
overruled until O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. En Banc
1957), some 26 years later.
14. See, e.g., chs. 509-12, RSMo 1969 (pretrial procedure, procedure forjudgment, new trial motion procedure, appeal procedure, etc.). .
15. Missouri Supreme Court Order Appointing Committee on Jury Instruc-
tions, in Mo. Approved Instr., at XXI (2d ed. 1969).
Simplifying instructions, was a primary goal of the committee, To achieve
this, instructions were cut to the bare essentials and subjected to four tests: "(1) Is
it a correct statement of the law? (2) Is it a complete statement? (3) Is it concise?(4) Is it stated in language that the average juror can understand?" Mo. Sup.
Ct. Comm. on Jury Instr., 1963 Report, in Mo. Approved Instr., at XXIII (2d
ed. 1969).
16. Mo. R. Civ. P. 70.01. Rule 70.01 (b) provides:
Whenever Missouri Approved Instructions contains an instruction ap-
plicable in a particular case which the appropriate party requests or
the court decides to submit, such instruction shall be given to the exdu-
sion of any other on the same subject.
17. In Brown v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. En Banc
1967), the court said: "The system was devised to eliminate the old system of
complex, detailed and frequently argumentative instructions which , resulted
in a high percentage of reversals .... Id. at 257. -
18. See, e.g., Scheele v. American Bakeries Co., 427 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1968);
Skain v. Weldon, 422 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1967); Nugent v. Hamilton & Son, Inc.,
417 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. 1967) (three converse instructions for one verdict director
not allowed); Motsinger v. Queen City Casket Co., 408 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1966)
(unnecessary deviations not permitted).
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Service Co.,' o into a presumption of prejudicial error.2 0 In Brown, which
was cited as controlling in Meredith, there was a similar omission of the
word "direct" before the word "result" (in this instance in a damages
instruction). The court held prejudicial error was presumed "where there
is deviation from an applicable MAI instruction which does not need
modification under the facts of a particular case." 2' Thus, what began
as a noble attempt to make instructions simple and intelligible has re-
sulted in far too many new trials due to the hypertechnical application of
court rule.
The court's conclusion in Meredith that MAI 28.01 [now 32.01] was
an applicable instruction, since it correctly stated the law of Kansas, was
based on two cases, neither of which actually held, contrary to the court's
apparent assumption, that an instruction omitting the word "direct" would
be erroneous. 2 2 To support its conclusion the court cited the Kansas case of
Jefferson v. Clark.23 In that case there were questions concerning the cor-
rectness of either of two instructions which were inconsistent with each
other. The first was found inaccurate because it contained "but for"
language.2 4 The second instruction stated that, to bar recovery, the con-
tributory negligence of plaintiff must be the "direct and proximate" cause
of the collision.2 5 This instruction was upheld because it "seems to be the
rule applied in this state."20 A year after Jefferson, in the case of Henderson
v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,27 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
granting of defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
although the defendant's contributory negligence instruction did not con-
tain the word "directly."2 8 This decision was dismissed in Meredith be-
cause "the adequacy of the instruction was not an issue."29 While this may
provide sufficient reason for holding Henderson not controlling, the case
should not be completely dismissed, since the Jefferson decision is also
completely devoid of any affirmative statement that the word "direct" is
19. 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
20. Id. In Brown the court en banc adopted the earlier divisional holding
in Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo. 1967), where the court had stated
that "[a]ll deviations from the straight and narrow path prescribed by MAI will
be presumed prejudicially erroneous unless it is made perfectly clear that no
prejudice has resulted." See 421 S.W.2d at 259. A concurring opinion in Brown
stated that this ruling went farther than rule 70.01. Id. at 260 (concurring opinion
of Storkman, J.). Brown has been consistently followed. See Brannaker v. Trans-
american Freight Lines, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 524,. 587 (Mo. 1968); Gousetis v. Bange,
425 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. 1968); Cash v. Bolle, 428 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Mo. En Banc
1968); Brittain v. Clark, 462 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
21. Brown v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 421 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Mo. En Banc
1967) (emphasis added).
22. 467 S.W.2d at 82.
23. 190 Kan. 520, 876 P.2d 928 (1962).
24. Id. at 528, 376 P.2d at 925.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. 191 Kan..276, 880 P.2d 448 (1968).
28. Instruction No. 4 for defendant stated: "If you find... that plaintiff was
guilty of negligence ... and that such negligence contributed to plaintiffs inury,
then your verdict -should be for defendant company." Id. at 280, .880 P.2d at 448.
29. 467 S.W.2d at 82.
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necessary. It would seem from these two cases that the most that can: be said
about the use of the phrase "directly caused" in a Kansas- contributory
negligence instruction is that its use is acceptable, perhaps even preferred,
but not necessary.3 0 On close examination then, it appears that the Meredith
decision finessed the Jefferson case into an established rule of law for
Kansas, while completely ignoring the later Henderson decision..
The Meredith court's decision that there was an applicable MAI in-
struction also raises the question of the latitude afforded the word "ap-
plicable." The Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions believed
that the MAI would provide proper instructions in about 80 percent of
the cases tried.3 1 Thus, it was realized that there would arise a substantial
number of situations for which an MAI instruction would not be appropri-
ate.3 2 It would not seem illogical to consider all instructions which purport
to contain the substantive law of a sister state to be in the "not in MAI"
category. Indeed several arguments support such an interpretation. First, the
MAI is a procedural device for submitting the issues more fairly to the jury,
and for eliminating error and appeal; and since it, in most cases, provides
only one instruction for each situation, it is not unreasonable to assume the
drafters never intended to provide instructions on any foreign state's sub-
stantive law. Second, because cases arising under foreign law constitute
only a small percentage of the total cases tried in Missouri, it is not in-
consistent with the committee's estimate of the percentage of situations
"not in MAI" to allow cases involving foreign law to be guided by the
"spirit" of the MAI as provided for by rule 70.01 (e).3 3 Third, the number
of determinations required to establish the validity of an instruction would
be reduced by holding foreign law "not in MAI." Presently, according to
the decision in Meredith, the court must determine: (1) what the sub-
30. This conclusion is reached-as follows: (1) Jefferson did not rule that the
word "direct" is necessary in a contributory negligence instruction, (2) Henderson
allowed an instruction which omitted the word "direct," and (3) the Kansas
Pattern Instructions which contain the word "direct" are not mandatory, as is
MAI, but merely advisory. Pattern Instr. for Kan., at X (2d ed. 1966).
It is interesting to note that in the drafters' comments to Kansas Pattern
Instruction 5.01 (Causation Defined) there was a feeling that it might "be better
to simply eliminate any descriptive word in speaking of causation. .. The Com-
mittee does not recommend this solution, but it refrains only because of insuffi-
cient precedent." Pattern Instr. for Kan., at 92 (2d ed. 1966). In the 1968 Sup-
plement to these instructions the committee commented: "We now suggest that
no instruction defining causation be given, and the adjective modifiers "direct"
and "proximate" be no longer used when instructing about cause or result."
Pattern Instr. for Kan., at 16 (Supp. 1968).
31. Mo. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instr., 1963 Report, in Mo. Approved Instr.,
at L (2d ed. 1969).
32. Mo. R. Crw. P. 70.01 (e) was designed to guide the drafting of instructions
when there is no applicable MAT. It provides that:
Where an MAI must be modified to fairly submit the issues in a particular
case, or where there is no applicable MAI so that an instruction not in
MAI must be given, then such modification or such instructions- shall be
simple, brief, impartial, free from argument, and shall not submit to thejury or require findings of detailed evidentiary facts.
33. Where a Missouri Approved Instruction must be modified, the variation
is governed by rule 70.01 (e), not by rule 70.01 (c). Slagle v. Singer, 419 S.W.2d 9(Mo. 1967).
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stantive law of the foreign jurisdiction is, (2) whether the MAI correctly
states that law, (3) whether the instruction offered deviates from MAI, and
(4) whether the deviation from the MAI is prejudicial. On the other hand,
if cases involving foreign substantive law always fell within rule 70.01 (e),
the court would only be required to determine: (1) what the foreign sub-
stantive law is, (2) whether the instruction offered correctly states that
law, and (3) whether the offered instruction is "simple, briefL impartial,
free from argument, and .. . [does not] ... require findings of detailed
evidentiary facts."3 4 Finally, it should be noted that in declaring all foreign
substantive law to be "not in MAI" the force and integrity of the MAI
within Missouri would not be lessened since these decisions would create
no precedent for cases arising under Missouri law. In light of the above,
if the Missouri courts are unwilling to hold that instructions involving
foreign law are always to be viewed in light of rule 70.01 (e), it is submitted
that at the very least the courts should not apply the Brown presumption of
invalidity when there is any deviation from an applicable MAI instruction.
Difficulties will undoubtedly arise if the word "applicable" continues
to hold the meaning given it in Meredith for any length of time. What will
happen when the substantive law of Kansas, or Iowa, or New York is un-
clear in some area? Will the MAI be applied? If so, will it be applied with
the previously displayed vigor? Should MAI be strictly applied when
either of two instructions, one of which is in the MAI, would be acceptable
to the foreign state?3 5 It would seem that Missouri has chosen to force a
plaintiff to undergo a new trial, due to a violation of a hypertechnical rule
of Missouri procedure, even though the alleged violation was in the form
of a jury instruction almost certainly acceptable to the courts of Kansas,.
whose substantive law governed. This writer questions whether there exists
a state interest sufficiently strong to warrant imposing the burden of an
additional trial on the parties, as well as on its own courts, when the sub-
stantive rules in the case are governed by another state. As far back as 1909
Missouri courts held that: "[I]n administering the substantive laws of a
sister state we administer them, not our own; and we should not ad-
minister them either more or less blandly than do our sister's courts."'30
34. Mo. R. Civ. P. 70.01 (e). If the court should continue following Meredith
it may find itself applying a "law of diminishing returns." If a certain aspect
of the substantive law of a foreign state has been ruled on it would not set a
firm precedent because a continual re-examination of foreign courts' decisions
would be needed to see if MAI still applies, applied but no longer applies, or
did not apply but now does. This problem would be compounded if a later
decision made the law unclear. It would seem reasonable, in order to avoid the
possibility of this confusion, to allow foreign substantive law instructions to be
governed by rule 70.01 (e).
35. It is submitted that this is really the situation in Meredith, and if so, it
would seem that Missouri has taken the position that MAI must predominate
over any other acceptable instruction.
36. Newlin v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. 222 Mo. 375,-892, 121 S.W. 125, 130
(1909). It is submitted that if the Missouri Supreme Court were presented with
a factual situation similar to that in Meredith, but arising in a state whose law
was substantially different than Missouri's, there would be a strong likelihood that
that the effects" bf Meredith would be limited to a situation where the necessary
substantive content of a foreign instruction is well settled, and MAI completely
1972)
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It is submitted that the court in Meredith undoubtedly did not view
this case as making law in a heretofore unentered area, but, merely as an-
other situation in which to uphold the letter of the MAI. Nevertheless,
what the case may in fact do is establish a precedent for extending the MAI
farther than its drafters and its proponents intended.
ROBERT FwxLuN DEIS
LABOR LAW-FEDERAL LAW CONTROLS CONSTRUCTION
OF TERM "POLITICAL SUBDIVISION" IN NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District'
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 102 petitioned the National Labor
Relations Board for a representation election. In the representation pro-
ceeding, the Natural Gas Utility District argued that it was a political
subdivision of Tennessee and, therefore, exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Board.2 The Board, finding that the District was neither created direct-
ly by the state, nor administered by state-appointed or publicly elected
officials, held that the District was not a political subdivision within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act,3 even though a state statute4
and a state supreme court decision 5 indicated that the District was an
comprehends the necessary criteria. While this writer feels such a rule would
not be advisable, if such is to be the eventual rule, Meredith, with its shaky
analysis of Kansas law, would seem an inappropriate foundation upon which to
build.
1. 402 U.S. -600 (1971).
2. See National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 2 (2), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2)(1970). The applicable portion of the definition of "employer" is: "The term
'employer'... shall not include... any State or political subdivision thereof .... "
If the entity under consideration is a political subdivision within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act, it is exempt from the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board even if the entity under consideration is found
to affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., New Bedford, Woods
Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 127 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1324 (1960).
Further, if the entity under consideration is exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Board, labor disputes involving the entity's employees are subject to state
law. See, e.g., International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga.
712, 124 S.E.2d 733, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962).
A different problem arises when the entity is a political subdivision, and the
political subdivision, rather than a union or employees of the .political sub-
division, seeks relief from the Board. In this situation, the Board may grant
relief. Plumbers Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151.68 (1970).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2607 (1955).
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instrumentality of the state.6 The Board said that while such state law
declarations are considered, state law declarations do not control the
determination -of whether an entity qualifies as a "political subdivision"
within -the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.7
The union won the election and was certified by the Board as bargain-
ing representative of the District's pipefitters. The District, however, re-
fused to recognize and bargain with the Union. Consequently, the Union
brought an unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board.8 The Board,
finding the District in violation of sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the
Act,9 entered a cease and desist order against the District. The District,
however, continued its non-compliance.
As a .result, the Board sought enforcement of its orler in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.1 0 The court of appeals,
basing its. decision on the fact that state law indicated that the District
was a political subdivision, held that the District was a political sub-
division -wit4in the meaning of the Act and, therefore, refused to enforce
the Board's order.-1 On certiorari, the. Supreme Court, finding that the
District was- administered by individuals responsible to public officials,
affirmed .the :co1urt of appeals' determination that the District was a politi-
cal subdivision within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, exempt
from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.' 2 Although
reaching.the same result as the court of appeals, the Supreme Court based
its decision -on different grounds. Specifically, the Supreme Court held
that federal law, not state law, is controlling on the question of whether
an entity is a political subdivision.' s
6. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 167 N.L.R.B. 691 (1967).
7. Id. at 691. The Board relied on NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership
Corp., 34a F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), which affirmed the Board's order in Randolph
Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1968). The Board had said that a
state law. declaration should not control where the entity under consideration
was neither created directly by the state, nor administered by state-appointed or
publicly elected officials. id. at 161.
8. The unfair labor practice proceeding was brought pursuant to National
Labor Relations Act § 10 (b), 29 U.S.C. §. 160 (b) (1970).
,9. Id. §§ 8(a) (1), (5), 29 U.S.C. at §§ 158 (a) (1), (5). These provisions
provide that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain or coerce his employees in the exercise of their rights. guaranteed by the
Act, or, to refuse to bargain with his employees.
10. See Id. § 10 (e), 29 U.S.C. at § 160 (e), where it is provided that the
Board may 'seek enforcement of an order or appropriate temporary relief or
restraining order in federal court. The District, had it so chosen, could have also
sought review of the Board's final order in the appropriate federal court. Id. § 10(f),
29 U.S.C.' at § 160 (f).
11: NLR.B v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 427 F.2d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 1970). For
discussion of this case see Comment, Political Subdivisions-Qualifications for Ex-
clusion from the Labor-Management Relations Act, 28 WAsH. S LEE L. -Rrv. 268
(1971); Note, Political Subdivisions versus Employers: Does Jurisdiction of NLRB
Extend to Public Utility Districts?, 1 MEMPHis ST. L. Rnv. 847 (1971). The court's
refusal to enforce the Board's order is provided for in § 10 (e) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1970).
12. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 609 (1971).
13.. Id.. at 602,03. "Entity" is used rather than "employer" because a political
subdivision is Excluded from the jurisdiction of the Board; it does not fit within
the definition of "employer" as provided in the Act. See note 2 supra.
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Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,14 it has been said that federal courts have the power to
choose whether federal or state law is to control an issue substantially
related to a federally enacted program.15 Thus, the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District'6 could choose whether federal or
state law is to control the meaning of "political subdivision." Of course,
if Congress had provided some direction on this issue, the Court would
have been bound to follow Congress' guidance;1 7 but since there was no
such guidance,' 8 the choice of law devolved on the Court.19
While the Supreme Court had never explicitly considered whether
federal or state law is to control the meaning of the- term "political sub-
division" as found in the National ' Labor Relations Act,2 0 the issue had
been ruled on by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.21 In NLRB v.
Randolph Electric Membership Corp.,22 the respondent electric corporation
argued that Congress, by exempting political subdivigions from the juris-
diction of the Board, evidenced an intention riot only. to disclaim federal
jurisdiction over state political subdivisions, but also to make state law
declarations control the determination as to whether an entity is a political
subdivision within the meaning of the'Act.23 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals responded to this argument by saying that the fact -that a North
Carolina statute characterized the entity under consideration as a political
subdivision was not decisive on the question of ';vhether the- entity was
a political subdivision within the meaning of the National Labor Rela-
14. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
15. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence- and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. -PA. L:. REv. 797, 833(1957), where it is said: "The enduring contribution of Clearfield:is its clear estab-
lishment of power in the fedeial courts to select the governing .law in matters
related to going operations of the -national government." .
16. 402 U.S. 600 (1971).
17. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 811. ,
18. "The term 'political subdivision' is not defined in the Act and its legis-
lative history is silent as to the purpose of Congress in using these ivords." NLRB
v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1965).
19. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 811.
20. However, the Supreme Court had said that when the state of Missouri
took over and ran Kansas City Transit, Inc., under-a statute providing for tempo-
rary state control of a public utility during labor strife, the state's- involvement
fell far short of creating a political subdivision exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Board. Division 1287, Bus Employees Union v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
The Supreme Court also has determined whether federal or state law is to
control other issues related to the national labor acts. The Court has-held that
federal law must prevail with respect to the meaning of the term "employee" as
used in the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111 (1944). The Court has similarly held, in suits under § 301 (a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1970),
that federal law, as fashioned from the policy of the national labor laws, is the ap-
plicable substantive law. Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln; Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957).
21. NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp.343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 62. .
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tions Act.2 4 According to the Fourth Circuit the "actual operations and
characteristics" of the entity were determinative.2 5
The court's decision in Randolph Electric was based largely on two
factors. First, Congress does not make a statute dependent on state law
unless there is "a plain indication to the contrary."2 6 Second, the con-
gressional purpose in enacting the labor acts was to protect uniformly
the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively.2 7 To allow
state law to control the definition of "political subdivision" would defeat
this purpose.28
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility
District,2 9 took an opposite view, saying that
the state has a right to create its own political subdivisions, and
when its creations have been held by the state's highest court to
constitute political subdivisions that ought to be binding on federal
administrative agencies. 30
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit, much like the Fourth Circuit in Randolph
Electric, felt it was preventing the possible frustration of one purpose of
the Act.31 The Sixth Circuit felt the overriding purpose to be upheld
was the exclusion of entities which are arguably political subdivisions
from the coverage of the Act; 32 the Fourth Circuit, on the other hand,
felt the overriding purpose to be upheld was the protection, on a national
scale, of employee rights.33
In Natural Gas, the Supreme Court easily disposed of the problem
of whether federal or state law is to control the meaning of "political
subdivision."3 4 The Court, without any explanation, explicitly said that
it agreed with the Board that federal law, not state law, governs the
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 62. For this proposition, the court relied on Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101 (1943).
27. 343 F.2d at 63. For this proposition, the court relied on NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
28. 343 F.2d at 63.
29. 427 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1970).
30. Id. at 315. The dissent, however, would have upheld the Board's deter-
mination and granted enforcement of the Board's order on authority of NLR.B
v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
31. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 427 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1970). The court
said:
It was the clear intention of Congress not to make amenable to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act employees of either federal or state govern-
ments. The effect of the order of the Board in the present case may be
to extend its jurisdiction over public employees in nearly 270 Utility
Districts in Tennessee, which Districts perform a wide variety of public
functions. Id. at 315.
32. Id.
33. NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir.
1965).
34. All nine of the Justices felt federal law should control. NLRB v. Natural
Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 n.2 (1971).
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determination' of whether an entity is a political subdivision.3 5 Then the
Court adopted as correct law the language of Randolph Electric.3 6 In
so doing the Court accepted the uniformity argument; namely, that the
operation of the Act should not be dependent on the vagaries of state
law. 37
While .the Supreme Court clearly declared that federal law controls
the meaning of "political subdivision" under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the Court did not clearly explain what factors would control
in making this determination under federal law.
The National Labor Relations Board had considered the question
of whether an entity was a political subdivision a number of times. In
so doing, the .Board had specified several factors which it thought were
significant in determining whether the entity under consideration was
a political subdivision.38 One factor considered important was the manner
of creation of the entity.39 Another was the manner in which the entity's
administrators were selected.4 0 Further, if a tax exemption had been granted
to the entity, such exemption was to be considered. 41 Similarly, other
considerations were whether the entity had special powers, 42 whether
35. Id. at 602-03.
36. Id. at 603-04.
37.. Id. at 604.
38. Of course, if the entity under consideration was a city, it was held to be
a political subdivision. E.g., City of Austell Nat'l. Gas Sys., 75 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1970);
Local 833, UAW, 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956); City of Anchorage, 82 L.R.R.M. 1549
(1953).
One argument that historically has been put forward to determine whether
or not an entity* is. a political subdivision relates to the legislative history of the
Act. The first version of the bill presented to the Senate used this language: "the
term 'employer' . . .shall not include . . . any State, municipal corporation, or
other governmental instrumentality .... See NLRB, LEGisLATivE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATiONS Acr, 1935, at 2 (1949). This argument adopts the
theory that since the above language was changed to: "the term 'employer' ... shall
not include . . any State or political subdivision thereof ... ," Congress intended
only to exclude functions traditionally governmental in nature. Thus if the entity
is inVolved in 'a' proprietary function, as opposed to a governmental function, it
is not excluded from the definition of "employer." This argument, however, is
usually unsuccessful. See, e.g., Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285, 1291 (1941)
(dissenting opinion), and Justice Stewart's dissent in NLRB v. Natural Gas Util.
Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 609 (1971). Justice Stewart said:
The question ... is not whether the District is a state instrumentality,
but whether it is a 'political subdivision' of the State. And the provisions
in question hardly go to that issue. Id. at 610 (dissenting opinion).
39. Compare Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 8 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1938) (dock commission
created directly by' the state held to be a political subdivision), and New Jersey
Turnpike Auth., 33 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954) (turnpike authority created directly
by state legislature held to be a political subdivision), with Oxnard Harbor Dist.,
34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941) (harbor district created pursuant to a general enabling
statute but administered by commissioners elected by the qualified voters of the
district held to be a political subdivision).
40. See, e.g., Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941); New Jersey
Turnpike Autll., 33 L.R..PM. 1528 (1954).
41. See, e.g., New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 33 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954) (property
and bonds tax.-exempt).
42. See, e.g., Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941) (district had
power to tax and the right of eminent domain); New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 33
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it had previously been classified as a part of the state,43 and whether the
state paid certain deficiencies arising from the entity's operations. 44 Con-
versely, certain other factors were either insignificant or significant in
a negative way.45
In 1963, the Board apparently decided that out of these factors two
were predominant.4 6 From these two, the Board developed a test to deter-
mine whether or not an entity was to be classified as a political sub-
division within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. Under
the test, an entity was exempt from the jurisdiction of the Board, as a
political subdivision, if:
(1) it was created directly by the state, or
(2) it was administered by state-appointed or publicly elected
officials.4 7
The Board developed the test further by applying it in a number of
decisions. 48 In these decisions the Board did not explicitly rely on the
L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954) (authority had power to collect tolls and the right of
eminent domain).
43. See, e.g., New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, & Nantucket
S.S. Auth., 127 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1324 (1960). The Board, in concluding the authority
was a political subdivision, relied on state law. The Board also said the fact that
the authority's bonds were classified as those of the state was significant, but the
Board has since changed its view of the importance of state law declarations. See
Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1963).
44. See, e.g., New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, &t Nantucket
S.S. Auth., 127 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1324 (1960).
45. See, e.g., Middle Dep't Ass'n of Fire Underwriters, 122 N.L.R.B. 1115
(1959). The fact that the association was required to be licensed by the state and
was subject to special regulation did not establish that the association was a politi-
cal subdivision of the state. Moreover, the fact that the association set its own labor
relations policies, did its own hiring and firing, and handled its own personnel
matters refuted the contention that the association was a political subdivision.
46. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1963):
One or both of these factors [created directly by the state, or administered
by state-appointed or publicly elected officials] have been present in those
cases where, over the years, the Board has held that it had no jurisdiction
of various governmental employers. Id. at 161.
47. The Board first explicitly mentioned these two alternative factors in
Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1963). The Board, how-
ever, said only that a state law declaration could not control where neither of
these elements was satisfied. In Natural Gas Util. Dist., 167 N.L.R.B. 691 (1967),
the Board's determination was based on all of the "relevant factors," one of which
was the test. However, in Fayetteville-Lincoln County Elec. Sys., 74 L.R.R.M.
1278 (1970), the Board relied exclusively on the test.
There is an element of confusion in Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 75
L.R.R.M. 1430 (1970), where it was said: "Early in its history the Board held that
the Section 2 (2) exemption applied to public bodies created: (1) directly by a
State and governed by state officials appointed by the State; or (2) by election
by voters of a state-created district." Id. at 1431. As a practical matter, this is not
an alteration of the test, since most entities which are directly created by the state
are also governed by state-appointed officials. See, e.g., Fayetteville-Lincoln County
Elec. Sys., supra; New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, & Nantucket S.S.
Auth., 127 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1960); New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 33 L.R.R.M. 1528
(1954).
48. For decisions amplifying created directly by the state: Compare Fayette-
ville-Lincoln County Elec. Sys., 74 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1970) (municipally owned
1972]-
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test alone; rather, the Board noted other factors to support its conclusions.
However, these additional factors were only mentioned when they sup-
ported the conclusion that the Board would have reached through use
of the test alone.49 Thus, while the Board noted these other factors in
its decisions, the Board relied on its test to determine whether the entity
under consideration was a political subdivision within the meaning of
the Act.
Two courts of appeals, each petitioned by the Board for enforce-
ment of a cease and desist order, reached different results with respect
to the validity of the Board's test. In Randolph Electric, the Fourth Cir-
cuit felt the Board's construction of the meaning of "political subdivision"
was entitled to great respect5 0 Conversely, in Natural Gas, the Sixth Cir-
cuit challenged the validity of the Board's test. The Sixth Circuit said
the entity need not be created directly by the state.5 1 Rather, it was
corporation created by private act in the state legislature held to be a political
subdivision), with Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1963)
(utility, formed with permission of state rural electric authority which had been
created directly by the state, held not to be created directly by the state) and
Virginia Pilot Ass'n, 159 N.L.R.B. 1733 (1966) (private unincorporated pilot as-
sociation created by private persons held not to be a political subdivision). For
decisions amplifying administered by state-appointed or publicly elected officials:
Compare Fayetteville-Lincoln County Elec. Sys. supra (superintendent in charge
of day-to-day affairs of municipal corporation had been appointed by a board
of trustees appointed by the mayor; corporation held to be administered by
publicly elected officials), with Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 75 L.R.R.M.
1430 (1970) (directors elected by landowners within the district; district held not
to be administered by publicly elected officials). See also Truckee-Carson Irrigation
Dist., 164 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1967); Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941)(district's directors elected by qualified voters of district; district held administered
by publicly elected officials); Virginia Pilot Ass'n, supra (where private unin-
corporated association selected its own officers, this element of the test was not
satisfied).
49. For example, where a pilot association satisfied neither element of the
test, the Board supported its conclusion that the pilot association was not a political
subdivision by saying that it was significant that the association established its own
personnel policies free of the state merit system and that the association could
appeal the determination of pilotage rates. Virginia Pilot Ass'n, 159 N.L.R.B.
1733, 1734 (1966). Similarly, where the Board had already decided than an irrigation
district did not satisfy the test, the Board supported its conclusion that the district
was not a political subdivision by noting that under state law the district was
not a political subdivision. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 164 N.L.R.B. 1176,
1177 (1967). On the other hand, where the Board decided that the entity did not
satisfy the test, but where state law called the entity a political subdivision, the
Board said that such a state law declaration was not controlling where the test was
not satisfied. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 158, 161 (1963).
Also, where the entity satisfied neither element, but the entity's property was exempt
from taxation and the entity had the power to levy and collect taxes and the right
of eminent domain, the Board disrcgarded these factors and held that the entity
was not a political subdivision. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 75 L.R.R.M.
1430 (1970).
50. NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir.
1965).
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said to be sufficient for the entity to qualify for the exemption if the
entity was created in conformity with state law. 2
Thus, at the time Natural Gas came before the Supreme Court, the
manner in which the Board itself would determine whether the entity
under consideration was a political subdivision was well established. How-
ever, there was a conflict in the courts of appeals as to whether this
manner reflected a proper construction of the Act.
In Natural Gas, the Supreme Court avoided considering whether an
entity must necessarily satisfy the Board's test to qualify for the exemp-
tion.53 Rather, the Court said that the second element of the Board's
test is not whether the entity is administered by state-appointed or publicly
elected officials, but whether the entity is administered by individuals who
are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.5 4 The Court
concluded that application of the proper second element dearly indicated
that the District was a political subdivision.55 The Court supported its
conclusion by reviewing the Tennessee statute under which the District
had been created, noting that the District had the right of eminent domain
and that under other federal statutes the District had been classified as
a political subdivision.5 6 Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, asserted that the
Board's decision that the District was not a political subdivision embodied
a reasonable construction of the Act.57
The Supreme Court's decision in Natural Gas is significant in several
ways. The Court clearly stated that federal law controls the meaning of
"political subdivision."58 In so doing, the Court prevented the potential
frustration of national labor policy that could arise if the states were
allowed to determine what entities are exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Board. 59 Allowing state law to control this issue possibly would intro-
duce variances in the statute's operation to such an extent that a truly
national labor policy would be impossible.0 0 While the Court clearly
stated that federal law controls the meaning of "political subdivision,"
the Court did not clearly analyze what factors control this determination
52. Id. (dictum).
53. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971).
54. Id. This change in terminology appeared in the Board's brief. Brief for
Petitioner at 11.
55. Id. The Court said that since a county judge appointed the District's
commissioners and the District's managers were subject to removal by the governor,
county prosecutor or private citizens, the District was administered by individuals
responsible to publicly elected officials or to the general electorate. The countyjudge, however, had no choice as to whom he was to appoint. He had to appoint
the first three names on the petition seeking formation of the District. NLRB v.
Natural Gas Util. Dist., 427 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1970). Therefore, the subjec-
tion to removal must be the factor which satisfied the new second element of the
test.
56. 402 U.S. at 605. By using other federal law declarations, the Court made
these previous classifications a factor to be considered in the determination whether
an entity is to be classified a political subdivision under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
57. Id. at 609 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 603.
59. See Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
60. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944).
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under federal law. First, although the Court indicated that..the Board's
construction of the broad statutory term is entitled to great respect, it
stated that the case did not require it to decide whether the Board test
had to be satisfied in order to qualify for the exemption.61 Second, in
declaring the second alternative of the test, the Court relied on the Board's
brief as a correct statement of this element.62 The Board's brief cited
Randolph Electric for the proposition that the second alternative of the
test is whether the entity is administered by individuals who are "respon-
sible to public officials or the general electorate."63 Randolph Electric,
however, states the second alternative of the test to be whether the entity
is administered by individuals who are "state-appointed or publicly
elected."6 4 For some unknown reason this language was altered in the
Board's brief. Whatever the reason for this change in terminology, the
Supreme Court adopted the change. 5 If the Board adheres to this new
statement of the second element of the test, it is submitted that the number
of entities exempt from the jurisdiction of the Board will increase. This
can be illustrated by the fact that the Board, in the representation pro-
ceedings, through use of the old terminology, found that the District was
not a political subdivision.66 When the Court applied the new terminology,
the District was found to be a political subdivision, largely because its
managers were subject to removal by public officials or the general elec-
torate. Subjection to removal does not, alone, satisfy the old "state-ap-
pointed or publicly elected" language. 67 Thus, if the Board adheres to
the new terminology, 270 utility districts in Tennessee alone will be
outside the jurisdiction of the Board. Employees of entities so exempted
will be left to state remedies, thereby narrowing the coverage of the national
labor laws.6 8  JAMES S. ALLEN, JR.
61. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971).
62. Id. at 604-05.
63. Brief for Petitioner at 11.
64. NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir.
1965).
65. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971).
66. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 167 N.L.R.B. 691 (1967).
67. See note 55 supra.
68. See note 2 supra. It is paradoxical that the Court lessened the national
scope of the Act by altering the second element of the Board's test; the Court's
purpose in adopting federal law to control the meaning of "political subdivision"
was to ensure the uniform, national coverage of the Act. However, it may be that
the Court had two purposes in mind. The first was the prevention of the mere
labelling by the states of entities as political subdivisions to avoid national regula-
tion. See text accompanying note 33 supra. The second purpose was the exclusion
from coverage of the Act of entities which are arguably political subdivisions. See
text accompanying note 32 supra. The first purpose could be obtained by choos-
ing federal law; the second by enlarging the Board's test. If the Court's treatment
of this exclusion significantly lessens the number of employers subject to the
Board's jurisdiction, an amendment may be necessary. However, an amendment,
even if it only partially does away with the exemption to political subdivisions
of the states, may raise the question of whether the exclusion of "any State or
political subdivision thereof" is constitutionally required. That the- exclusion is
not so required see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). and United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). That the exclusion may be so required see Justice
Douglas' dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra.
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LOTTERIES-THE CONSIDERATION REQUIREMENT
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Danforth'
P1laiptiff Mobil brought this action seeking to have its promotional
game "International Flags" declared not to be a lottery under the Missouri
Constitution and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereto,2 and to enjoin
the Attorney General of Missouri from interfering with the conduct of
the game.
The rules of "International Flags" provided that any licensed driver
could obtain game pieces and a game card at any participating Mobil gas
station: Some .game pieces were by themselves winners and could be re-
deemed for a cash prize immediately. However, most pieces had to be
affixed to the card, certain combinations of which produced a winner. Even
though no purchase was necessary, the number of persons who played the
game without making a purchase was small.
This suit was Mobil's reaction to a policy statement issued by the
Attorney General which, in effect, was a warning that ,promotional games,
such as the one Mobil sponsored, were, in the Attorney General's opinion,
illegal lotteries and that action would be taken against those who continued
the games'after a specified date. The trial court ruled that Mobil's game
was not a lottery and granted an injunction against the Attorney General.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed.
The Missouri Supreme Court has defined a lottery as including "every
scheme or device whereby anything of value is for a consideration allotted
by chance."3 Thus the elements of a lottery are prize, chance and considera-
tion. That-prize and chance were present in the Mobil game is indisputable.
The question in Mobil, therefore, was whether consideration passed from
the participants to the oil company. This question can be answered only
1. 455 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. Mo. CONsT. art III, § 39:
The general assembly shall not have power:
(9) To authorize lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall
enact laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets, or
tickets in any scheme in the nature of a lottery.
§ 565.430, RSMo 1969:
If any person shall make or establish, or aid or assist in making or estab-
lishing, any lottery, gift enterprise, policy or scheme of drawing in the
nature of a lottery as a business or avocation in this state, or shall advertise
or make public, or cause to be advertised or made public, by means of any
newspaper, pamphlet, circular, or any written or printed notice thereof,
prinited or circulated in this state, any such lottery, gift enterprise, policy
or schene or drawing in the nature of a lottery, whether the same is being
Sor is to be conducted, held or drawn within or without this state, he shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than five
ytears, or by imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse for not less than
six nor more than twelve months, provided, however, that this section shall
apply 'only where there is consideration in the form of money, or its
equivalent, paid to or received by the person awarding the prize. (Itali-
cized portion added by amendment. Mo. Laws 1965, at 685.) •
8. State v. Emerson, 318 Mo. 633, 639, 1 S.W.2d 109, 111 (1927).
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when the type of consideration necessary for a lottery is determined. Is it
only that technical amount of consideration needed to support a contract
(that which is the object of a bargain between promissor and promisee-
generally a benefit to the promissor or a detriment to the promisee whether
in the nature of money or not), or must the consideration be pecuniary in
nature (something valuable paid to the promissor by the promisee)?4
Lotteries were originally favored in this country as a legitimate means
of raising money for public, educational and charitable purposes, but the
bribery and corruption they spawned caused them to fall into disrepute.5
Lotteries were first prohibited in Missouri by statute in 1842,6 and in 1865
this prohibition was raised to the constitutional level it holds today.7 The
Missouri Supreme Court has condemned lotteries as preying upon the
"credulity of the unwary" and arousing the "gambling instinct."8 Other
state courts have given additional insight into the conditions- that anti-
lottery legislation was meant to combat. For instance, the Supreme Court
of Alabama has said:
The evil following from them has been the cultivation of the
gambling spirit-the hazarding of money with the hope by chance
of obtaining a larger sum, often stimulating an inordinate love
of gain, arousing the most violent passions of one's baser nature,
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
The jurisdictions are split on this issue. The first case holding that only pecuniary
consideration will support a lottery was Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196
(1889), which was subsequently overruled in Grimes v. State, 235 Ala. 192, 178
So. 73 (1938), but not before it became precedent for many other jurisdictions.
See F. WILLIAMS, LOTTERIES, LAWS AND MORALS 290-99 (1958). For a case support-
ing the majority view that mere contractual consideration is all that is needed,
see Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487 (1955).
5. F. WILLIAMS, FLEXIBLE-PARTICIPATION LOTTERIES §§ 7, 14 (1938).
6. Mo. Laws 1842, at 85, §§ 1-4. In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller,
66 Mo. 328, 341 (1877), it is indicated that a statute prohibiting the sale of lottery
tickets was passed in 1836. However, an examination of the session laws for
that year did not reveal the statute. State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389 (1845), seems
to confirm the fact that the first anti-lottery statute appeared in 1842.
7. Mo. CoNsT. art. IV, § XXVIII (1865):
The general assembly shall never authorize any lottery; nor shall the
sale of lottery tickets be allowed; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized
be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold.
8. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 341 Mo. 862,
875, 110 S.W.2d 705, 713 (En Banc 1937); State ex rel. Home Planners Depository
v. Hughes, 299 Mo. 529, 537, 253 SA. 229, 231 (En Banc 1923).
Lotteries were also condemned as an undesirable way for businessmen to
compete by a delegate to the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1945. Brief
for Appellant at 44, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Danforth, 455 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. En Banc
1970), citing VERBATiM STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPTION OF DEBATES OF THE CONSTITu-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI, ll1th day, 865-73 (1944). "International Flags" is
squarely within this particular evil, but that remark should not be credited with
being part of Missouri's policy. In State ex rel. Heimberger v. Curators of Univ. of
Mo., 268 Mo. 598, 616, 188 S.W. 128, 132 (En Banc 1916), the court stated:
Even when they are relevant ... constitutional debates are not the most
trustworthy aids, since these in no wise necessarily represent the views of
the majority of the convention, and less certainly reflect those of the
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sometimes tempting the gambler to risk all he possesses .... It is
in the light of these facts, and the mischief thus intended to be
remedied, that we must construe our statutory and constitutional
prohibitions against lotteries .... 9
The Montana Supreme Court has expressed the view that the framers of
their constitution "were seeking to suppress and restrain the spirit of
gambling which is cultivated and stimulated by schemes whereby one is
induced to hazard his earnings with the hope of large winnings."'1 Like-
wise, the Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded that "anti-lottery
statutes were enacted to prevent the impoverishment of the individual."'1
The Mobil court based its decision on the 1938 case of State v. Mc-
Ewan,' 2 which involved a movie theatre promotion called "bank night."
On specified nights the patrons of the theater registered their names in a
book opposite a number. Later in the evening a number was selected, the
holder of which received $25 if he presented himself at the stage within
two and one half minutes. No extra charge was levied for the chance to
take part in the drawing. In addition, one could participate without paying
admission; the registration book was placed in the lobby so that non-patrons
were also able to sign. These non-patrons would wait in the lobby or on
the sidewalk where the winning number would also be announced. They
too had to comply with the time limit. The court held that there was suf-
ficient consideration' 3 to make it an illegal lottery, but was vague as to
what actually constituted that consideration. According to the Mobil court,
"International Flags" fell squarely within the prohibition of the McEwan
case because the schemes in both cases allowed free participation.' 4 But
dose analysis reveals that the two cases could arguably have been dis-
tinguished on an interpretation of what the McEwan court found the con-
sideration in bank night to be.
The McEwan court may have found consideration in the price of the
theatre ticket. The- Supreme Court of Texas was cited in McEwan as cor-
rectly pointing out that the non-paying participants did not have as good
a chance to win as those who paid for a theatre seat and were able to see
the drawing and to hear the announcement first hand.'3 Four other bank
night cases, cited by the McEwan court as supporting its conclusion, also
found consideration from evidence that paying customers actually had or
reasonably believed they had a better chance to win by virtue of being on
the inside. 16 The McEwan court also stated that the promoter's attempt to
9., Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 200 (1889).
10. State v. Cox, 136 Mont. 507, 511, 349 P.2d 104, 106 (1960).
11. Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Ore. 272, 281, 377 P.2d 150, 155 (1963).
12. 343 Mo. 213, 120 S.W.2d 1098 (En Banc 1938).
13. Id. at 221, 120 S.W.2d at 1101.
14. 455 S.W.2d at 507.
15. State v. McEwan, 343 Mo. 213, 219, 120 S.W.2d 1098, 1100 (En Banc
1938), citing City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Park, 100 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.
1936).
16. Jorman v. State, 54 Ga. App. 738, 188 S.E. 925 (1936); Iris Amusement
Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937); Commonwealth v. Wall, 3 N.E.2d
28 (Mass. 1936); State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 P. 37 (1926).
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eliminate the element of consideration failed in that bank night was not
in fact free.'17 Therefore, the scheme could be classified as called for pe-
cuniary 'consideration because the theatre patrons paid partly for the movie
and partly for the chance to win even though the admission price -was not
raised on bank nights.' 8 If this was the basis of the McEwan decision, then
the Mobil situation is clearly distinguishable because non-paying partici-
pants had the same chance to win as participants who actually made a
purchase.'
There is some indication in McEwan of a broader holding. At one
point in the opinion the court stated that bank night, because it required
the participants' presence at the theatre, was surely a revenue producer. 9
In addition, bne of the cases cited by the court held that increased revenues
constituted the required consideration.2 0 In other words, under this analysis,
something of'value need not pass from the participant to the sponsor in
order to constitute a lottery, as long as revenue is somehow produced from
the lottery.2 ' If this was the McEw.an holding, and it is by no means clear
that it was, then the court came very close to adopting a non-pecuniary con-
sideration approach (benefit to the promissor), althouigh proper considera-
tion analysis would seem to dictate that the theatre bargained for the
presence of the participants at the theatre (detriment to the promisee).
It was apparently the Mobil court's view that McEwan required only
non-pecuniary consideration even though the McEwan court nowhere men-
tioned this term. 22 Though the Mobil court did not articulate this view, the
consideration to be found in "International Flags" appeared contractual in
nature. (i.e., there was detriment to the participant in that he had to go to
the gas station to participate, and benefit to the gas station arising from in-
creased traffic, both of which arose from Mobil's bargaining for the par-
ticipants presence), and the Mobil court found "International Flags" to be
squarely within the prohibition of McEwan. That' finding'is logical if both
games are con'sidered as involving free participation, and only non-pecuniary
consideration. But as the foregoing analysis reveals, the holding of McEwan
that bank night was a lottery may very well have been based on a finding of
something more than merely non-pecuniary consideration. The Mobil court,
by summarily classifying "International Flags" with bank night, was ap-
parently analyzing bank night independently rather than exploring the
McEwan'Court's analysis of it.
17. 343 Mo. at 219, 120 S.W.2d at 1100.
18. See State v. Mumford, 73 Mo. 647 (1881), in which a scheme whereby
each subscriber to a newspaper received a lottery ticket in addition to his sub-
scription t at no extra charge, was held to be a lottery.'
19. 343 Mo. at 222, 120 S.W.2d at 1102.
20. State ex rel. Beck v. Fox Kan. Theatre Co., 144 Kan. 687, 62 P.2d 929
(1936).
21. It should be noted that the trial court in Mobil found, as a matter of
fact, ";that it wtas impossible to directly relate any specific increase in sales solely
to any promotional game. Brief for Respondent at 14, Mobil Oil Corp; v. Dan-
forth, 455 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
22. However, McEwan did cite Maughs v. Porter,- 157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242
(1931), which is one of the leading cases holding contractual consideration to
be enough to support a lottery.
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The McEwan case was decided under the lottery provision of the Mis-
souri Constitution of 1875.23 When the provision was re-enacted in .the con-
stitution of 1945, the McEwan case became embodied in the fundamental
law of this state.2 4 This is most significant considering the broadness with
which the Mobil court interpreted McEwan. It is also significant in de-
termining the constitutionality of the 1963 amendment to the lottery statute
which provides that the lottery prohibition applies only "where there is
consideration in the form of money, or its equivalent, paid to or received
by the person awarding the prize."25 The intent of this amendment, ac-
cording to its sponsor Senator Nelson B. Tinnin, was to exempt promotions
in which no cost is required to participate, or in terms of the analysis thus
far-to require pecuniary consideration for lotteries.2 6
It was the effect of this amendment on the McEwan decision that con-
stituted the main issue in the Mobil case. If the clear intent of the amend-
ment was carried out, then McEwan, as interpreted by the Mobil court,
would be overruled. This, of course, was not possible since McEwan is
part of Missouri's constitutional law. The court held that the General
Assembly did not intend to abrogate the McEwan holding because to do
so would be to "ascribe to the General Assembly an intention to assume the
power to define lotteries and thereby avoid the constitutional restriction by
defining its limitations."2 7 Strangely, the court did not hold the amendment
unconstitutional, but merely that it did not affect the McEwan holding.2 8
However, it gave no indication as to what possible effect the amendment
could have.2 9
Could the amendment's intention have been carried out if the court
had taken the narrow view of McEwan-that the consideration found there
was pecuniary? The amendment is consistent with that view of McEwan and
thus not unconstitutional per se. But at the same time the General As-
sembly, by defining the consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, was
construing the constitution-a decidedly judicial function.3 0 The court
23. Mo. CONsT. art. XIV, § 10 (1875).
24. In Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. WArollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 355, 205 S.W.
196, 199 (En Banc 1918), the court stated:
The rule is firmly settled that the adoption in a later Constitution of
the words and context of another, which had been construed by a court
of last resort, is presumed . . . to have been done to give the adopted
words their adjudicated meaning.
25. See statute quoted note 2 supra.
26. Telephone interview with Senator Nelson B. Tinnin, Missouri State
Senator, March 9, 1971.
27. 455 S.W.2d at 508.
28. Id.
29. Appellant Danforth offered the explanation that it was the amendment's
intention to take non-pecuniary lotteries out from the felony statute (§ 563.430,
RSMo 1969) but that they were still subject to the lottery statutes providing
misdemeanor penalties. Danforth contended that the amendment did not apply
to § 563.440, RSMo 1969, which prohibits the advertising and selling of lottery
tickets, or to § 563.374, RSMo 1969, which prohibits the sale, possession or trans-
portation of lottery tickets. Brief for Appellant at 20, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dan-
forth, 455 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
30. "To the courts is given authority to construe the Constitution ... 
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would be obliged to give such a legislative construction great weight, but
it is by no means bound by it.31 Thus, no matter how the court viewed the
McEwan case, it could still avoid the intent of the amendment if it con-
flicted with the court's view of lotteries.
After deciding that the amendment did not abrogate the holding in
McEwan, the court then considered whether it should overrule McEwan
in favor of a pecuniary consideration theory such as the one adopted by
the Supreme Court of Oregon in Cudd v. Aschenbrenner.32 It seems that if
McEwan is embodied in the constitution the court should no more be able
to reverse it than the General Assembly was.38 This point is, of course, moot
since, after interpreting McEwan to cover "International Flags," the court
was not going to reject it.
The court expressed the opinion that the constitutional provision was
designed to prevent a man from exploiting the weaknesses and corrupting
the morals of his fellow man, and that a pecuniary definition of considera-
tion would conflict with this policy. 34 It should be noted that the Oregon
Supreme Court did not find a pecuniary definition to conflict with its view
that anti-lottery legislation was enacted to prevent the impoverishment of
the participants. This is strange since the policies of the two states are not
that different. After all, man is only exploited if he is forced to part with
something to get his chance at easy money. He is only immoral if he wagers
the rent money on the slim chance that a larger return will be his. In other
words, exploitation and corruption are only the results of a lottery that
causes impoverishment. Certainly the wave of anti-lottery legislation that
swept this nation in the 19th century was not a reaction to free participation
"1. In re V , 306 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
32. 233 Ore. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1963). This case involved a promotional
game sponsored by a grocery store. The holding of the court was as follows:
Unless a scheme requires (1) a participant part with a consideration,
and (2) the consideration be something of economic value to him, par-
ticipation therein can rob him neither of his purse nor his accumulated
worldly goods. We must conclude, therefore, that the anti-lottery pro-
visions of our statute are directed at schemes in which participants are
obligated to contribute something which is of economic value to them as
a condition of participation. We do no violence to the law of contracts
when we hold that a lottery contemplates a greater consideration than
is generally required to support a contract .... We merely hold that a
lottery is a special kind of contract which requires a special kind of
consideration-consideration which can impoverish the individual who
parts with it. Id. at 282, 377 P.2d at 155.
Coincidentally, the Oregon Supreme Court had earlier declared bank night to be
a lottery on the grounds that, because paying customers had a better chance
to win, part of the price paid for admission was consideration for the drawing.
McFadden v. Bain, 162 Ore. 250, 91 P.2d 292 (1939).
33. In State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 184, 190, 229
S.W. 1078, 1081 (En Banc 1921), the court stated:
It is an established rule of construction that where a constitutional
provision has received a settled judicial construction, and is afterwards
incorporated into a new or revised Constitution, it will be presumed
to have been retained with a knowledge of the previous construction, and
courts will feel bound to adhere to it.
34. 455 S.W.2d at 508.
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lotteries in which one has nothing to lose and everything to gain. And, if
there indeed is a gambling instinct residing within man's soul, then free
participation lotteries are a healthy outlet for this instinct. One stands to
lose a lot less at the gas station than at the race track.
Nonetheless, the Missouri court rejected the Oregon decision as con-
flicting with Missouri's public policy.3 5 In so doing the court displayed its
antagonism towards lotteries, but failed to establish a clear cut policy as to
what constitutes consideration. The court merely stated that since con-
sideration was found in the McEwan case, it must also be found in this
one. As has been demonstrated, in neither case did the court clearly define
the type of consideration necessary for a lottery. Instead, the court seems
content to define the concept of lottery on a case-to-case basis.3 6
This leaves at least one area still open to question. That is- the situ-
ation found in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,37 in which the Supreme
Court of the United States held that radio and television giveaway games,
wherein listeners were called at random and given a chance to win a prize,
did not involve sufficient consideration to be a lottery.3 s The Court held
that listening to the radio was not sufficiently detrimental to the partici-
pants 9 even though there was advertising benefit to the sponsors.40 A
strict non-pecuniary consideration jurisdiction would probably hold such
a promotion to be a lottery because the radio listening, however small a
detriment, is what is bargained for and it of course results in a benefit to
the promissor. Since Missouri has not expressly adopted such a view, the
situation where there is no detriment to the player is still an open issue.
BARRY M. K&Tz
35. id. at 509.
36. Id. at 508.
37. 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
38. Id. at 294.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 291.
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MINORS-CAPACITY TO APPOINT AN AGENT IN MISSOURI
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fields'
William B. Fields, a minor serving in the United States Marine Corps,
purchased a 1969 Ford Mustang while home in Missouri on furlough. His
father, 'Wendell Fields, suggested that William purchase liability insur-
ance on the car and telephoned State Farm's agent, Eugene S. Crawford,
to obtain the insurance. Although Crawford was at home and did not
have his rate book, he recorded such pertinent information as William
Fields' age and a description of the car, and assured Wendell Fields that
his son would be insured from the time of their conversation. The parties
agreed to meet at Crawford's office on Tuesday, August 15, 1969, to sign
the application and pay the premium. Crawford, however, was not in his
office on Tuesday and was thereafter unable to contact Fields and transact
the business. On Sunday morning, August 20, 1969, the Mustang, while
being driven by William Fields, was involved in an accident which resulted
in the death of Fields and two of his friends who were passengers in the
car. Later that week, Fields' stepmother attempted to pay the initial
insurance premium; however, the tender was refused by Crawford.
State Farm, in a diversity action brought under the Dedaratory Judg-
ment Act, title 28, sections 2201 and 2202,2 sought to establish its non-
liability under the alleged oral binder agreement to furnish liability
insurance on the automobile owned by William Fields. State Farm denied
liability on'two grounds. First, it argued that the parties had-not agreed
on all the essentials necessary to establish an oral contract of insurance.
The court rejected this contention, concluding that all the essentials were
agreed upon by the parties and that the oral binder agreement was in
effect at the time of the accident.3 Plaintiff further contended that, even
if there was agreement on all the essential elements, no valid insurance
contract had ever existed since Wendell Fields had attempted to act as
his minor son's agent, thereby rendering the entire transaction void under
Missouri law.
Without clearly stating the rationale for its decision, the court held
that the cases cited by plaintiff holding that a minor cannot appoint an
agent were not controlling on the issues in this case and refused to allow
State Farm to assert Fields' incapacity to appoint an agent as a defense. 4
The court enumerated four facts which had a direct bearing upon this
finding: (1) William Fields was over 20 years, 10 months old and was
serving in the armed forces at the time the insurance was bound; (2) Fields
1. 325 F. Supp. 1135 (W.D. Mo. 1970), affd mem., 441 F.2d 659 (8th Cir.
1 )'2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1964).
3. 325 F. Supp. at 1137. Chailland v. M.F.A. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 S.W.2d
78 (Mo. En Banc 1964), established five essential elements which must be agreed
upon before a valid automobile insurance binder becomes effective. These elements
are: (1) the subject matter; (2) the risk insured against; (3) the duration of the
risk; (4) the amount of the coverage; and (5) the amount of the premium. The
issue of the validity of the oral binder will not be discussed in this note.
4. 325 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
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was attempting to comply with the provisions of the Missouri Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act which require motor vehicle operators to post a bond
after an accident unless they had liability insurance in effect; 5 (3) the
above facts were known to plaintiff's agent at the time he bound the in-
surance; and (4) State Farm was attempting to deny liability on the policy
after a loss.6
The court's reluctance to apply the rule in a situation where a minor
was less than two months from attaining majority and was serving in the
armed.forces (and therefore presumably had accepted adult responsibilities)
is understandable. Since the rationale for the rule is the protection of
minors, there is no reason for the rule when the facts indicate that the
minor has no need for such protection.7 This is especially true given
the fact that Fields' agent was his father, who unquestionably was acting
in his son's best interests by insisting that he obtain liability insurance.
In addition, the court's concern with the plight of Fields' alleged tort
victims8 is apparent from its mention of the Missouri Safety. Responsi-
bility Act as a factor in the case. The policy underlying the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act is to protect tort victims from insolvent tortfeasors,9 and
the court no doubt realized that Fields' tort victims would have little
chance of recovering on any judgments which might be rendered against
Fields' estate if Fields was found to be uninsured. Thus the court reached
a result that would give these statutory considerations full force rather
than applying the common law rule which voids all transactions con-
ducted by a minor through an agent.
In emphasizing Crawford's knowledge of the existence of this agency
relationship at the time he bound the policy, the court reasoned that
State Farm would not be unfairly prejudiced since it had adequate notice
of the grounds on which it could refuse to bind the policy. In this respect,
the court stressed that State Farm was attempting to deny liability after
5. §§ 303.010-.370, RSMo 1969. Section 303.030 provides (in part):
1. If within twenty days after the receipt of a report of a motor ve-
hicle accident... the director does not have on file evidence satis-
factory to him that the person who would otherwise be required tofile security ... has been released from liability ... the director
shall determine the amount of security which shall be sufficient in
his judgment to satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from
such accident ....
2. The director shall ... suspend the license of each operator...
unless such operator or owner or both shall deposit security in the
sum so determined by the director ....
4. This'section shall not apply... (1) To such operator or owner if
such owner had in effect at the time of such accident an automobile
liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such
accident ....
6; 325 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
7. F. MECHEx, THE LAw or AGEmcy § 53 (1889).
8. Subsequent to .the accident, the heirs of the passengers -in Fields' car
brought actions against Fields' estate. The present action arose when, Fields'
administrator demanded that State Farm defend all claims arising out of the
accident. 325 F. Supp. at 1136.
9. .Winterton v. Van Zandt, 351 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Mo. 1961).
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a loss. This conclusion places a limitation on application of the common
law rule. Therefore, while it is arguable that the court would have applied
the rule if the suit to void the transaction had been instituted prior to the
accident, the occurrence of the accident and the resulting possibility of
harm to third parties greatly influenced the court's decision not to apply
the rule.
One of the earliest reported statements of the rule that a minor has no
power to appoint an agent appears in the 1765 English case of Zouch v.
Parsons.10 That case, while holding that a minor could appoint an agent
to accept seisen on his behalf, stated as a rule that "[a]ll such gifts, grants,
or deeds made by infants which do not take effect by delivery of his hand
are, void."'" In Doe d. Thomas v. Roberts,'2 the court expanded upon
this statement, holding that an infant could not bind an agent nor could
an agent bind an infant.' 3 The English courts have affirmed the 'rule as
recently as 1953 in Shephard v. Cartwright.14 In that case, the court stated:
The reason for this rule is because an infant has not sufficient
discretion to choose an agent to act for him. He is all too likely
to choose the wrong man; and so the law, rather than have any
argument upon the point, declares him to be incapable of choos-
ing an agent at all.' 5
Certain American jurisdictions have not followed this strict rule but
have instead adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Agency16
that a minor's appointment of an agent and the transactions negotiated
by the agent are only voidable.' 7 This less extreme approach makes no
distinction between those transactions conducted by the minor himself and
those conducted through an agent, both of which are subject to disaffirm-
ance by the minor at or before reaching majority.' s
10. 97 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B. 1765).
11. Id. at 1109. This quotation indicates that the court's standard for deter-
mining if an infant's transactions were void or voidable was whether the act was
conducted by the infant in person, or by his attorney. If done by the infant him-
self, the act was voidable; but if by an attorney, the transaction was void. However,
other authorities at the .time disagreed, believing that the correct test was whether
the transaction benefited the minor, regardless of who conducted the transaction.
See W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMM ,tON AssuRANCEs 232 (4th ed. rev. 1780).
12. 153 Eng. Rep. 1404 (Ex. 1847).
13. Id. at 1406.
14. [1953] Ch. 728.
15. Id. at 755.
16. A person who has capacity to affect his legal relations by giving con-
sent to a delegable act or transaction has capacity to authorize an agent to
do such act or to conduct such transaction for him with the same effect
as if he were to act in person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 20
(1958).
Section 20 is made specifically applicable to situations involving a minor's appoint-
ment of an agent by Comment c, which states (in part):
The contract of an infant to employ an agent is voidable by him, as is
any contract made for him by such agent, except a contract for necessaries.
If not avoided, however, the contracts are effective against all parties to
them.
17. Annot., 31 A.L.R. 1001 (1924) summarizes the position taken on this issue
by the various jurisdictions.
18. Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 333, 72 N.W. 697, 699 (1897).
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In Turner v. Bondalier,19 the Kansas City Court of Appeals applied
the stricter rule which voids all transactions by a minor when acting through
an agent. The case involved a replevin action, brought by a minor in a
justice of the peace court, in which the affidavit necessary to confer au-
thority on the court was supplied by an agent of the minor. After reviewing
authorities in other jurisdictions, the court held that a minor did not have
capacity to appoint an agent.20 As a result, the affidavit supplied by the
agent was without effect to give the court authority to issue process.21
The Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a minor's capacity
to appoint an agent in Curtis v. Alexander 22 Plaintiff contended that the
father of the minor defendant was barred from testifying under the Dead-
man Statute23 because he negotiated a contract for a deed of land to his
minor son as his son's agent, and the other party to the contract was dead.
The court held that the father was not prohibited from testifying by
the statute because a minor had no power to appoint an agent.24 In State
ex rel. Dyer v. Union Electric Co.,25 the St. Louis Court of Appeals held
that Nancy Dyer, an infant stockholder in defendant corporation, did
not have legal capacity to appoint her father as her agent to examine
defendant's corporate records under what is now section 351.215, RSMo
1969. While noting that the trend seemed to be away from strict applica-
tion of the rule, the court stated that it was bound to follow the doctrine
laid down by the supreme court and applied the rule.26
19. 81 Mo. App. 582 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888).
20. Id. at 586. In doing so, the court did not follow the holding in Ward v.
Steamboat "Little Red," 8 Mo. 858 (1844). In this case, the owners of a boat, some
of whom were minors, sued under a statute for injury to the reversionary interest.
In order to show that their interest was reversionary, they had to rely upon a
lease which was executed only by the adult owners. The court held that by bring-
ing an action the infants had affirmed the contract of lease made by the part
owners of the boat. The case has not been cited in :subsequent cases involving
the issue of a minor's capacity to appoint an agent.
21. The Kansas City court also dealt with this issue in Poston v. Williams,
99 Mo. App. 518, 73 S.W. 1099 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908). This case involved the
employment by a minor of an agent to negotiate a horse trade on his behalf.
When the agent refused to deliver one of the horses for which he had traded,
Poston, the minor, instituted a successful replevin action against the agent, which
was later set aside by the trial court. On appeal, the Kansas City court affirmed
the decision of the trial court, concluding that the minor had no right of recovery
since his attempt to act through an agent voided the entire transaction. Id. at 518.
73 S.W. at 1100.
22. 257 S.W. 482 (Mo. 1928).
23. § 5410, RSMo 1919 [now § 491.010, RSMo 1969].
24. Curtis v. Alexander, 257 S.W. 432, 436 (Mo. 1928). The supreme court
also applied the rule in Hodge v. Feiner, 38 Mo. 268, 90 S.W.2d 90 (1936). In
this case, a minor allowed a friend to drive his car. The car, while being driven
by the friend, was involved in an accident. The injured party sued the minor
on the basis of respondeat superior, contending that the friend was acting as
the minor's agent. The court held that while a minor may be liable for his own
torts, he could not be held liable for the torts of another based on respondeat
superior, since he had no power to appoint an agent. Id. at 272, 90 S.W.2d at 91.
See Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. En Banc 1968) for a more recent case with
the same holding.
25. 809 S.W.2d 649 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
26. Id. at 654.
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The principal criticism of the rule that a minor has no power to
appoint an agent is that it is not needed to protect the minor in his deal-
ings with third parties.2 7 In his direct contractual dealings, the minor is
protected from his indiscretions since he may disaffirm his contracts, except
for necessaries; at or before reaching majority.28 The logic of avoiding
contracts at their inception solely because of the interposition of.a third
party has been criticized primarily because, in many situations, a minor
can be better protected by allowing an adult agent to act on his behalf.
If such transactions were merely voidable, instead of void, and a minor
chose an agent who did not act in his best interests, the option to either
affirm or disaffirm the transaction would seem to give the minor adequate
protection.29 However, in spite of these criticisms, the rule-remains a part
of Missouri law.
While federal courts are required in diversity cases to apply the sub-
stantive law of the state in which the action arose,30 the district court in
Fields nonetheless found that the rule forbidding minors from appointing
agents was not applicable to this factual situation.3 1 The court indicated
that it would not apply the rule so as to void an otherwise valid trans-
action simply because a minor had acted through an agent in cases where
it is apparent that surrounding circumstances and policy considerations
embodied in a statute outweigh the rationale for applying the rule. To
reach this decision, the court in effect has held that the Missouri courts
would have reached a similar result in situations where the overriding
considerations behind the Safety Responsibility Act were at stake. The
court stated that Curtis v. Alexander32 and Bell v. Green,33 cases cited by
the plaintiff as authority for the proposition that a minor has no capacity
to appoint an agent, were not controlling on the facts of this case. While
those cases did hold that a minor could not appoint an agent, both are
distinguishable on their facts from the present case since neither case
required the court to decide between applying the rule or adhering to
the policy behind a statute, such as the Safety Responsibility Act.. Further-
more, since Missouri courts have not decided a case involving an. insurance
company's attempt to rely on the rule as a defense, the federal: court had
no criterion for ascertaining the circumstances, if any, under which state
courts would apply the rule to void insurance contracts negotiated for
minors.
Whether or not Missouri courts will adhere to this determination and
deny the defense of incapacity of a minor to appoint an agent in cases
where the facts indicate that application of the rule would bring about
27. Annot., 31 A.L.R. 1001 (1924) states:
It seems clear that the infant is better protected, and his rights more fully
safeguarded, if the appointment and acts of the agent are held merely void-
able by him, than if they are regarded as absolutely void. Id. at 1002.
28. Windisch v. Farrow, 159 S.W.2d 392, 394 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
29. Webb, Capacity of an Infant to Appoint an Agent, 18 MODEm L. REv.
461, 463 (1955).
30. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. 325 F. Supp. at 1139.
32. 257 S.W. 482 (Mo. 1923).
33. 423 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. En Banc 1968). See note 24 supra.
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an unjust result, or conflict with the policy behind the Safety Responsi-
bility Act, can only be determined through future litigation. Until then,
all that can be stated with certainty is that this federal court has deter-
mined that the rule forbidding minors from appointing- agents is not




SKIDDING ONTO THE WRONG SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY
Friederich v. Chamberlain'
This suit arose out of a collision between an automobile driven by one
of the plaintiffs, Gail Friederich, and a truck driven by the defendant, Noah
Chamberlain. The collision occurred on September 14, 1967, just south of
Montgomery City, Missouri, on a wet, slick two-lane blacktop highway. At
the time of the accident Noah Chamberlain was accompanied by his wife,
and Gail Friederich was accompanied by her husband. The Friederichs
sued Noah Chamberlain and the Chamberlains counterclaimed, contending
that plaintiff Gail Friederich was negligent in driving her vehicle on the
wrong side of the highway. The Chamberlains' evidence indicated that at
the time of the collision the Friederich vehicle was skidding out of control
and had crossed over the centerline of the highway. The trial court, at the
close of all the evidence, sustained Gail Friederich's motion for a directed
verdict on the Chamberlains' counterclaim.2 The Friederichs' claim was
submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for Noah Chamberlain. The
Chamberlains appealed, asserting as error the directed verdict against their
counterclaim.3
The essential question on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
sustaining the motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Cham-
berlains failed to make a submissible case in their counterclaim against Gail
Friederich.4 At the trial, Gail Friederich had based her defense to the
counterclaim primarily on the grounds that if the evidence indicated that
her vehicle was on the wrong side of the highway at the time of the col-
lision, and its presence there was due to skidding, then, according to Wray
v. King,5 the Chamberlains must prove that the skid was caused by her
negligence in order to recover. She also claimed that she could not be
negligent unless she had been "driving" on the wrong side of the highway
at the time of the collision and, according to Strickland v. Barker,6 if her
1. 458 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. Id. at 361.
3. Id.
4. Id. "
5. 385 S.W.2d 831 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
6. 436 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1969).
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car was skidding out of control when she crossed the centerline she did not
"drive" onto the wrong side of the road. The Missouri Supreme Court, in
reversing the decision of the trial court, overruled both the Wray7 and
StricklandS cases.
In Wray v. King, the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated that a sub-
missible case could not be made by proof, standing alone, that the de-
fendant's automobile skidded or slid into a collision with plaintiff's vehicle
on the highway.9 Stating that such a mishap could have as readily been
caused by circumstances beyond the control of the defendant as by his
negligence, the court found that no inference of negligence would arise
from the mere evidence of the skidding of a vehicle.' 0 The court said:
Where the evidence of the skidding is confined to the defendant's
case, as where he offers it to explain and excuse the accident, it is
unnecessary for plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction to make
reference to it, because plaintiff is under no duty to hypothesize or
otherwise notice defensive or exculpatory evidence introduced by
his adversary (although, of course, he may not so frame his instruc-
tions as to preclude the jury's consideration of it when properly
submitted in defendant's own instructions)."
However, the court pointed out that where evidence of skidding came into
the record as part of plaintiff's case, he could not use the normal instruction
which assumes that the defendant was in control of his automobile and re-
sponsible for its manuevers. On the contrary, he must give an instruction
which allows the jury to consider the possibility that the apparent negligent
movement of the defendant's vehicle was in fact caused by non-negligent
skidding.' 2 Referring to Karch v. Stewart13 and Evans v. Colombo,'4 the
court in Wray said that proof of skidding across the centerline did not make
a submissible case of negligence simply because the centerline was crossed.15
7. Friederich v. Chamberlain, 458 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
8. Id. at 366.
9. 385 S.W.2d at 833.
10. Id. See also Doyle v. Wilmesherrer, 358 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. 1962);
Evans v. Colombo, 319 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Karch v. Stewart,
315 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Mo. 1958); Girratono v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 363
Mo. 359, 362, 251 S.W.2d 59, 63 (1952).
11. Wray v. King, 385 S.W.2d 831, 833-34 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
12. Id.
13. 315 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1958). This case involved an auto skidding into
the path of an oncoming truck. The court held that the issues of whether the loss
of control and skidding of the auto into collision with the truck was due to
negligence in operation, and whether such negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision, were for the jury.
14. 319 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En Banc 1959). This case involved an auto which
skidded on wet pavement while making a left turn onto a highway from an
intersection. The car crossed the centerline and collided with an auto which was
waiting for the light to change. The court said that when the evidence disclosed
more than mere skidding it was for the jury to decide if negligence caused the
auto to skid across the centerline.
15. Wray v. King, 385 S.W.2d 831, 834 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). The court
said that there were two courses of action open to plaintiff:(a) He may elect to submit defendant's negligence in causing the car to
(Vol. 37
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The cause of the skidding is the important issue and when the plaintiff
enters evidence as to the defendant's skidding, the burden is on the plaintiff
to introduce substantial evidence showing with reasonable certainty that
the skidding resulted from defendant's negligence.1 6
The Missouri Supreme Court, by overruling Wray v. King, has adopted
what seems to be the majority view in the United States.17 Under this view,
a submissible case cannot be made against the operator of a motor vehicle
by mere proof that his vehicle skidded into collision with another vehicle
on a highway. However, if the evidence shows that the skidding vehicle was
on the wrong side of the road when the collision occurred, an inference
of negligence is created and a prima facie case is made.' 8 The operation of
a motor vehicle on the wrong side of the road, resulting in a collision with
an approaching vehicle, may at times constitute negligence as a matter of
law.19 There is no actionable negligence, however, where, without fault of
the driver, a vehicle skids across the centerline of a highway and collides
with an approaching vehicle.20 This was and still is the law in Missouri.2 1
But under the majority view adopted in Friederich, the burden is no
go out of control as a ground of recovery. In that event, of course,
his verdict-directing instruction must hypothesize the facts that support
that theory.
(b) He may elect not to submit on that theory but on some other, as, for
instance, "failing to drive on the right half or east half of said road;"
but in that event he may not ignore his own evidence as to the car's
skidding or sliding, for that is the evidence "upon which the submis-
sion of negligence must be premised." Id. (citations omitted).
16. Id.
17. See Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hurd, 320 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1963);
Nelson v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256, 257 (10th Cir. 1957); De Antonio v. New Haven
Dairy Co.; 105 Conn. 663, 136 A. 567 (1927); Dellenback v. Dobbs, 105 Ga.
App. 159, 123 S.E.2d 565 (1961); Tomlinson v. Chapman, 24 Ill. App. 2d 192,
164 N.E.2d 240 (1960); Berio v. Talley, 269 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954);
Schaubhut v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. Ct. App. 1963);
Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152 A. 633 (Ct. App. 1930); Wilson
v. Bright, 255 N.C. 329, 121 S.E.2d 601 (1961); Gum v. Wooge, 211 Ore. 149,
153, 315 P.2d 119, 124 (1957); Stanford v. Holloway, 25 Tenn. App. 379, 157
S.W.2d 864 (1941); Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co., 400 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1966);
Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wash. 2d 78, 234 P.2d 548 (1951); Martin v. Bear, 167 Wash.
327, 9 P.2d 365 (1932); Goldenberg v. Daane, 13 Wis. 2d 98, 108 N.W.2d 187
(1961); Butcher v. McMichael, 370 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 1962). But see Gebhardt v.
Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 348 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1965); Halprin v. Mom,
231 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1956); Gist v. Allentown Wholesale Distrib., Inc., 158 A.2d
777 (Pa. 1960).
18. Friederich v. Chamberlain, 458 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
19. 2 D. BLASHrEELD, AUTOmOBILE LAW & PRAcrIcE § 111.16 (8d ed. 1965). For
cases stating that violation of a statute is negligence per se on the part of the
person committing the violation see Gas Serv. Co. v. Helmers, 179 F.2d 101 (8th
Cir. 1950); Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 341 Mo. 658, 108 S.WV.2d 98
(1937).
20. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, 374 P.2d 206, 209 (Wyo. 1962). See also Raz
v. Mills, 231 Ore. 220, 372 P.2d 955 (1961); Gum v. Wooge, 211 Ore. 149, 315
P.2d 119 (1957).
21. 458 S.W.2d at 363. The court in Friederich, in reiterating this point,
cited with approval the cases of Evans v. Colombo, 319 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En Banc
1959), and Karch v. Stewart, 315 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1958).
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longer on the driver of the non-skidding vehicle to introduce substantial
evidence showing with reasonable certainty that the skidding resulted from
negligence on the part of the driver of the skidding vehicle. If the operator
of the skidding vehicle wants to introduce evidence to excuse or explain
the cause of the skidding, he may do so. Whether or not evidence of justi-
fication is presented, the question of the driver's negligence is for the. jury.22
The driver of the non-skidding vehicle may, of course, present evidence in-
dicating the skid was due to negligence if he has such evidence, but there
is no longer any burden on him to do so. Consequently, his failure to
produce such evidence will no longer result in a directed verdict, against
him. The reasoning behind this rule is expressed well in Zanetti Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Hurd23 where the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said:
Apparently the rule is based on the proposition that if the driver
of a motor vehicle is driving on the wrong side of the road in
violation of the law of the road, and causes an injury to another,
he may be excused only by showing that he was there without'
fault.2 4
It would seem logical that the offending motorist should be required
to explain why he started skidding and why he continued to skid into the
improper lane. He is in a better position than anyone else to give this ex-
planation. The motorist traveling in his proper lane, in many, cases, may
not know what caused the other vehicle to start skidding. If the motorist
in the wrong lane can show that he started skidding through no fault of
his own and thereafter was unable to avoid skidding into the improper lane,
it is unlikely that he will be found to be negligent. 25 But the showing of
evidence justifying his presence on the wrong side of the road should be
primarily his responsibility since only he knows whether he skidded. there
or drove there intentionally.26 The reasoning behind this view was ex-
pressed in the Illinois case of Tom linson v. Chapman: 2 7
The causes of one skidding an automobile on a wet or icy pave-
ment are manifold and are most often hidden within the breast
and mind of the operator of the skidding car.... [A] momentary
lapse of memory, a glance toward a passenger, or any other slight
distraction, as well as speed or other improper handling might
cause the skidding. It might even be a defect in the mechanical
condition of the vehicle. Certainly it is not incumbent upon the
plaintiff to show conclusively why the defendant was on the wrong
side of the road or the exact cause of the skid. Only in rare in-
stances would that knowledge be possessed by the plaintiff.2 8
22. 458 S.W.2d at 366. Showing that the skidding was not deliberate will
not relieve the defendant from liability. Id.
23. 820 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1963).
24. Id. at 125-26.
25. 458 S.W.2d at 366. See also Schaubhut v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d
346, 349 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
26. 458 S.W.2d at 366.
27. 24 I1. App. 2d 192, 164 N.E.2d 240 (1960).
28. Id. at 196, 164 N.E.2d at 242. '
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The court in Tomlinson went on to say that in such cases, if defendant
wishes to show that he was on the wrong side of the road for some reason
other than his own negligence, he must furnish evidence of that fact.2 9
It appears that even before Friederich was decided the Missouri Su-
preme Court had taken a position which was somewhat inconsistent with
the doctrine of Wray v. King. In Hodge v. Goffstein,3o decided in 1966, the
court said that the fact of a motorist's presence on the wrong side of the
road, without evidence of reason or explanation, was sufficient, standing
alone, to enable a jury to find a motorist negligent.3 1 Although there may
have been circumstances excusing a motor vehicle operator from being
on the wrong side of the road, the court said "his presence there is suf-
ficient to present an issue of negligence, with his excuse or reason a matter
for the jury's consideration." 32 However, the holding in Goffstein, while
in conflict with Wray, did not expressly overrule Wray.33
Even in jurisdictions which place the burden of producing evidence
of negligence as to the 'cause of the skid on the driver of the non-skidding
vehicle, it may be possible for the non-skidding driver as plaintiff to avoid
the issue. In Pennsylvania, which appears to follow this view, the court in
Richardson v. Patterson3 4 stated:
Had the plaintiff been content with proving that the collision
occurred in the westbound lane where [the defendant's] car...
should not have been, the burden would have been upon the de-
fendant to offer exculpatory proof if she wished to be found not
guilty of causative negligence. The presence of an automobile on
the wrong side of a highway is prima facie evidence of the driver's
negligence. But, here, the explanation of how the Patterson car
came to be in the wrong traffic lane was supplied by the plaintiff
himself when he offered evidence that it was the result of skidding.
It then became the duty of the plaintiff to offer testimony from
which the jury could infer that the skid resulted from negligence
on the part of the driver.35
Thus it can be seen that even in jurisdictions following the minority rule
evidence showing that the defendant's car was on the wrong side of the
highway at the time of the collision may be enough to make a prima fade
case of negligence. 36
29. Id. When the plaintiff merely alleges that defendant drove on the wrong
side of the road the defendant can introduce evidence of skidding and evidencejustifying such skidding. When plaintiff alleges skidding, defendant can introduce
evidence justifying the skid.
30. 411 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1966).
31. Id. at 169.
32. Id.
33. This is due to the fact that the question of skidding was not in issue
in the case. In Goffstein,. all those involved in the accident were killed and there
was no evidence of skidding introduced at trial. Therefore, the burden of proof
as to a skid was not in issue.
34. 368 Pa. 495, 84 A.2d 342 (1951).
35. Id. at 496,. 84 A.2d at 343.
36. This might at times be consistent with the Wyray doctrine previously fol-
lowed in Missouri in a situation where plaintiff introduced no evidence of
defendant's skidding as a part of his case. For alternatives under the Wray doc-
trine, see note 15 supra.
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The second point relied upon by Gail Friederich in her motion for a
directed verdict was that the evidence of skidding conclusively proved that
she did not "drive" her vehicle on the wrong side of the road and, there-
fore, she could not be negligent in that respect.87 She asserted that if the
rear end of her vehicle skidded laterally across the centerline on the wet
pavement and was continuing to skid in that manner, she did not have
control of the vehicle because automobiles are not so constructed as to
make possible their controlled operation in that manner.38 She relied
primarily upon the case of Strickland v. Barker,89 in which the Missouri
Supreme Court stated:
To "drive" an automobile means to impel or urge it to move; to
direct its movements, course and direction. The driver's control
over the movements of the vehicle is implicit in the term. A slip-
ping, sliding or skidding vehicle, in contrast, is out of control.
"Skidding means that the wheels of a vehicle slip sideways, result-
ing in the inability of the driver to control the movement of the
vehicle... ." Defendant's truck, under the evidence in this case, was
not "driven" across the centerline, and it was error to submit'the
case on that theory.4 0
The Missouri Supreme Court, in overruling the Strickland case, con-
cluded that since Gail Friederich was operating the vehicle at the time it
went out of control and began to skid, the fact that it began to skid and
went out of control would not, in the opinion of the court, "change the
status of Gail Friederich as the Driver of the vehicle." 41 The court said
that in order to make a prima facie case it was not necessary to show that
she intended to drive on the wrong side of the road, or that she was in
actual control of the vehicle as it skidded, or that she affirmatively guided
the vehicle onto the wrong side of the road. It was "sufficient to show
that she was in charge of the motor vehicle and operating it as it skidded
down the wrong side of the road. '42
In overruling Wray v. King and adopting the majority view on vehicles
skidding onto the wrong side of the road, the court made a logical deci-
sion. It seems apparent that the operator of a skidding vehicle will normally
be in the best position to explain or justify his skid. It would be seldom
indeed that the driver of the other vehicle would be in a position to know
37. 458 S.W.2d at 365-66.
38. Id. at 364. Doyle v. Wilmesherrer, 358 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Mo. 1962), was
cited in support of this contention.
39. 436 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1969). This case held that an instruction .directing
the jury to find for plaintiff, if it found that defendant drove or skidded on the
wrong side of the road, and if it found that defendant's conduct was negligent
in that respect, was erroneous in that it permitted a finding of negligence based
upon skidding without the necessary prerequisite finding that the skidding was
caused by antecedent negligence.
40. Id. at 40.
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what caused the skid. Once the non-skidding driver enters evidence of a
skid, if the skidding driver can convince the jury that his skidding was
not due to his negligence, he may escape liability. If not, the jury may
find him negligent from evidence showing he skidded into the wrong lane
and was in the wrong lane at the time of the collision. Regardless of whether
any evidence explaining the skid is produced, the question of negligence
is for the jury. This seems to be by far the most logical of the two possible
views since it removes the burden of explaining the skid from the driver
of the non-skidding vehicle, who would be least likely to know the cause.
In overruling Strickland v. Barker the court has eliminated the tech-
nical defense that a person operating a skidding vehicle was not in control
of that vehicle and so could not negligently "drive" on the wrong side of
the highway: All that need be shown to establish negligence is that the
operator of the vehicle was in charge of it and operating it as it skidded
down the wrong side of the road.43
To summarize, the court reached the following conclusions in Fried-
erich: (1) A sUbmissible case is not made against an operator of a motor
vehicle by merely proving that his vehicle skidded into a collision with
another vehicle on a highway; 44 (2) however, if the evidence shows that
the skidding vehicle was on the wrong side of the road when the collision
occurred, an inference of negligence is created, and a prima facie case is
made;43 and (3) the burden of producing evidence "then shifts to the
operator of the skidding vehicle to excuse the presence of his vehicle on
the wrong side of the road.. ." but if "no evidence of justification is pre-
sented, the question of negligence is for the jury."46 The Missouri Supreme
Court as well as a number of other courts throughout the United States
have chosen an inaccurate phrase when they state that "the burden of
producing evidence shifts to the operator of the skidding vehicle to excuse
the presence of his vehicle on the wrong side of the road." If this were
true, and the'driver of the skidding vehicle produced no evidence justifying
the skid, the court would be required to direct a verdict against him for
failure to meet 'that burden. However, it is dear that whether or not evi-
dence of justification is presented, the question of negligence is for the
jury.4 7 It would be- more accurate to say that the burden of producing
evidence showing the cause of the skidding is no longer on the driver of
the non-skidding vehicle. This is the actual change in the law which results
from the court's decision in Friederich. Either party may present evidence
explaining the cause of the skidding, but there is no burden on either party
to do so.
The question of negligence will always be for the jury unless evidence
produced by the defendant negates the prima fade case so conclusively
that no reasonable man could be justified in engaging in the inferences
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case is that it brings Missouri in line with the majority of jurisdictions and




PROTECTION AFFORDED A TENANT FROM
PREDICTABLE CRIMINAL ACTS
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.'
A basic concept underlying the law of torts is that all persons are
liable for their negligent actions that cause injury to others. Whether or
not an action is negligent is a factual issue, to be decided by the jury2
under careful instruction.3 The courts, however, have seen fit in certain
circumstances to grant an immunity even where the action of the defendant
clearly fits the basic definition of negligence. Although the. defendant is
clearly negligent he may be allowed to plead, for reasons of policy, that
he has "no duty" to be careful. 4 By granting this immunity, the court is
actually ruling that, as a matter of law, no jury can find the defendant
liable. While these "no duty" immunities have often been granted in the
past, there has been increasing reluctance on the part of the courts to
allow these defenses in the last few decades.5
1. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2. 2 F. HARPER g. F. JAMEs, LAW oFToRTS §- 18.8 (1956).
3. The action is termed negligent only if its fits the standard definition of
negligence: "the failure to use that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and
prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances." Mo. Approved
Instr. § 11.02 (2d ed. 1964).
4. These "no duty" immunities include: (1) A manufacturer's immunity from
suit by persons not in "privity". with the manufacturer. 2 F. HARER & F. JAAMS,
supra note 2, § 18.8. (2) The landowners immunity from liability to trespassers.
Id. (3) The notion that there is "no duty" to take affirmative action to aid an-
other. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54 (3d ed. 1964). (4) Immunities for certain
classes of defendants, i.e., governmental bodies, infants and the insane. Id. §§ 125-29.
5. Both charitable and governmental immunities are iii rapid decline and
have been abandoned altogether in many states. In the field of manufacturer's lia-
bility the "no duty without privity" defense is being replaced by a strict liability
theory.
For the decline in charitable immunities, see, e.g., Abernathy v. Sisters of St.
Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Gamier v. St. Andrew's Presbyterian
Church, 446 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp.,
Inc., 269 N.C. I, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa.
486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965). See generally Comment, The Immunity of Charitable In-
stitutions from Tort Liability, 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 86 (1959).
For the decline in governmental immunity, see, e.g., McAndrew v. Mularchuck,
33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962). See generally Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental Im-
munity, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rv. 529 (1966).
For the increase in manufacturers liability, see, e.g., Morrow v. Caloric Ap-
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In the past the courts have held that a person has "no duty" to pro-
tect another from anticipated criminal acts of third parties. This "no
duty" immunity was granted to all persons except those placed in certain
special relationships, such as carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business
proprietor-invitee, school district-pupil, and employer-employee.7  In
Kline v.. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,8 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew the immunity earlier granted
to the landlord and placed the landlord-tenant relationship in that group
of special relationships where a person, because of public policy, may be
held liable for his "negligence" in failing to protect others from anticipated
criminal acts of third persons.
In Kline the court reversed the district court's ruling that as a matter
of law a landlord owes "no duty" to protect the tenant from foreseeable
criminal acts of third persons.9 In 1966 the plaintiff, a female tenant, was
criminally assaulted and robbed in the common hallway of the landlord's
apartment house.1 0 The building, containing 585 individual apartments,
had been the scene of a "rising wave of crime,"' 1 in which twenty thefts
and one assault had occurred in a brief period prior to the assault and
robbery in question.' 2. The court noted that the landlord had both con-
structive and actual notice of these crimes,18 but had failed to reinstate
certain safety measures which he had discontinued after the tenant had
first moved into the building in 1959.14 (Previously the building had been
safeguarded by.a number of methods, including stationing guards at all
the doors, except-for the side entrance which was locked after nine P.M.,
and by placing at least one employee at the desk at all times, from which
all elevators could be observed.15) The court upheld the tenant's conten-
tion that the trier of the facts might find the landlord negligent in failing
to protect the residents from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons,
by leaving entrances unguarded and the desk unmanned in spite of the
increasing number of crimes committed in the building.,
In reversing the district court's decision that the landlord had "no
duty" to protect the tenant, the court based the landlord-defendant's lia-
bility on three -lines of reasoning. First, protection should have been offered
by the landlord based on the "logic of the situation itself."' 7 The land-
pliance Corp., 872 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1968); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 82 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See generally Prosser, The Fall Of
The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791 (1966).
6. Crandall v. Consolidated Tel., Tel. & Elec. Co., 14 Ariz. 822, 127 P. 994
(1912); Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 341 (1910);
W. PROssER,-supra, note 4, § 83.
7. W. PRossEa, supra note 4, § 38.
8. 489 F,2d .477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
9. Id. at 478.
10. Id.- -
11. Id. at 488.
12. Id. at 489.
18. Id. at-483,
14. -Id. at 479.
15. Id. -
16. Id. at 486.-
17. Id. at 488.
1972)
70
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
lord should assume the obligation of protection not only because it is
economically more feasible, but because he alone has the exclusive power
to control areas of common use and common danger.1 8 The court pointed
out that the apartment lessees could provide some degree of security by
installing better locks and security devices on their individual doors and
windows; but they had no power to take measures to guard areas of com-
mon use and common danger:19
As between tenant and landlord, the landlord is the only.one in
the position to take the necessary acts of protection required. He
is not an insurer, but he is obligated to minimize the risk to his
tenants. Not only as between landlord and tenant is the landlord
best equipped to guard against the predictable risk of intruders,
but even as between landlord and the police power of the govern-
ment, the landlord is in the best position to take necessary protec-
tive measures. 20
The court's second rationale was that, in the contract between land-
lord and tenant, there is an implied obligation that the landlord provide
protective measures within his reasonable capacity.2 ' This. rationale was
first announced by the District of Columbia Circuit in a 1968 case, Levine
v. Katz. 22 While this implied obligation had heretofore only been applied
in fact situations involving injuries from physical defects in areas within
the landlord's exclusive control,23 .the court in Kline applied the same
rationale to find an implied obligation to -safeguard against predictable
criminal acts by third persons.24 In applying the Levine rationale, the
court amplified and refined the reasoning of Kendall v. Gore Properties,
Inc., 2 5 in which a criminal act had been committed by the landlord's em-
ployee. Kendall had held that the "no duty" defense may be denied if
"particular conduct depending on the circumstances, can raise an issue
18. Id. at 481. Exclusive control of common hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc.
b3 reserved by a landlord when he leases separate portions of a building. Levine v.
Katz, 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969); Mason v. Lieber-
man, 208 N.E.2d 222, 349 Mass. 321 (1965); Janis v. Jost, 412,S.W., 498 (Mo. 1967);
Green v. Kahn, 391 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1965). See also 2 F. HARER WF. JAME-S, supra
note 2, § 27.17.
19. 439 F.2d at 480.
20. Id. at 484.
21. Id. at 485.
22. 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
23. Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Dekoven v. 780 W. End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951,
266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965); Kobeski v. Judkowitz, 57 Lack. Jur. 37(Pa. C.P. 1955). In Kobeski, the court held that the ambit of a landlord's "duty"
to his tenant does not embrace the risk of injury which is the result of a criminal
act of another person.
24. 439 F.2d at 481.
25. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Although the Kendall case can be dis-
tinguished from Kline in that the criminal act was committed by an employee,
the court in Kline relied on Kendall to "signal the extension of a rule theretofore
applied only to injuries caused by defects or obstacles in areas under the land-
lord's control . .. ." 439 F.2d at 485 n.19.
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for the jury to decide in terms of negligence and proximate cause." 2G
Thus, under the holding in Kline, the trier of the facts may hold the land-
lord liable for injury resulting from negligent failure to protect a tenant
from predictable criminal acts, as well as negligent failure to protect him
from physical defects in areas of his exclusive control.
The court grounded its third line of reasoning in common law. Rely-
ing on a footnote by Judge Wright in javins z. First National Realty Corp.2 7
(decided three months earlier by the same court), the court stated that
medieval common law concepts of agrarian leases obscure the modern
landlord-tenant relationship. It stated that the most analagous relationship
to the modern urban apartment dweller is not that of landlord-tenant
but rather innkeeper-guest.2 8 At common law, the innkeeper was generally
held liable for assaults by third parties if the innkeeper had not exercised'
reasonable care to protect the guest from abuse or molestation and if the
attack should have been anticipated.2 9
It should be noted, however, that the Kline court merely complicated
the issue of what standard of care is required, by its use of the term "duty
to protect." 30 While it seemed to be placing a new obligation on the land-
lord, arising out of the special relationship of landlord-tenant, the court
was doing no more than eliminkting the "no duty" immunity previously"
granted to the landlord against predictable criminal acts.3 ' That is to
say, by voluntarily entering into the special relationship 6f landlord-tenant,
the landlord assumes no special obligations save those of the ordinarily
careful and prudent man in the typical tort situation. The Kline decision
merely said that the laiidlord can no longer claim the immunity usually
granted to an individual to prevent him from being liable for failure to
protect another from predictable criminal acts.
It is still uncertain what verbal formulation of the standard of care
the trier of facts will be given to apply to the defendant's conduct. Follow-
ing the court's analogy to the innkeeper-guest relationship, one may find
trouble extrapolating an exact formulation. While most courts agree that
an innkeeper is held to a standard of reasonable care,3 2 there is some
26. Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 286 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See
also Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969) (tenant's al-
legations of negligence held sufficient to preclude summary judgment when tenant
alleged negligence in landlord's failure to take steps to protect tenant, although
he had kiiowledge of prior criminal activity); Mayor v. Housing Authority, 84
N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (1964) (public housing authority held liable for not
furnishing supervisory. personnel, rendering playground unsafe; based on reten-
tion of exclusive control).
27. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
28. 439 F.2d at 485.
29. See McKee v. Sheraton-Russell, Inc., F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959); Gurren v..
Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928). In both cases liability was based on
the innkeeper's supervision, care and control of the premises.
30. 439 F.2d at 485.
31. For cases where the landlord was held not liable for actions by criminal-
third parties, see Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Goldberg
v. Housing Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
82. See, e.g., McKee v. Sheraton-Russell, Inc., 268 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959)
(at least ordinary care required to protect guests from injury caused by employees,
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authority that an innkeeper may be held to a very high degree of care to
protect his guests.33 The court, however, simply stated that, while verbal
formulations of the standard of care vary, "in the last analysis the standard
is the same-reasonable care in all circumstances". 34
The court concluded that the "specific measures to achieve his stand-
ard vary with the individual circumstances".3 5 It held that- the specific
security measures in force at the time when the plaintiff first became, a
tenant3 6 were-within the "reasonable capacity" of the defendant-landlord
and that his abandonment of these measures constituted a.negligent act on
his part.3 7 Even though these particular measures were abandoned,. the.
landlord would not have been held. liable if he had- replaced .them with
measures of the same relative degree of security.33 In other words, the land-
lord is expected to take only those precautions that are within his reasonable
capacity to protect the tenants, but these precautions can change drastically
depending on the different factual context of each case.
The court then set out three major factors to be considered in deter-
mining the standard of care that was within the. reasonable capacity of
the defendant-landlord: (1) the standard of care taken among landlords
of the same class of buildings, 39 (2) the landlord's degree of:control over
the common area of danger and his power to take preventative actions
relating thereto,40 and (3) notice of crimes and the reasonable expectation
of their occurrences. 41  .
When considering these three factors, it is unclear what constitutes
notice. In Kline there had been some twenty thefts, but.only one case.of
an attempted assault and robbery 2 In his dissent, Judge MacKinnon
seriously questioned whether this constituted notice of assaults:..
It seems elementary that one solitary instance of an,:assault and
robbery is an insufficient base to support a finding that.ossaults
other guests and strangers); Burgauer v. McClellan, 205 Ky. 51, 265 S.W. 439 (1924);
Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 970, 973 (1962); Hill v. Merrick, 147 Ore.
244, 31 P.2d 663 (1934).
33. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iberville Amusement Co., 181 So. 817 (La. App. 1938);
Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 288 P. 309 (1930) (innkeeper-guest
relationship is identical to that of carrier-passenger and subject to the same degree
of care). .... .
34. 439 F.2d at 485 (emphasis added). This standard of'reasonable care in all
circumstances is simply the standard definition of negligence, i.e., that degree" of
care which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would use-under' the same or
similar circumstances.
35. Id at 486.
36. Id. at 479. The specific measures held in force at the time the" tenant be-
came an occupant included guards at all unlocked doors and at least one employee
at all times stationed at a desk near the elevator. But see DeKoven v. 780 W: End
Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y. City- Ct. 1965), where the
court held that incidents of crime impose no obligations upon the landlord to
provide doorman service where there is no contractual obligation to do so.
37. 439 F.2d at 487.
38. Id. at 486. The court said, as an example, that the number of guards might
have been'reduced had an intercom-automatic latch system been installed.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 481.
41. Id. at 483.
42. Id. at 489.
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and robberies are a "predictable risk" from which the landlord
would have "every reason to expect like crimes to happen again."
One swallow just does not make a whole summer. Assaults of this
nature are not predictable from dandestine thefts.4 a
The majority of the court seemed to hold that knowledge of any criminal
activity would provide notice of the possibility of future criminal acts
of the same general nature. But when does a crime fit in the same general
category of prior criminal activity? This question remains unanswered.
The court also failed to answer how many criminal acts are necessary
before the landlord is put on notice. The court, also confused the issue
by its elaborate formulations of the circumstances which may dictate
liability without emphasizing that this decision is always for the trier of
facts under appropriate -instructions from the court. The difficulty with
this sort of hypothesizing is that it implies that liability is automatic in
such situations, whereas, in fact, the hypotheses deal with types of situa-
tions in which the trier of fact may impose liability.
Wile in most jurisdictions the "no duty", immunity still gives the
landlord a pre-emptive defense in a tort action based upon a failure to
provide reasonable security measures for the protection of his tenants, the
District of Columbia Circuit has taken an important step in closing the
gap between modern urban needs and landlord-tenant law. By ruling that
a tenant has a submissible negligence case in such a situation, the court
has kept pace with the modern trend towards the elimination of immunities.
If there is'a shortcoming to the case, it is in the court's failure to make it
clear that it was only removing an immunity which 'previously prevented
the trier of facts from' rendering a verdict or judgment for the plaintiff,
and that it *as not holding, as a matter of law, that liability would be









CONFUSION IN DIVISION OF GIFTS TO "DESCENDANTS"
Mercantile Trust Co. National Associatidn v. Brown'
In 1913 Samuel Hoffman drafted a will with the aid of competent
legal counsel. The first 12 clauses of this will were clear. The 13th clause
provided for the creation of a trust, the income to be paid to Ruth Scott,
a niece, for life, and then to her daughter, Louise Scott Simpkins, for life,2
after which the trust terminated and was to be distributed "to the de-
scendants of my aforesaid grandniece, if there be such descendaints." 3
This action for a declaratory judgment was initiated by the trustee
after the death of the grandniece, Louise Scott Simpkins. She was survived
by two daughters, a granddaughter by a deceased third daughter, and a
son and grandson of one of the living daughters. The son and grandson
claimed that they were intended to share equally in the trust fund because
they were "descendants" as that word was defined in 1913. 4 The trial
court agreed and divided the residue of the trust into five equal parts.
The two daughters and the granddaughter appealed, contendifg that there
was no settled definition of the word "descendants" in 1913, and that a
per stirpes5 distribution was called for by the will-thus excluding children
with living parents or grandparents. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the trial court, and divided the trust into three parts. The
court held that there was not a settled meaning of the term' descendants"
in 1913, and therefore the way to decide what the testator intended when
he used this term was to take the definition of the term from the statute
of intestate descent.6 This decision resulted in a per stirjes, distribution,
and aligned Missouri with the majority of modern jurisdictions that have
decided the question of a "testator's intent [in providing] for distribution
of the residuary' trust to . . . descendant."7 A definition of "descendants"
that results in a per stirpes distribution, as this one does, is considered
the better rule because it is more representative of the average testator's
intent.8
1. 468 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1971).
2. The trust would have terminated upon Ruth Scott's death if Louise Scott
Simpkins had predeceased her. Id. at 10.
3. Id.
4. The time element is important in the consideration of this case, since
the general rule has changed since 1913.
5. This means by roots or stock, or by representation. Thus, a grandchild
would take the share of his deceased parent as his parent's representative, not as
a beneficiary in his own right. This term is also applied to the method of distribu-
tion popular in most statutes of intestate descent, which provide for a per capita
tistribution if the distributees are of equal degree of consanguinity, and a per stirpes
distribution if of unequal degree. See § 474.020, RSMo 1969.
6. 468 S.W.2d at 13-14.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Most courts would agree that the average testator would feel closer to
his children than more distant descendants, and would desire their shares to be
equal. In re Mayhew, 307 Pa. 84, 91, 160 A. 724, 726-27 (1932).
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The contrary English rule as to the meaning of "descendants" was
firmly established before the end of the 18th century.9 This rule provided
for a per capita'O distribution of a gift to "issue" 11 or "descendants," 12
regardless of degree of consanguinity.' 3 It was adopted in Ireland,14 On-
tario,' 5 and many American jurisdictions, 16 even though the rule was rec-
ognized by some as contrary to the intent of the testator.17 In order to avoid
9. Davenport v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. Jr. 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 999 (Rolls Ct. 1796);
Butler v. Stratton, 3 Brown Ch. 367, 29 Eng. Rep. 587 (1791); Crossley v. Clare, 1
Akmb. 397, 27 Eng. Rep. 264 (Ch. 1761); Wythe v. Thurlston, 1 Amb. 555, 27 Eng.
Rep. 355 (Ch. 1750); Cook v. Cook, 2 Vern. 545, 23 Eng. Rep. 952 (Ch. 1706).
10. This means distribution according to the number of individuals, equally.
As used in this note, unless otherwise indicated, it will refer to distribution unre-
stricted by degrees of consanguinity.
11. Davenport v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. Jr. 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 999 (Rolls Ct. 1796).
12. Crossley v. Clare, 1 Amb. 397, 27 Eng. Rep. 264 (Ch. 1761).
13. Freeman v. Parsley, 3 Ves. Jr. 421, 30 Eng. Rep. 1085 (Ch. 1797); Daven-
port v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. Jr. 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 999 (Rolls Ct. 1796); Crossley v.
Clare, 1 Amb. 397, 27 Eig. Rep. 264 (Ch. 1761). There are two reasons for the
English rule. Both are discussed in Annot., 5 A.L.R. 195, 196 (1920). The first is of
historical interest only. "The word 'issue' .... was synonymous with 'heirs of the
body' and created an estate in tail. . ." and had to include all descendents to make
the entail effective. The second reason is as follows:
A bequest to the issue of a man was a bequest to a class. All these [sic]
persons living at the time of the taking of the bequest, who were within
the designated class, took equally. If the word "issue" were [sic] given
the limited meaning of "children," then all the children living at that
time would take per capita. Children of deceased children, not being in
the class, would take nothing. If, however, the word "issue" was given the
meaning of descendants of every degree, than all that were in the designa-
tion of the class would share equally. As the right did not come through
the parent, but because the grandchild was an original object of the be-
quest, because of its being one of the class designated, the grandchil-
dren or great grandchildren would take per capita, and without regard
to stock. Id.
14. Hobbs v. Tuthill, 1 Ir. R. 115 (1895).
15. In re Davidson, 58 Ont. L.R. 597, affd, 59 Ont. L.R. 643 (1926).
16. Maryland: McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197 (1862); New Jersey: Walsh
v. Hulse,'23 N.J. Super. 573, 93 A.2d 230 (1952); New York: Soper v. Brown, 136
N.Y. 244, 32 N.E. 768 (1892); Ohio: Moon v. Hedford, 2 Ohio N.P. 365, 3 Ohio
Super. & C.P. Dec. 508 (1895); Pennsylvania: Wistar v. Scott, 105 Pa. 200 (1884);
Gest v. Way, 2 Whart. 445 (Pa. 1837); Rhode Island: Pearce v. Rickard, 18 R.I.
142, 26 A. 38 (1893); Tennessee: Ridley v. McPherson, 100 Tenn. 402, 43 S.W. 772(1897); Virginia: Crow v. Crow, 1 Leigh 74 (Va. 1829); Washington: Re Thomson,
168 Wash. 32, 10 P.2d 245 (1932). It has been argued that Kentucky and South
Carolina should be included in this list of jurisdictions that followed the English
rule, even though "issue" was qualified by the phrase "share and share alike" in
the cases in which they awarded per capita distribution. See Yarrington v. Freeman,
201 Ky. 135, 255 S.W. 1034 (1923), and Corbett v. Laurens, 23 S.C.Eq. 301 (1851).
The argument was that since Massachusetts had said that "share and share alike"
or "equally" used with "issue" did not require a per capita distribution, but may
mean equally between stirps, "the fact that a similar expression is used [with
'issue' or 'descendants'] does not furnish the reason for the holding that issue in-
dudes all descendants per capita." Kales, Meaning of the Word "Issue" in Gifts
to "Issue," 6 ILL. L. REV. 217, 220 n.10 (1911).
17. Petry v. Petry, 186 App. Div. 738, 175 N.Y.S. 30, affd without opposition,
227 N.Y. 621, 125 N.E. 924 (1919); Lea v. Lea, 145 Tenn. 693, 237 S.W. 59 (1922);
Cancellor v. Cancellor, 2 Dr. & Sm. 194, 62 Eng. Rep. 595 (Ch. 1862); Freeman v.
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this per capita distribution courts began interpreting "issue" as meaning
"children" whenever the words "parent," "mother, .... father," "brother," or
"sister" also appeared in the same clause.18 In this way competition of
children with their living parents was avoided, but at the cost of exclud-
ing all grandchildren, whether their parents were alive or not.' 9 As a
result, this "cure" was also avoided.20
The courts could also defeat the English rule by finding "slight evi-
dence" or a "faint glimpse" of an intent for a distribution other than per
capita.21 This evidence might consist of words Used in the clause concern-
ing "issue" or "descendants," such as "between"2 2 or "respective."23 The
result of this interpretation was a per stirpes distribution, or some other
result ascertained from the will.2 4 This method of "repudiation"2 5 is
still important in Tennessee, Virginia, and to some extent, New York,20
Parsley, 3 Ves. Jr. 421, 30 Eng. Rep. 1085 (Ch. 1797). In the Freeman case, Lord
Loughborough, in applying the common law rule, said-
I very strongly suspect, that in applying that to this will I am not acting
according to the intention: but I do not know, what enables me to con-
troul it. If a medium could be found between the total exdusion of the
grand-children, and the admission of them to share with the parents, the
nearest objects of the testator, that would be nearer the intention; as by
letting in those, whose parents were deceased, to take the share, the par-
ents, if living, would have taken: but that construction would be setting
up my own conjecture against the obvious sense of the words. 30 Eng. Rep.
at 1086-87.
18. Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. Jr. 523, 32 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ch. 1802); Annot, 83
A.L.R. 164, 173-74 (1933). "Issue" also meant children where it seemed to have
been used synonymously with "children." Craig v. Warner, 16 D.C. (5 Macky) 460
(1887); Arnold v. Alden, 173 I1. 229, 50 N.E. 704 (1898); Palmer v. Horn, 84 N.Y.
516 (1881).
19. Ralph v. Carrick, 11 Ch. D. 882 (1879).
20. Dolbeare v. Dolbeare, 124 Conn. 286, 199 A. 555 (1938); Rieck v. Rich-
ards, 40 Ohio App. 201, 178 N.E. 276 (1931); In re Swain, [1918] 1 Ch. 399; Ralph
v. Carrick, 11 Ch. D. 882 (1879); In re Kavanaugh's Will, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 120^ (1862);
Ross v. Ross, 20 Beav. 645, 52 Eng. Rep. 753 (Rolls Ct. 1855).
21. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Pell, 268 N.Y. 354, 197 N.E. 810(1935); In re Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 213 N.Y. 168, 107 N.E. 340 (1914); In re
Milnor's Estate, 87 Misc. 528, 149 N.Y.S. 1064 (1914); Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C.
505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926); Lea v. Lea, 145 Tenn. 693, 237 S.W. 59 (1922); Ward v.
Ottley, 66 Va. 639, 186 S.E. 25 (1936).
22. This usually indicates an intent for a per stirpes distribution. Record v.
Fields, 155 Md. 314, 55 S.W. 1021 (1900). But see In re Mays, 197 Mo. App. 555,
196 S.W. 1039 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917), where the court said that "between" was used
,s "among," which indicated a per capita intent.
23. Usually a per stirpes intent. Coulden v. Coulden, [1908] 1 Ch. 320.
24. The English courts had previously recognized the use of a per stirpes dis-
tribution only when they thought the will expressly provided for this. Robinson v.
Shepherd, 4 De G.J. & S. 129, 46 Eng. Rep. 865 (Ch. 1863); Robinson v. Sykes, 23
Beav. 40, 53 Eng. Rep. 16 (Rolls Ct. 1856).
25. Termed this in Note, Wills-Construction of a Will--"Issue" as a Word
of Purchase, 14 TEMp. L.Q. 289, 291 & n.16 (1940).
26. In re Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 213 N.Y. 168, 107 N.E. 340 (1914); White
v. Kane, 178 Tenn. 469, 159 S.W.2d 92 (1942); Lea v. Lea, 145 Tenn. 693, 237
S.W. 59 (1922); Ward v. Ottley, 66 Va. 639, 186 S.E. 25 (1936). In New York the
English rule has been changed by statute in regard to "issue," but with the term
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but is not .completely effective in these states because the English rule
still may be applied.27
The possible distribution will be influenced most by the definition
the court assigns to the word "issue," "descendants," or whatever general
term is in question. As the Missouri court observed, the terms "issue" and
"descendants" are often judged synonymous 2s and case law or statutes
that apply to one are logically assumed to apply to the other in the absence
of context to the contrary. Regrettably, however, this often has not been
true, and a, case or statute using one of the terms does not necessarily control
the use of the other.2 9
To avoid the disadvantages of the English rule, the Massachusetts
case of Jackson v. Jackson3o announced what became known as the Massa-
chusetts rule.8 ' This rule provided for a per stirpes distribution when the
words "issue" or "descendants" were used in the absence of any explanatory
context otherwise. 32 This rule is now widely accepted in the United States, 3
27. In re Gardiner, 20 Misc. 2d 722, 191 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sur. Ct. 1959); Third
Nat'l Bank v. Noel, 183 Tenn. 349, 192 S.W.2d 825 (1946).
28. 468 S.W.2d at 11 n.2. Other cases supporting this contention are: In re
Schoellkopf, 21 Misc. 2d 564, 197 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Frech, 130
Misc. 283, 224 N.Y.S. 285 (Sur. Ct. 1927); First Nat'l Bank v. Gaines, 15 Ohio Misc.
109, 237 N.E.2d 182 (1967); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128
W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946); Davenport v. Hanbury, 3 Ves. Jr. 257, 30 Eng.
Rep. 999 (Rolls Ct. 1796).
29. See,.e.g., Ralph v. Carrick, 11 Ch. D. 882 (1879) (holding that even though
"issue" had been construed as meaning "children," "descendants" would not be,
and adding that only in the language of lawyers were these two terms called
synonymous); Parrish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276, 106 S.W. 882 (1908) and James v.
Hooker, 172 N.C. 780, 90 S.E. 925 (1916) (both saying that only a decedent could
have "descendants," while "issue" was of broader import). These distinctions are
regrettable, not because of the results in the cases involved, but for their effect
on the rest of the law. There are many authorities that say the terms "issue" and
"descendants" are synonymous, yet distinctions had been made to such an extent
that as7 late s 1950 it was said that the general rule was that a gift to "descendants"
was divided per capita and one to "issue" was divided per stirpes. Annot., 13
A.L.R.2d 1023, 1030 (1950). More consistency in this area would be desirable,
whichever definition is favored.
30. 153 Mass. 374, 26 N.E. 1112 (1891).
31. Watson v. Watson, 34 Ohio App. 311, 171 N.E. 257 (1929).
32. Justice Field said:
We are of opinion that when by a will personal property is given in
trust to pay the income to a person during life, and on the death of such
person to pay the principal sum to his issue then living, it is to be pre-
sumed that the intention was that the issue should include all lineal de-
scendants, and that they should take per stirpes, unless from some other
language of the will a contrary intention appears.
Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 378, 26 N.E. 1112, 1113 (1891).
33. Connecticut: Warren v. First New Haven Nat'l Bank, 150 Conn. 120, 186
A.2d 794 (1962); Delaware: Wilmington Trust Co. v. Chapman, 20 Del. Ch. 67,
171 A. 222 (1934); District of Columbia: In re Robins' Estate, 38 F. Supp. 468
(D.D.C. 1941) (the court also considered the statute of intestate descent in mak-
ing its decision); Illinois: Wyeth v. Crane, 342 111. 545, 174 N.E. 871 (1931); Indi-
ana: Runyan v. Rivers, 99 Ind. App. 680, 192 N.E. 327 (1934) (dictum); Maryland:
Clarke v. Clarke, 222 Md. 153, 159 A.2d 362 (1960) (the court also considered
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 303 (1) (1940) in deciding the issue); Minnesota:
In re Thompson's Estate, 202 Minn. 648, 279 N.W. 574 (1938); New Hampshire:
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although prior to 1913, Massachusetts was the only state in which it was
applied and arguments had been advanced even then that it was not a
renunciation of the English rule.3 4
Other states have used different methods to accomplish a result similar
to that of the Massachusetts rule. South Carolina, as the Missouri court
noted,3 5 awarded distribution to "descendants" according to the statute
of intestate descent.3 6 This method of interpretation has been used in other
states since then,3 7 has been adopted by the Restatement of Property,3s
and is now the rule in Missouri. 39 But the propriety of using the statutes
governing intestate descent to interpret a will was hotly debated before
the Hoffman will was drafted,40 and the draftsman may have considered
statutory definitions of little value.
Merrow v. Merrow, 105 N.H. 103, 193 A.2d 19 (1963); Ohio: Watson v. Watson, 34
Ohio App. 311, 171 N.E. 257 (1929); Pennsylvania: In re Mayhew's Estate, 307.
Pa. 84, 160 A. 724 (1932); Wisconsin: In re Morawitz, 214 Wis. 595, 254 N.W. 345
(1934). It has been argued that states such as Kentucky (Crozier v. Crundall, 99 Ky.
202, 35 S.W. 546 (1896)) and Oregon (Gerrish v. Hinman, 8 Ore. 348 (1880))
should be listed here for awarding a per stirpes distribution when the testator left
a bequest "to my children and the issue of deceased children," the contention be-
ing that this phrase is only a more elaborate way of saying "to my issue." Brooks,
Meaning of the Word "Issue" in Gifts to "Issue"-Another View, 6 ILL. L. REv. 230,
236 (1911). But see Kales, supra note 16, at 221-22.
34. Professor Kales quoted from Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26 N.E.
1112 (1891), and then said: "It is difficult to tell ... whether this is dictum merely
or an actual decision. The subsequent Massachusetts cases still have the position of
the Massachusetts court in doubt." Kales, supra note 16, at 225. But see Brooks,
supra note 33, at 234.
35. 468 S.W.2d at 11-12.
36. Dixon v. Pendleton, 90 S.C. 8, 72 S.E. 501 (1911); Rembert v. Vetoe, 89
S.C. 198, 71 S.E. 959 (1911). The court made a point of defining "issue" as "heirs
of the body" to reach this result. "Issue" had been given this same definition in
England, but the distribution was still per capita. Roddy v. Fitzgerald, 10 Eng. Rep.
1518 (H.L. 1858).
37. Kentucky: Smith v. Thom, 158 Ky. 655, 166 S.W. 182 (1914); Michigan:
In re Horrie's Estate, 365 Mich. 448, 113 N.W.2d 793 (1962); North Carolina:
James v. Hooker, 172 N.G. 780, 90 S.E. 925 (1916); Oklahoma: Franklin v. Margay
Oil Co., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944); Vermont: In re Beach's Estate, 103
Vt. 70, 151 A. 654 (1930); In re Smith's Will, 95 Vt. 97, 112 A. 897 (1921); West
Virginia: Jones v. Hudson, 122 W. Va. 711, 12 S.E.2d 533 (1940).
38. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 303 (1) (1940):
When a conveyance creates a class gift by a limitation in favor of a
group described as the "issue of B," or as the "descendants of B," and
the membership in such class has been ascertained in accordance with the
rules stated in sections 292 and 294-299, then, unless a contrary intent
of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, dis-
tribution is made to such members of the class as would take, and in
such shares as they would receive, under the applicable law of intestate
succession if B had died intestate on the date of the final ascertainment
of the membership in the class, owning the subject matter of the class
gift.
39. 468 S.W.2d at 13-14.
40. The following states opposed using the statutes of intestate descent in
interpreting a will. New Hampshire: Cuthbert v. Laing, 75 N.H. 304, 73 A. 641
(1909); South Carolina: Wressenger v. Hunt, 30 S.C.Eq. 459 (1856); but see
Rembert v. Vetoe, 89 S.C. 198, 71 S.E. 959 (1911); Virginia: Walker v. Webster,
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A third way to avoid the English rule has been through the legisla-
ture. Five states presently have statutes designed to control the distribution
of a bequest to "issue" or "descendants." 4 1 Four such statutes had been
enacted before the Hoffman will was drafted.42 But statutes of this type
have met some obstacles in the courts of New York 43 and New Jersey44
which have made the interpretation of a will more confusing than before.
In Missouri prior to 1913 there had been no cases dealing with this
precise issue. However, an analogous issue arose in Record v. Field,45 where
a testator had left a bequest which was to be "equally divided between
the heirs" 40 of his two sons. The court decided that the gift was to be
divided in half, due to the use of the word "between." 47 But it also decided
95 Va. 377, 28 S.E. 570 (1897); West Virginia: Collins v. Feather, 52 W. Va. 107,
43 S.E. 323 (1903); but see Jones v. Hudson, 122 W. Va. 711, 12 S.E.2d 533 (1940).
Some states favored following the statutes of descent when in doubt as to
the testator's intent: Georgia: Fraser v. Dillon, 78 Ga. 474, 3 S.E. 695 (1887);
Indiana: Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N.E. 56 (1890); New Jersey: Stouten-
burgh v. Moore, 37 N.J.Eq. 63 (1883), aff'd without opposition, 38 N.J.Eq. 281
(1884); New York: Clark v. Leach, 46 Barb. 68 (N.Y. 1866); Pennsylvania: Minter's
Appeal, 40 Pa. I1l (1861). Three of this latter group of states also followed
the English rule at this time, showing that at least in these states the testator's
intent was not in doubt when he left a gift to "issue" or "descendants." The
three states were: New Jersey: Weehawken Ferry Co. v. Sisson, 17 N.J.Eq. 475
(1864); New York: Soper v. Brown, 136 N.Y. 244, 32 N.E. 768 (1892); and
Pennsylvania: Wistar v. Scott, 105 Pa. 200 (1884).
41. Montana: MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 91-218 (1947); New Jersey: N.J.
REv. STAT. § 3A:3A-1 (1952); New York: N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAW § 47-a (Mc-
Kinney 1949); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-6-9 (1956); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 74-2-18 (1953).
42. California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1334 (1909); Montana: Mont. Laws 1887,
at 358, § 491; Utah: Comp. LAws OF UTAH § 2784 (1907); Rhode Island: R.I.
GEN. LAws ch. 203, § 11 (1896). In California the words "issue" and "descend-
ants" that had been used in the former statute have been excluded. See CA.. PRoB.
CODE § 108 (West 1946). There is some speculation as to what is now the rule
in California. See Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Condition of
Survival, 49 CAL. L. REv. 297, 312-14 (1961).
43. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LA-w § 47-9 (McKinney 1949) provides:
If a person dying after this section takes effect shall devise or bequeath
any present or future interest in real or personal property to the "issue"
of himself or another, such issue shall, if in equal degree of consanguinity
to their common ancestor, take per capita, but if in unequal degree, per
stirpes, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will.
This statute was held not to apply when the word "descendants" was used, since
the legislature had used the word "issue" only, and distribution was awarded
by the common law rule. In re Gardiner, 20 Misc. 2d 722, 191 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sur.
Ct. 1959), followed in In re Estate of Phares, 38 Misc. 2d 1, 237 N.Y.S.2d 925
(Sur. Ct. 1963); contra, In re Palmer, 38 Misc. 2d 553, 237 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sur.
Ct. 1963); In re Schoellkopf, 21 Misc. 2d 524, 197 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
44. Plainfield Trust Co. v. Hagedorn, 28 N.J. 483, 147 A.2d 254 (1958).
Here the court said that the statute did not apply to the will of a man who died
before the statute was passed. This would seem desirable but for the fact that
the date of the testator's death could be controlling for 60 or 70 years.
45. 155 Mo. 314, 55 S.W. 1021 (1900).
46. Id. at 318, 55 S.W. at 1021.
47. See cases cited note 22 supra.
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that the gift was to the heirs as a class and that the distribution should be
per capita among them, even though there would be competition between
children and their living parents.4 8 The fact that the bequest was originally
divided into two classes could have been held to indicate an intention for
per stirpes distribution.4 9 As it was, the court demonstrated that it would
not hesitate to divide a class gift in general terms per capita, even if chil-
dren competed with living parents,50 thus leaving the door open for adop-
tion of the English rule.
The case of Wooley v. Hays,5 1 although not decided until 1920, also
allowed a per capita distribution. A testator had left a bequest to his "law-
ful heirs, share and share alike."8 2- The court said that the estate was to
be divided per capita among three brothers and the children of deceased
sisters, in accordance with the terms "share and share alike" and the overall
intent of the testator.5 3 The court added that the terms "heirs" or "lawful
heirs" would be construed as connoting a per stirpes distribution, as if
the testator had died intestate, in the absence of any language indicating
a different intention.5 4
These two cases are of minimal value in construing the Hoffman will
since "heirs" can have a broader meaning than "descendants," 55 and a
testator may have valued decisions from other states more highly in his
use of "descendants"6 in 1913. It was not until 1928 that there was any
real indication of how a Missouri court might construe this term. Then,
in Freund v. Schilling,5 7 the Kansas City Court of Appeals was confronted
with a provision stating that a gift was to be distributed "in equal shares
to the living lawful issue of my brother."' 8 Since the will had been written
by a man who died in Utah, the court felt that they should decide the
case on the basis of Utah statutes which provided for a per stirpes distribu-
48. Record v. Field, 155 Mo. 314, 325, 55 S.W. 1021, 1024 (1900).
49. Slattery v. Ryan, 233 Ky. 611, 26 S.W.2d 544 (1930).
50. It has since been suggested that this reasoning should not be followed,
though the testator in Mercantile could not, of course, have -known this. First
Trust Co. v. Myers, 351 Mo. 899, 174 S.W.2d 378 (1943).
51. 285 Mo. 566, 226 S.W. 842 (1920).
52. Id. at 573, 226 S.W. at 842.
53. Id. at 581, 226 S.W. at 815. The court said that the exclusion by the
testator of some members of the class by name, since they were well provided
for, revealed an intent to help the needy ones, and only the children of the
deceased children were needy in this case.
54. Id. at 578, 226 S.W. at 844.
55. [T]he word "descendant" in its technical sense comprises issue of
every degree .... [Tihere is a clear distinction between [descendant],
and such words and phrases as "heirs" and "legal heirs," the latter being
descriptive of a status given by law rather than connoting relationship
to the testator by consanguinity.
Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, , 37. S.E.2d
563, 568 (1946).
56. Lich v. Lich, 158 Mo. App. 400, 138 S.W. 558 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911),
defined "descendants" as all who proceed from the body, including children,
grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, but did not decide what distribution
resulted when this term was used alone. Id. at 420, 138 S.W. at 564.
57. 222 Mo. App. 901, 6 S.W.2d 673 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
58. Id. at 902, 6 S.W.2d at 673.
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tion59 The court added that they would have found for this distribution
of a gift to "issue" anyway, claiming that the weight of authority in this
country indicated that this would be correct.60 However, the phrase "in
equal shares" may have changed the court's opinion in this case. 1
Since these observations were but dicta in 1928, a competent lawyer
in 1913 would, or should, have known that at that time the more orthodox
view was that a per capita distribution resulted from a gift to "descend-
ants."62 Even though the English rule was not followed in all states at
that time,63 and had been criticized over 100 years before,64 it was being
or would be followed in many states as the general rule.65 Most of these
states would adopt a method of per stirpes distribution later,66 but the
argument that a gift to "descendants" connoted a per. capita distribution in
1913 is more convincing.67
That is of little importance now. Whether the.decision in Mercantile
reflected the testator's intent or not, the court used this opportunity to
adopt the better rule of distribution for a gift to "descendants."6 8 The
question now. is: What does this decision mean to the practicing bar?
59. Id. at 904-05, 6 S.W.2d at 674-75.
60. Id. at 905, 6 S.W.2d at 675. The court said:'
Unless the words "in equal shares", found in the will, throw some light
on the question, even without the Laws of the State of Utah, we would
construe the will as the statutes of that State have provided, following
the weight of authority in this country.
61. Id. at 906, 6 S.W.2d at 675. The court said:
Were we to resort to rules of construction, other than those laid down by
the statutes of Utah, we would probably resolve that ambiguity in favor
of a distribution on a per capita basis, although there is ample authority
upon which to decide the ambiguity in favor of the per stirpes rule. (Cita-
tions omitted.)
62. Kales, supra note 16, at 220 n.10; Brooks, supra note 33, at 230 (Brooks
is opposed to this view, but admits that it was the more orthodox at that time).
The so-called general rule at the time of the Hoffman will is expressed in Lever-
ing v. Orrick, 97 Md. 139, 145, 54 A. 620, 622 (1902), where the court said:
In bequests to descendants equally, or to all the descendants of any
person, or to the descendants simply, the rule is that all take per capita
unless a contrary intention appears.
63. California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1334 (1909); Massachusetts: Jackson v.
Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26 N.E. 1112 (1891); Montana: Mont. Laws 1877, at 358,
§ 491; Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws ch. 203, § 11 (1896); South Carolina: Rembert
v. Vetoe, 89 S.C. 198, 71 S.E. 959 (1911); Utah: Comxp. LAws OF UTAH § 2785 (1907).
64. Freeman v. Parsley, 3 Ves. Jr. 421, 30 Eng. Rep. 1085 (Ch. 1797).
65. See cases cited note 16 supra.
66. By case law: Maryland: Clarke v. Clarke, 222 Md. 153, 159 A.2d 362
(1960); Ohio: Watson v. Watson, 34 Ohio App. 311, 171 N.E. 257 (1929); Pennsyl-
vania: In re Mayhew, 307 Pa. 84, 160 A. 724 (1932). By statute: New Jersey: N.J.
REv. STAT. § 3A:3A-1 (1953); New York: N.Y. DECFD. EST. LAw § 47-a (Mc-
Kinney 1949); Rhode Island: R.I. GFN. LAWs ch. 203, § 11 (1896).
67. See note 62 supra.
68. See RESTATEMENT Or PROPERTY § 303 (1) (1940); Brooks, supra note 33;
Brown, The Testator's Intent-Vague Meanings of Clear Sounding Phrases, 69
W. VA. L. R.v. 133 (1967); Schnebly, Testamentary Gifts to "Issue," 35 YALE L.J.
571 (1926); Comment, Wills-Construction-Meaning of "Issue" in Testamentary
Gifts, 37 MicH. L. REv. 630 (1939); Notes, Distribution to "Issue;" 21 MD. L. REv.
242 (1961); Wills-Construction-Effect of Devise "to A for life and then to his
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In view of the past history of this issue, there are still several direc-
tions in which a court could go. It is hoped that future cases with "issue,"
"lineal descendants," and other general phrases will be decided in the
same manner as this case. Logically this will follow, but the Missouri court
only acknowledged in a footnote that "descendants" and "issue" were "prac-
tically synonymous." 69 In New York, where these terms were once inter-
changeable,7 0 there is now debate as to whether a statute in which "issue"
only was used applies to "descendants" as well.71
It must also be remembered that there are many cases in Missouri
that say that the terms "equally" and "share and share alike" indicate
a per capita distribution.72 This may be true even when the statute of
intestate descent would be applied to the terms otherwise.7 3 While there
is authority to support the opposite view,7 4 the court could divide a gift
to "descendants equally, share and share alike" per capita, saying there is
no doubt in the definition of these terms.
How can unwanted results be avoided? Only by carefully drafting
a will to say exactly what is meant. A lawyer cannot rely upon the courts
or the legislature to define all words as his testator does. If a testator
desires to leave a gift to all of his descendants equally, without regard to
their respective degrees of consanguinity to him, the will should be phrased
to say just that. It should be clearly expressed that children may compete
with living parents or grandparents.
If, as is more likely, the testator desires to leave the gift to his de-
scendants per stirpes, he has two methods from which to choose. If the
statute of intestate descent describes the desired form of distribution, then
a phrase such as "by the laws of the state" or "by the Statute of Descent"
is usually sufficient to accomplish this result.7 5 A per stirpes distribution
issue," 37 N.D.L. REV. 126 (1961); Wills-Construction of a Will-"Issue" as a
Word of Purchase, 14 TEAP. L.Q. 289 (1940); The Meaning of "Issue," 7 Wst.
Rs. L. REV. 186 (1956).
69. 468 S.W.2d at 11 n.2.
70. In re Estate of Frech, 130 Misc. 283, 224 N.Y.S. 285 (Sur. Ct. 1927).
71. See cases cited note 43 supra.
72. See Wooley v. Hays, 285 Mo. 566, 226 S.W. 842 (1920); Mavrakos v.
Papadimitriou, 331 S.W.2d 161 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); In re Mays, 197 Mo. App.
555, 196 S.W. 1039 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917).
73. Wooley v. Hays, 285 Mo. 566, 226 S.W. 842 (1920).
74. Hall v. Hall, 140 Mass. 267, 2 N.E. 700 (1885); First Nat'l Bank v.
Gaines, 43 Ohio Op. 2d 101, 237 N.E.2d 182 (P. Ct. 1967).
75. Zombro v. Moffett, 329 Mo. 137, 44 S.W.2d 149 (1931); Lawton v.
Corlies, 127 N.Y. 100, 27 N.E. 847 (1891); Holloway v. Radcliffe, 23 Beav. 163,
53 Eng. Rep. 64 (Rolls Ct. 1857). Most statutes of descent are very similar to
§ 474.020, RSMo 1969, which provides:
When several lineal descendants, all of equal degree of consanguinity to
the intestate, or his father, mother, brothers and sisters, or his grand-
fathers, grandmothers, uncles and aunts, or any ancestor living and their
children, come into partition, they shall take per capita, that is, by per-
sons; where a part of them are dead, and part living, and the issue of
those dead have a right to partition, such issue shall. take per stirpes;
that is, the share of the deceased parent.
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will also result from a clause that says "children of deceased children
are to take their parent's share by representation.'" 6
In addition, as the Mercantile case held, a per stirpes distribution will
result from a gift to "descendants." This decision has placed Missouri
firmly with almost all jurisdictions in the United States that have con-
sidered this issue. Hopefully, Missouri will remain with the majority, and
will follow this decision when similar problems arise-72
ROBERT J. BLACKWELL
76. This was sufficient to gain a per stirpes distribution even in 19th century
England. Robinson v. Shepherd, 4 De G.J. & S. 129, 46 Eng. Rep. 865 (Ch. 1863);
Robinson v. Sykes, 23 Beav. 40, 53 Eng. Rep. 16 (Rolls Ct. 1856). The phrase
"to my descendants, per stirpes" may not be sufficient as the words "per stirpes"
may be overlooked as surplusage when considered with the rest of the will.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Farley, 127 N.J.Eq. 346, 13 A.2d 313, aff'd sub noin.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Stridsberg, 129 N.J.Eq. 386, 19 A.2d 460 (1941);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1023, 1030 (1950). Also, if a per stirpes distribution is
awarded, there may be some confusion as to heads of stirps if all of one degree
of relation predecease the testator, and this contingency has not been provided
for. L. SiMs & A. SMrrH, THE LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESRs § 744 (2d ed. 1956).
77. For additional treatment of this subject see L. SImES & A. SMrrH, THE
LAw oF FUTURE INTER.srs §§ 738, 743-44 (2d ed. 1956); Annots., 13 A.L.R.2d
1023, 1037 (1950), 126 A.L.R. 157, 170 (1940), 117 A.L.R. 691, 706 (1938), 78
A.L.R. 1385, 1397 (1932), 31 A.L.R. 799, 804 (1924), 16 A.L.R. 15, 54 (1922), 2
A.L.R. 930, 963 (1919).
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